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Abstract 
Approximately 60% of human pathogens and emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic. 
Simulation models are increasingly being used to investigate the spread of diseases, 
evaluate intervention strategies and guide the decisions of policy makers. In this thesis a 
systematic review of modeling methods and approaches used for zoonotic influenza in 
animals and humans was conducted, and knowledge gaps were identified. Furthermore, 
the disease spread and intervention parameters used in these studies were summarized 
for ready reference in future work. 
Building on this review work, the research presented in this thesis evaluated the 
effects of transmissibility of the pandemic H1N1 2009 (pH1N1) virus at the swine-
human interface and the control strategies against its spread in swine and human 
populations as a case study for zoonotic disease modeling. The feasibility of North 
American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM) for modeling directly transmitted 
zoonoses was also assessed. Population data based on swine herds and households 
(categorized as rural households with or without swine workers, and urban households 
without swine workers) of a county in Ontario, Canada was used. The swine workers 
served as a bridging population for the spread of the virus between swine herds and 
households. Scenarios based on the combinations of the transmissibility of the virus 
(low (L), medium (M), and high (H)) from swine-to-human and human-to-swine (LL, 
ML, HL, MM, HM, LL), and targeted vaccination of swine worker households (0% to 
60%) were evaluated. The results showed that lowering the influenza transmissibility at 
the interface to low level and providing higher vaccine coverage (60%) had significant 
  x 
beneficial effects on all outcome measures. However, these measures had little or 
negligible impact on the total number of rural and urban households infected. A set of 
models evaluating the combination of control strategies indicated that a moderate speed 
of the detection (within 5 to 10 days of the first infection), combined with the quarantine 
of detected units alone, contained the outbreak within the swine population in most 
simulations. However, a zone-based quarantine strategy was more effective when the 
detection was delayed until around three weeks after initial infection. Ring vaccination 
had no added beneficial effect. This work suggested that NAADSM can be used for 
modeling the directly transmitted zoonotic diseases under similar simplifying 
assumptions adopted in these studies. However, this needs to be evaluated further with 
more accurate parameters and influenza outbreak data. 
To fill in some of the gaps identified in the review study, network analyses of swine 
shipments among farms, and between farms and abattoirs were conducted. This 
provided network metrics and parameters necessary for disease modeling and risk-based 
disease management in swine in Ontario for the first time. Finally, agent-based network 
models assessing the spread and control of pH1N1 in swine established the importance 
of explicitly incorporating appropriate contact network structures into such models to 
increase their validity. It also demonstrated the benefits of targeted control strategies 
against highly connected farms. In conclusion, the modeling tools developed in this 
thesis can assist decision makers in preparedness and response of outbreaks of infectious 
diseases as more information become available for the parameterization of models. 
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Approximately 58% of the human pathogens and 60% of emerging infectious diseases 
are zoonotic diseases (Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria, 2005, Jones et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, the incidence of zoonotic disease continues to increase and is causing 
significant impact on global health and economies (Jones et al., 2008). The main reasons 
for the increasing incidence of zoonoses include: population growth and climate change, 
the intensification of animal production systems, increased interaction between people, 
domestic and wild animals, and globalization which leads to increasing international 
movements of people, animals and food (Kuiken et al., 2006, Jones et al., 2008, Lloyd-
Smith et al., 2009a, Woolhouse, 2011). These factors are decreasing the extent of 
geographical, environmental, or behavioral barriers that limit transmission of pathogens 
between different species of animals, and between animals and humans. In addition, 
they facilitate the evolution of pathogens and their adaptability in new host species 
(Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria, 2005, Kuiken et al., 2006). The infectious nature 
and multihost ecology of zoonoses result in a complex non-linear transmission dynamics 
within or between different species of populations that necessitates new approaches and 
analytical tools for understanding the patterns of disease spread and the development of 
effective control policies. Mathematical and computer simulation modeling have been 
identified as one of the important tools for these purposes and are becoming routinely 
used tools for disease management (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2009a, Woolhouse, 2011).  
A literature survey of modeling studies focusing on zoonotic diseases found that most 
of these studies are limited to dynamics of zoonoses in a single host species, either in the 
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reservoir animal species or human populations. They found only six studies that 
considered animal-to-human spillover for directly transmitted zoonotic disease, which is 
the most crucial phase of zoonotic dynamics (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2009b). Therefore 
there is a need to direct more modeling research on the zoonotic diseases at the animal-
human interface, and how the spread at the interface would affect the spread and control 
measures in animal and human populations. Zoonoses is a broad topic consisting of a 
wide-spectrum of infectious agents with diverse and complex biology, life cycles, and 
host-species interactions. Amongst zoonotic diseases, pandemics caused by influenza A 
viruses still remains a major threat to mankind, occurring over the intervals of one to 
four decades since pandemic H1N1 in 1918 (Brown, 2000, Ma et al., 2009, Zimmer and 
Burke, 2009). It causes significant public health, livelihood and economic impact 
(Meltzer et al., 1999, Fiore et al., 2008). In addition, unlike many other directly 
transmitted zoonotic diseases where the transmission of a disease is limited to single 
host species after crossing the interspecies barrier, influenza A viruses circulating in 
swine and human population (H1, H2, H3 subtypes) have been shown easily 
transmissible between swine and people, particularly the pH1N1 virus. Therefore, for 
simplicity pH1N1 transmission dynamic at the swine-human interface and effect of 
control strategies were investigated as a case study for zoonotic diseases modeling. 
1.1 Influenza viruses 
Influenza viruses belong to a family Orthomyxoviridae and consist of three types, 
influenza A, B and C (Baigent and McCauley, 2003, Alexander, 2007). Influenza viruses 
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are made of a negative sense, single strand RNA genome divided into eight (type A and 
B) or seven (type C) linear segments. Influenza type A viruses can infect a range of 
mammalian and avian species naturally, while the type B is known to infect only 
humans and seals, and the type C infects humans and swine only. The influenza A and B 
viruses cause a wide range of severe respiratory diseases and occasionally encephalitis, 
whereas the type C only causes mild respiratory tract infection in the hosts (Baigent and 
McCauley, 2003, Alexander, 2007). Only the type A viruses have been associated with 
the major human influenza pandemics. Influenza A viruses are further classified into 
subtypes based on their two surface antigens, haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase 
(NA). There are 17 HA (H1±H17) and 10 NA (N1±N10) subtypes, with a particular 
virus containing one each of HA and NA antigens in any combinations, thus resulting in 
many subtypes (Baigent and McCauley, 2003, Alexander, 2007, Tong et al., 2012). The 
aquatic birds (waterfowl, shorebirds and gulls) are the natural reservoir of influenza 
viruses from which mammalian influenza viruses are directly or indirectly derived 
(Hinshaw et al., 1981, Baigent and McCauley, 2003, Alexander, 2007). To date human 
viruses are limited to H1, H2, H3, N1 and N2 subtypes, whereas only H5 and H7 are 
known to cause highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in birds. Low pathogenic H5 
and H7 viruses also exist in birds. The main influenza viruses circulating in swine across 
the world include subtypes H1N1 (DOVRNQRZQDVµFODVVLFDO¶VZLQHLQIOXHQ]DYLUXV), 
H1N2, H3N2 and pH1N1 2009 viruses (Torremorell et al., 2012). Although pigs can be 
infected with HPAI H5N1 virus, both field and experimental evidences show they are 
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less susceptible to the virus (Lipatov et al., 2008, Cao et al., 2013). However, some 
evidence of the virus circulating in pigs at low prevalence without exhibiting clinical 
signs has been reported, indicating the virus may be adapting to pigs (Nidom et al., 
2010). Its adaption to pigs is further reinforced by the experimental evidence where the 
H5N1 viruses isolated from pigs in Indonesia were found less harmful to mice than the 
viruses isolated from chickens (Takano et al., 2009). If H5N1 viruses adapt to pigs, a 
novel virus of pandemic potential may evolve over time through reassortment with other 
influenza viruses circulating in pigs at the same. 
The evolution of different influenza virus subtypes occurs as a result of the molecular 
changes in the eight RNA segments by: (i) point mutations or antigenic drift - resulting 
from changes in the antigenic sites of HA and NA surface proteins, and (ii) gene 
reassortment or antigenic shift that results from the introduction of HA and/or NA genes 
from an animal-derived influenza virus to the circulating human virus, generating a 
novel influenza A subtypes. This antigenic shift is responsible for causing major 
influenza pandemics, whereas the antigenic drift causes seasonal influenza epidemics. 
Recently human infections have also resulted from complete avian viruses causing 
fatalities (H5N1 and H7N9) or non-fatal diseases (H7N7 and H9N2) (Baigent and 
McCauley, 2003, Alexander, 2007, Gao et al., 2013, Uyeki and Cox, 2013). A 
comprehensive review on avian influenza viruses and factors associated with virus 
virulence, host-diversity and cross-species transmission of influenza A viruses in 
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humans are provided by Alexander (2007) and Baigent and McCauley (2003), 
respectively. 
The first anecdotal evidence of epizootic influenza outbreak in swine prior to the 
influenza pandemic in 1918 was documented in England in 1892, coinciding with the 
influenza pandemic of 1889 (Baigent and McCauley, 2003, Morens and Taubenberger, 
2013). Before 1892, influenza outbreaks have been reported mainly in equine (from 
1647 to 1917) often associated temporally and geographically to epidemics of human 
influenza. This shift in the epizootiological patterns of influenza from horse to swine 
after 1918 has been speculated as a result of co-adaptation of human influenza A viruses 
to domestic mammals in close proximity to each other and to humans, coinciding with 
the intensification of swine production in modern era with relative decrease in equine 
population and human-equine interaction (Morens and Taubenberger, 2013). 
Since the first report of transmission of the H1N1 1918 virus from humans-to-pigs 
(Shope, 1931), the transmission of influenza A viruses between people and swine has 
been well documented (Hinshaw et al., 1978, Easterday, 1980, Dacso et al., 1984, Myers 
et al., 2007). Pigs can be infected by both avian and human influenza viruses. There is 
much evidence of reassortments of swine, human and avian influenza viruses occurring 
in pigs in Europe (Brown et al., 1998) and in North America (Zhou et al., 1999, Karasin 
et al., 2000, Lekcharoensuk et al., 2006, Olsen et al., 2006). The transmission of 
influenza viruses from pigs to people were commonly reported (Brown, 2000, Myers et 
al., 2007, Robinson et al., 2007, Ma et al., 2009, Zimmer and Burke, 2009). The pH1N1 
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also rapidly spread from humans to swine since its first case reported on a swine farm in 
Alberta, Canada (Howden et al., 2009). Several reverse zoonosis of pH1N1 continue to 
be reported from across the world (Hofshagen et al., 2009, OIE, 2009-2010, Song et al., 
2010, Forgie et al., 2011, Nelson et al., 2012, Torremorell et al., 2012). Recently the 
transmission of the H3N2 variant from pigs-to-humans, and a subsequent limited spread 
between humans, was reported in the United States (US) (Lindstrom et al., 2012). Cross-
sectional serological studies found that occupations involving direct contact with pigs 
(e.g. swine-farmers, veterinarians, abattoir-workers) are at higher risk of zoonotic 
influenza infection. Swine farmers are relatively at higher risk than veterinarians and 
abattoir-workers (Olsen et al., 2002, Myers et al., 2006). The persistent transmission 
pressure between swine and workers increases the opportunity for zoonotic spread of 
novel influenza viruses (Myers et al., 2006). As such, swine are considered to be 
potential hosts for the emergence of novel pandemic influenza viruses, and it is 
important to understand the transmission dynamics of influenza at the swine-human 
interface. 
1.2 Modeling approaches to contagious diseases 
Mathematical and computer simulation models are being widely used, inter alia, to 
investigate the patterns and extent of spread of diseases, evaluate intervention strategies, 
assess and develop contingency plans, and guide policy decision makers. Examples 
include, pandemic influenza (Longini et al., 2004, Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 
2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, Halloran et al., 2008, Fraser et al., 2009) and severe acute 
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respiratory syndrome (SARS) (Lipsitch et al., 2003, Lloyd-Smith et al., 2003, Riley et 
al., 2003, Gumel et al., 2004) in human populations, and the foot-and-mouth disease 
(FMD) outbreak of 2001 in the United Kingdom (Jalvingh et al., 1999, Ferguson et al., 
2001c, Ferguson et al., 2001a, Morris et al., 2001, Shirley and Rushton, 2005a, Kiss et 
al., 2006b). Recently, rapid growth in the application of simulation models was observed 
mainly due to the UK FMD outbreak of 2001 and the emergence of zoonotic diseases 
such as SARS, H5N1, and pH1N1 (Lee et al., 2009b, Lloyd-Smith et al., 2009b). These 
diseases caused significant adverse socio-economic and animal welfare impacts, and 
notable public health concerns. Concurrently, modeling approaches have also become 
increasingly complex, evolving from simple deterministic compartmental models, also 
NQRZQDVµDJJUHJDWH¶RUµV\VWHPG\QDPLF¶PRGHOV (SDMs) (Mills et al., 2004, Arino et 
al., 2008, Brauer, 2008) to stochastic individual-based or agent-based models (ABMs) 
(Germann et al., 2006, Lee et al., 2009a, Yang et al., 2009, Tsai et al., 2010). Agent-
based models offer the advantages of greater flexibility to incorporate individual-level 
heterogeneities such as age, sex, risk of susceptibility to an infection, historical health 
information (for example vaccination status, waning immunity, etc.) as well as spatial 
locations. In addition, tracing of infected individuals and its contacts, and targeted 
intervention measures can be easily implemented in this type of models. Some 
limitations of ABMs are: they are more computationally intensive and time consuming, 
difficulty in parameterization of a model as it require detail individual-level information 
(such as individual contact pattern, etc.), which are often difficult to collect, and 
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difficulty to perform sensitivity analyses (Brauer, 2008, Gojovic et al., 2009).A growing 
number of modeling studies have also extended the individual-based models further by 
explicitly incorporating either empirical or theoretical networks for disease spread and 
intervention measures in human populations (Riley et al., 2003, Eubank et al., 2004, 
Shirley and Rushton, 2005b, Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008) and animal populations 
(Green et al., 2006, Kao et al., 2006, Kiss et al., 2006b, Kiss et al., 2006a, Kiss et al., 
2008, Sharkey et al., 2008, Vernon and Keeling, 2009, Dürr et al., 2013, Fournié et al., 
2013). As individuals have contacts only with a limited set of other individuals in a 
population (although this number can vary widely), network models based on scale-free, 
small-world or spatial networks add more realism to the system being modeled 
compared with random mixing models. Furthermore, the frequency and patterns of these 
contacts will represent different network topologies influencing a disease spread and 
effectiveness of disease control strategies in a population. The advancement in the 
modeling approaches is facilitated by the availability of modern high-power computers, 
advanced modeling software and increasing data being available (Morris et al., 2001, 
Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008, Lloyd-Smith et al., 2009b, Vernon and Keeling, 2009, 
Stevenson et al., 2013). 
 6LPXODWLRQPRGHOVHQDEOHUHVHDUFKHUVWRVLPXODWHWKRXVDQGVRIYLUWXDOµZKDWLI¶
experiments of disease outbreaks and evaluate the effectiveness of control strategies 
under a range of scenarios. Such experiments cannot be implemented in real-world 
situations for ethical, economical and logistical reasons (Keeling and Rohani, 2008, 
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Lloyd-Smith et al., 2009b, Vynnycky and White, 2010). Through these experiments, 
modelers can examine in detail the effects of parameters of interest, be they represent 
population dynamics, biological factors, or disease control. The fact that they are an 
abstract and simplified representation of a real-world, models have been used 
meaningfully to support policy decisions both at the national level during the FMD 
outbreak of 2001 in UK (Jalvingh et al., 1999, Ferguson et al., 2001b, Morris et al., 
2001), and at the global level for SARS (Lipsitch et al., 2003, Lloyd-Smith et al., 2003, 
Riley et al., 2003, Gumel et al., 2004, Hsieh et al., 2007) and pH1N1 outbreaks (air 
travel ban was avoided based on the findings of Cooper et al., (2006) and Hollingsworth 
et al., (2006). 
1.3 Objectives 
The objectives of this research relate to the application of simulation modeling of 
infectious zoonotic diseases. In particular, modeling the effect of the transmissibility of 
pH1N1 virus at the animal-human interface and its impact on disease spread was 
addressed as a broadly representative case study. The pH1N1 virus was chosen as an 
example because: (a) it is easily transmissible from human-to-human, swine-to-swine 
and between human and swine populations, (b) information about the biology of this 
virus is relatively abundant, and (c) there were several questions arising from pH1N1 
concerning its dynamics at the human-to-swine interface. 
Specifically, the research objectives were to: 
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 Carry out a systematic review of different modeling methods and approaches for 
zoonotic influenza in human and animal populations, particularly those related to 
the animal-human interface, and identify gaps in the knowledge of influenza 
transmission dynamics in animals and at the animal-human interface. 
Furthermore, it was also aimed to summarize parameters used in these modeling 
studies for ready reference in future works (Chapter 2). 
 Assess the effects of the disease spread parameters on transmission between 
human and animal populations, and the benefit of targeted vaccination of swine-
workers (Chapter 3). 
 Assess the effectiveness of a combination of different intervention strategies 
such as the speed of detection of outbreaks, quarantine, movement control and 
ring vaccination strategies against the spread of the disease between swine, 
human, and swine and human populations (Chapter 4). 
 Assess the feasibility of using NAADSM for modeling the spread and control of 
directly transmitted zoonotic diseases (Chapters 3 to 4). 
 Carry out network analysis of swine shipments among farms to estimate farm 
and network level metrics, and parameters necessary for modeling of infectious 
diseases and supporting risk-based disease management strategies in swine 
populations in Ontario, Canada (Chapter 5). 
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 Assess the effects of network topologies (random, scale-free and small-world 
networks) on the spread and control of pH1N1 virus among farms using the 
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Increasing incidences of emerging and re-emerging diseases that are mostly zoonotic 
(e.g. SARS, avian influenza H5N1, pandemic influenza) have led to the need for a 
multidisciplinary approach to tackling these threats to public and animal health. 
$FFRUGLQJO\DJOREDOPRYHPHQWRI³2QH-+HDOWK³2QH-0HGLFLQH´have been launched 
to foster collaborative efforts amongst animal and human health officials and 
researchers to address these problems. Historical evidence points to the fact that 
pandemics caused by influenza A viruses remain a major zoonotic threat to mankind. 
Recently a range of mathematical and computer simulation modeling methods and tools 
have increasingly been applied to improve our understanding of disease transmission 
dynamics, contingency planning and to support policy decisions on disease outbreak 
management. This review provides an overview of methods, approaches and software 
used for modeling the spread of zoonotic influenza viruses in animals and humans, 
particularly those related to the animal-human interface. Modeling parameters used in 
these studies are summarized to provide references for future work. This review 
highlights the limited application of modeling research to influenza in animals and at the 
animal-human interface, in marked contrast to the large volume of its research in human 
populations. Although, swine are widely recognized as a potential host for generating 
novel influenza viruses, and some of these viruses, including pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009, have been shown to be readily transmissible between humans and swine, 
only one study was found related to the modeling of influenza spread at the swine-
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human interface. Significant gaps in the knowledge of frequency of novel viral strains 
evolution in pigs, farm-level natural history of influenza infection, incidences of 
influenza transmission between farms and between swine and humans are clearly 
evident. Therefore, there is a need to direct additional research to the study of influenza 
transmission dynamics in animals and at the animal-human interface. 




Mathematical and computer simulation models are increasingly being used to 
characterize the transmission dynamics of infectious diseases, to evaluate the 
effectiveness of various intervention strategies and to guide policy decisions on disease 
outbreak management. Examples include, the UK foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) 
outbreak in 2001(Ferguson et al., 2001b, Ferguson et al., 2001a, Keeling et al., 2001, 
Morris et al., 2001), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 (Lipsitch et al., 
2003, Lloyd-Smith et al., 2003, Riley et al., 2003, Gumel et al., 2004), and pandemic 
influenza (Longini et al., 2004, Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, 2006, 
Flahault et al., 2006, Germann et al., 2006, Halloran et al., 2008, Flahault et al., 2009, 
Fraser et al., 2009, Gojovic et al., 2009, Yang et al., 2009). The application of disease 
modeling has grown significantly since 2003 following the outbreaks of SARS and the 
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemics caused by the H5N1 virus in Asia 
(from its perceived threat of generating a pandemic influenza strain) as highlighted by 
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Lloyd-Smith et al. (2009) and Keeling and Rohani (2008), and more recently after 
pH1N1 2009 outbreak. Models have also become increasingly complex, evolving from 
simple deterministic compartmental models (Mills et al., 2004, Arino et al., 2008, 
Brauer, 2008) to stochastic individual-based models (Germann et al., 2006, Carpenter 
and Sattenspiel, 2009, Yang et al., 2009, Lee et al., 2010a, Tsai et al., 2010); with 
stochastic individual-based network models (Ajelli and Merler, 2008, Davey et al., 
2008, Chao et al., 2010) adding ever more realism through the use of computer 
simulation. 
The emergence of zoonotic diseases such as SARS, HPAI caused by H5N1 and 
pH1N1 2009, together with the recognition that 58% of known human pathogens 
(Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria, 2005) and 60% of emerging infectious disease 
(Jones et al., 2008) are zoonotic diseases has heightened research interest in zoonosis. 
Recognizing the need for a multidisciplinary approach in tackling these emerging public 
KHDOWKFRQFHUQVDJOREDOPRYHPHQWRQ³2QH-Health / One-0HGLFLQH´ZDVLQLWLDWHGWR
foster and facilitate collaborative efforts amongst animal and human health professionals 
(Harper et al., 2004). Historical evidence points to the fact that pandemics from 
influenza A viruses still remain one of the major zoonotic threats to mankind, occurring 
over intervals of one to four decades since pandemic influenza caused by H1N1 in 1918 
(Brown, 2000, Ma et al., 2009, Zimmer and Burke, 2009), with significant public health, 
livelihood and economic consequences (Meltzer et al., 1999, Fiore et al., 2008). The 
pH1N1 2009 also rapidly spread from humans to swine, with the first case reported on a 
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swine farm in Alberta, Canada on 28 April 2009 (OIE, 2009). This was linked to a 
carpenter employed in a swine barn, who was infected with the virus during his trip to 
Mexico (Howden et al., 2009). Subsequently, several other countries reported outbreaks 
in swine (20 countries as of 28 April 2010), while cases were also reported on two 
turkey farms in Chile and one in Canada (OIE, 2009-2010). Human-to-swine 
transmission was suspected in almost all these outbreaks based on circumstantial 
evidence, with swine workers showing flu symptoms prior to outbreaks in swine (OIE, 
2009-2010). Furthermore, pH1N1 2009 virus transmission between pigs was 
demonstrated under experimental (Itoh et al., 2009, Lange et al., 2009, Vincent et al., 
2009, Brookes et al., 2010) and observational studies (Howden et al., 2009, Lange et al., 
2009, Pasma and Joseph, 2010). No back transmission from pigs to humans was 
reported except for one suspected case in Canada (Howden et al., 2009). However, this 
may be related to the lack of reporting systems for pH1N1 2009 humans cases acquired 
from pigs. This virus demonstrated the potential for the pandemic influenza viruses with 
swine influenza gene lineage to emerge and spread between humans and swine readily 
(Vincent et al., 2010). Recently, a novel swine-origin influenza A H3N2 variant virus 
(designated as A(H3N2)v) containing the matrix gene derived from pH1N1 2009 virus 
was detected in humans in the US raising concern over the pandemic potential of these 
viruses of swine origin (Lindstrom et al., 2012) . It is therefore imperative to investigate 
epidemiological parameters influencing the transmission dynamics of pandemic 
influenza viruses at the swine-human interface. Similarly it is important to identify 
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appropriate surveillance or early warning systems, and intervention strategies to respond 
effectively to future outbreaks. Computer simulation modeling is a useful tool for such 
studies.  
It would be of interest to know the extent of modeling research directed towards 
zoonotic influenza at the animal-human interface as zoonotic diseases present a 
continuing threat to public health. In addition the role that birds and swine play in the 
generation of new viral strains and their transmission to humans is important in model 
development. Therefore, this review consolidates the relevant literature on the modeling 
of influenza virus spread in animals (including birds) and humans. It provides an 
inventory of methods and approaches, including software/platforms used to model 
influenza viruses in animal and human populations, with a particular emphasis on spread 
at the animal-human interface. Any differences and challenges that may exist for 
modeling spread of influenza between animals and humans simultaneously are also 
investigated. The review also identifies parameters required for modeling influenza 
spread between animals and humans. This should facilitate the modeling process under a 
range of conditions by providing parameters and methods that may be relevant under 
different emerging influenza epidemic or pandemic situations. 
2.3 Materials and Methods 
In this review, mathematical or computer simulation models refer to dynamic disease 
transmission models where force of infection varies with changes in the prevalence of 
infectious and susceptible individuals in a population over time. This differs from many 
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statistical models where population status and parameter values remain fixed and are 
used to quantify association between outcome and explanatory variables (Dohoo et al., 
2009, Vynnycky and White, 2010) . 
2.3.1 Search strategy 
A standard search term was developed based on the review objectives to collect 
information on the following research questions: (a) what are the different approaches 
and types of mathematical or computer simulation models used to model the spread of 
zoonotic influenza viruses in humans, animals or between animals and humans? (b) 
What modeling assumptions were used? (c) What software or platforms have been used? 
and (d) What were the parameters used for modeling influenza between animals and 







]RRQRVHVRU³]RRQRWLFGLVHDVHV´6HDUFKILelds were restricted to title and abstract while 
date of publication was used to exclude publications prior to 1990. Furthermore, search 
was limited to articles published in English. The searches were conducted on 9 February 
2010 in the PubMed, CAB Abstract, ScienceDirect, and Agricola bibliographical 
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databases. All articles retrieved from each of these four databases were imported into the 
bibliographic reference package, EndNote® version X2 (Thomson, Reuters, Carlsbad, 
CA) and duplicate articles were removed. Additional relevant articles not captured by 
the search term, particularly articles related to experimental or observational studies that 
provided relevant parameters, were retrieved based on the references contained in some 
key articles. 
2.3.2 Screening of articles 
Titles and abstracts were screened for their relevance by two reviewers. Articles deemed 
WREH³LUUHOHYDQW´VXFKDVWKRVHUHODWHGWRRWKHULQIHFWLRXVRUWRQRQ-infectious diseases 
of animals, humans, fish, or plants were removed. Articles were selected for review and 
data extraction if their abstract provided some details on mathematical or computer 
simulation models of influenza viruses in either animals, humans or both. Furthermore, 
if abstracts described the estimation of modeling parameters such as duration of disease 
states (incubation, latent, infectious, immune periods), contact parameters, transmission 
probabilities, the basic reproductive number (R0) or generation intervals, these were also 
selected. Screening and selection of articles as to their relevance was reinforced using a 
predesigned data extraction template described below. To aid consistency in abstract 
screening, two reviewers pre-tested 15 articles and accepted or rejected articles were 
compared. Of these in only one case (Perlroth et al., 2010) did the reviewers come to a 
different conclusion on acceptance. On investigation it was seen that the confusion in 
this case was due to the fact that no guidance had been given for articles primarily 
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focused on evaluating cost impacts of mitigation strategies. As this article also provided 
useful modeling parameters it was decided that it should be included. The screening 
criteria were further refined to provide guidance for similar cases. 
2.3.3 Data extraction 
A template was developed in Microsoft Excel® version 2007 to aid in the extraction and 
recording of relevant information and parameters from each selected article. Detailed 
information on study objectives, questions of interest, study type, modeling methods and 
approaches, strain(s) of influenza virus(es), disease spread type (within or between 
species), population units, type(s) of intervention evaluated, software used were 
recorded. In addition, modeled disease spread parameters were extracted according to 
strain of influenza viruses and unit of population (individual, household, herd or flock 
levels). 
2.3.4 Inventory of model types and approaches 
A summary of different modeling approaches was generated based on the research 
questions addressed in the selected studies. Research questions of interests were grouped 
into five categories, those aimed at: parameter estimation (coded as P), evaluation of the 
spread of the disease (S), evaluation of different types of intervention (I), method 
development (M), and the development of a modeling software/platform or tool (T). 
Many articles addressed a combination of these questions, in which case the relevant 
combinations of categories was recorded. The inventory of models in this review also 
included broad categorizations as to whether they were stochastic or deterministic, 
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whether they were spatially explicit or not, and the type of contact structure modeled 
(homogeneous or heterogeneous mixing assumed or explicit contact network used). 
For those unfamiliar with the range of modeling types and sometimes confusing 
terminology, a brief overview of some key approaches is provided below. 
2.3.4.1 Deterministic model 
A model in which a set of difference or differential equations (DE) describes the flow of 
individuals from one disease state to another as determined by a fixed set of parameters, 
and is sometimes referred as an aggregate or mean-field model. This approach will 
produce the same predicted outcome given a set of predefined model parameters (Nuño 
et al., 2007a, Arino et al., 2008, Brauer, 2008, Nuño et al., 2008). 
2.3.4.2 Stochastic model  
Stochastic models incorporate elements of random processes into the system. The 
infection and transition of individuals from one state to another is determined 
probabilistically (Ferguson et al., 2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, Germann et al., 2006, 
Glass and Barnes, 2007, Ajelli and Merler, 2008, Halloran et al., 2008, Basta et al., 
2009, Britton and Lindenstrand, 2009, Gojovic et al., 2009, Chao et al., 2010, Lee et al., 
2010a). Model parameters (e.g. disease state duration, contact frequency, or probability 
of transmission per contact) are specified in the form of probability distributions, and 
values are randomly selected from these distributions for each iteration. Accordingly, 
the predicted outcomes also vary by iteration. Therefore, stochastic models are typically 
run many times (e.g. 1000 iterations) to obtain a reasonable distribution of potential 
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outcomes. The model types described below can be implemented in either a 
deterministic or stochastic manner. 
2.3.4.3 Compartmental model 
In a compartment model, individuals in the population are categorized into one or more 
subgroups (compartments) based on the similarity of certain characteristics, such as 
susceptibility to a particular infection, contact types and rates, and most importantly the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VGLVHDVHVWDWHHJVXVFHSWLEOHLQIHFWLRXVDQG recovered which is why these 
DUHRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRDV³6,5´PRGHOV,QIHFWLRQSURFHVVLQWKHSRSXODWLRQLVGHWHUPLQHG
by the average behavior of the group, and individuals within each compartment are 
assumed to be homogenous and mixed perfectly. The flow of individuals from one 
FRPSDUWPHQWWRDQRWKHULVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHVXPRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VXQGHUO\LQJ
probabilistic rate and the model tracks this on a collective basis during each time step of 
the simulation (Chowell et al., 2006a, Chowell et al., 2006b, Flahault et al., 2006, 
Hollingsworth et al., 2006, Nuño et al., 2007b, Vardavas et al., 2007, Arinaminpathy 
and McLean, 2008, Arino et al., 2008, Tsai et al., 2010, Tuite et al., 2010). 
2.3.4.4 Agent-based / individual-based model 
The disease transmission process in an agent-based or individual-based model is 
governed by the behavior of each individual. Rules governing disease transmission 
dynamics are defined at an individual level. Although the same disease states 




The model keeps track of each individual (rather than the group of individuals) and adds 
up individuals in each disease state at the end of each time-step of the simulation. 
Therefore, this type of model can capture heterogeneity of individual behavior (such as 
µVXSHU-VSUHDGHUV¶- individuals who spread disease more readily than others as a result of 
a higher than average contact rate) and other sources of variation, which can have 
important impacts in terms of overall disease transmission dynamics. Incorporating such 
heterogeneity adds realism to the modeled process (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 
2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, Germann et al., 2006, Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2007, Basta et 
al., 2009, Yang et al., 2009, Yasuda and Suzuki, 2009). 
2.3.4.5 Network model 
Network models simulate disease spread in the population by explicitly taking into 
consideration the aFWXDOFRQWDFWVWUXFWXUHVEHWZHHQLQGLYLGXDOVµZKRLVFRQQHFWHGWR
ZKRP¶6WRFKDVWLFLQGLYLGXDO-based network models that simulate disease spread based 
on contact structures between individuals are more complex, yet more realistic, 
providing more accurate predictions. However, the reliability of these models depends 
on the availability of contact information which is still rare in most situations (Carrat et 
al., 2006, Ajelli and Merler, 2008, Davey et al., 2008, Chao et al., 2010, Perlroth et al., 
2010). 
2.3.4.6 Metapopulation model 
A metapopulation model consists of a collection of distinct subpopulations of the same 
species each having its own distinct dynamics, and yet being connected to other 
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subpopulations through limited interactions. In this approach disease spread occurs 
through mobility or migration processes of individuals amongst subpopulations. These 
characteristics suggest that metapopulation modeling should provide a suitable approach 
for modeling the spread of pandemic influenza at global or regional levels via, for 
example, air travel (Cooper et al., 2006, Colizza et al., 2007, Balcan et al., 2009, 
Flahault et al., 2009). 
2.3.4.7 Gravity model 
The gravity model can be used to model disease spread between different geographical 
locations (for example, from one province to another) by explicitly incorporating rates 
of movement of people which are influenced by the population sizes and distances 
between locations. Increased movement tends to occur with greater population size and 
more closely linked areas when compared to less densely populated areas that are farther 
apart. This approach was used to investigate influenza spread from a large city (point of 
introduction) to other provinces in Vietnam (Boni et al., 2009). 
2.3.4.8 Contact structure 
Type and frequency of contacts between infectious and susceptible individuals is likely 
to play a crucial role in infectious disease transmission within a population, depending 
on the infectiousness and mode of transmission of the causative agent(s). Highly 
contagious diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) can be transmitted over long 
distance through aerosol; similarly influenza or measles require less intimate contact 
than tuberculosis. In addition, the mixing pattern of hosts tends to play a crucial role in 
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the way disease is transmitted. The modeling of transmission characteristics will 
therefore be heavily influenced by assumptions around the homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of mixing. Homogeneous mixing assumes that contact between different 
individuals occurs randomly with equal probability (e.g. each child is equally likely to 
make contact with any other child or adult and vice versa). Heterogeneous mixing 
assumes non-random mixing where some individuals or groups are more likely to be in 
contact with infected individuals than others (Brauer, 2008, Vynnycky and White, 
2010). Furthermore, heterogeneous mixing can be assortative or disassortative. In 
assortative mixing, individuals belonging to the same subgroup make more contacts 
amongst themselves than with members of other subgroups (e.g. children are more 
likely to mix with other children than with adults). Disassortative mixing occurs when 
members of one subgroup mix more readily with members of a different subgroup than 
with members from within their own subgroup (e.g. sexual partners). Subgroups can be 
defined based on any characteristic (e.g. age group, gender, occupation, etc.) that is 
considered important in explaining differences in disease transmission and control. It 
has been noted that the assumption of homogeneous mixing, present in many models, is 
unrealistically simple in most situations (Brauer, 2008, Vynnycky and White, 2010). 
2.3.5 Intervention strategies 
Approaches used for assessing different intervention strategies have been summarized 
into the following groups: antiviral treatment, including prophylactic use (coded as A), 
vaccination prior to or during outbreak (V), school or day-care closure (S), and social 
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distancing (D). This last category includes workplace closure, contact tracing, 
quarantine, isolation, cancellation of community and mass gathering, use of personal 
hygiene and protective equipment. In addition, movement control and depopulation of 
animals, including bird, are coded as (M), while air travel restrictions are coded as (T). 
A combination of these letters indicates that modeled assessment covered a combination 
of the respective intervention measures. 
2.3.6 Modeling parameters  
Parameters extracted have been summarized into three categories: (a) estimated values, 
where an article attempted to estimate parameters from empirical data taken from 
experimental, observational, or modeling studies; (b) referenced values, where values 
were taken from other articles; (c) assumed values, where values assumed for modeling 
purposes were based on either expert opinion or unpublished data sources. Furthermore, 
articles that estimated parameters with 95% confidence intervals are reported separately 
so as not to dilute them with values from other studies that only estimated mean, 
minimum and/or maximum values. Parameters were summarized as median and range 
(minimum and maximum values) of means, medians, minimum and maximum values 
from one or more articles. However, only summary estimates of means, minimum and 
maximum values are presented in the main text as very few median values were 
available for most parameters. A detailed summary of these estimates along with a list 
of articles and reference sources is provided in the Supplementary materials in Appendix 
A. Single values for a parameter (with no stated range) indicate that these were either 
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extracted from a single article or that the values were exactly the same when 
consolidated from two or more articles. If an article provided only a single value for a 
particular parameter then this was entered under the mean section. In the main text, 
parameters were summarized according to strain of influenza viruses. Studies that did 
not specify a particular virus strain but used general terms such as "novel influenza", 
"pandemic influenza" viruses, or "mutant form of avian influenza H5N1" have been 
JURXSHGXQGHU³1RYHOLQIOXHQ]DYLUXV´,QDGGLWLRQVWXGLHVWKDWLQYHVWLJDWHGDQRYHO
influenza virus but calibrated model parameters to a known influenza viral strain were 
also grouped under a novel influenza virus category. If studies described the agent as a 
seasonal influenza virus (without specifying a particular strain) or the term "general 
influenza virus" was used, they were grouped under influenza viruses. Detailed 
summary according to the specific strain or terms used for different influenza strain 
along with article list are presented in the Supplementary materials in Appendix A. All 
data processing and summary analyses were carried out using Stata version 11 
(StataCorp. 2009. Stata Statistical Software: Release 11. College Station, TX: StataCorp 
LP) after importing data from Microsoft Excel® version 2007. 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
2.4.1 Search strategy 
A total of 721 unique articles were retrieved from PubMed, CAB Abstract, 
ScienceDirect and Agricola. Of these, 224 and 182 articles were excluded, through title 
and abstract screening respectively, as they were related to disease modeling and 
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epidemiological studies of other infectious or non-infectious diseases of animals, 
humans, fishes, and plants, including one article related to computer viruses. Of the 315 
articles reviewed, data were extracted from 133 articles. The remaining 182 articles 
were related to general reviews of models, general infectious disease models, and an 
assessment of the economic impact of vaccine adjuvant from which no relevant 
parameters could be extracted. In addition, the references from 9 articles (van der Goot 
et al., 2005, Tiensin et al., 2007, van der Goot et al., 2007, Basta et al., 2009, Cowling et 
al., 2009, Milne et al., 2009, Tuite et al., 2009, Chao et al., 2010, Tuite et al., 2010) 
considered to be important recent outputs in the area were individually reviewed and 
from these a further 18 articles were identified and added to the set for data extraction. 
From a total of 151 articles from which data were extracted, 93 and 11 articles were 
related to simulation modeling studies in humans and birds respectively, while 5 articles 
reported models of zoonotic transmission. The remaining 42 articles (comprising 28 on 
humans, 10 on animals and 4 on birds) were routine statistical and experimental studies, 
from which modeling parameters were extracted. 
2.4.2 Inventory and general trend of modeling approaches 
It was apparent that different approaches were applied to model influenza for a variety 
of purposes. This may be because influenza is a commonly occurring disease that is 
readily amenable to modeling and also because it can often be the cause of large-scale 
pandemics. A summary of the different model types applied to influenza viruses in 
animal and human populations to address a range of research questions of interest and 
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intervention measures are provided in Figure 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. Detailed list of 
articles that used different models to achieve different objectives are provided in Table 
S1 and S2 of the Supplementary materials. The temporal trend in the research questions 
of interest for modeling showed that the interests to assess intervention and influenza 
spread were predominant throughout the study period. In addition, an increasing number 
of articles related to method and tool development in combination with other questions 
of interest were observed since 2007 (Figure 2.3). An increasing trend in the publication 
of modeling studies was also observed since 2004, and this was mainly attributed to 
pandemic outbreaks of SARS and HPAI caused by H5N1, and more recently pH1N1 
2009. The relatively lower number of modeling studies captured for 2010 was related to 
censoring of the review period on 19th February 2010. A similar or larger number of 
modeling studies published in 2010 would be expected as some of the articles related to 
pH1N1 2010 might have been published thereafter. The temporal trend of application of 
different modeling methods indicated that while compartmental models are still being 
used, increasing trends in the use of more complex models, such as individual-based and 
network models was observed since 2005 (Figure 2.4). This may be attributed to the 
availability of high power computers as well as availability of more complex modeling 
platforms. More details on research questions of interests and types of modeling 
approaches used in different populations are presented in the following section. 
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2.4.2.1 Humans  
Modeling to evaluate different intervention strategies dominated this literature. Of the 
93 modeling studies dealing with influenza in human populations, 38 and 25 focused on 
the evaluation of intervention strategies alone or in combination with other questions of 
interest respectively. Nine articles were solely aimed at parameter estimation (Mills et 
al., 2004, Chowell et al., 2006a, Sertsou et al., 2006, Chowell et al., 2007a, Chowell et 
al., 2008a, Chowell and Nishiura, 2008, Fraser et al., 2009, Lessler et al., 2009, Tuite et 
al., 2010); while three articles addressed parameter estimation and an assessment of the 
spread of influenza viruses (Massad et al., 2007, Ajelli and Merler, 2008, Colizza et al., 
2009). Four articles described methods or approaches related to influenza modeling 
(Addy et al., 1991, Aparicio and Pascual, 2007, Fraser, 2007, Tsai et al., 2010) and four 
others on these methods or approaches in combination with influenza spread or the 
development of software (Brauer, 2008, Balcan et al., 2009, Carpenter and Sattenspiel, 
2009, Chao et al., 2010). These new methods and approaches included: extending 
stochastic models to allow for variable length of infectious period and heterogeneity in 
contact rates (Addy et al., 1991); models to estimate the R0 of within and between 
household transmission of influenza virus (Fraser, 2007); to improve computational 
efficiency of large-scale spatial stochastic individual-based models through algorithm 
refinement including the use of an R0 parameter rather than per contact transmission 
probability (Tsai et al., 2010); and the development of aggregate (system dynamic) 
models that capture the influence of contact network structures using basic reproductive 
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ratios derived from the network structures (Aparicio and Pascual, 2007). Seven articles 
related solely to the spread of influenza (Flahault et al., 1994, Grais et al., 2003, Grais et 
al., 2004, Lavenu et al., 2004, Boni et al., 2009, Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2009, Rios-
Doria and Chowell, 2009) and three focused on the development of modeling software 
(Hanley, 2006, Eichner et al., 2007, Feighner et al., 2009).  
Some of the recent studies related to the development of methods and approaches in 
combination with other questions of interest are described below. Chao et al. (2010) 
developed the modeling platform FluTE for stochastic individual-based network models 
capable of simulating influenza spread across major metropolitan cities or even the 
entire population of the US, together with intervention measures. Lunelli et al. (2009) 
investigated the effects of incorporating contact matrices and spatial components 
(movements between geographic patches) into deterministic compartmental models and 
compared these with stochastic approaches. This was done to identify key elements of 
complexity to aid design decisions on achieving a balance between realism and 
computational efficiency. Deterministic models with heterogeneous mixing by 
partitioning populations into active and less active subgroups (Larson, 2007, Brauer, 
2008) and a stochastic agent-based model for partitioning large-scale communities based 
on demographic, community features and daily activities (Das et al., 2008) were 
developed for assessing intervention strategies. Shaban et al. (2009) evaluated the effect 
of vaccination strategies at a household level during the early stage of an epidemic using 
a stochastic heterogeneous mixing compartmental model. An agent-based model to 
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examine the effect of population movement and seasonal community structure on the 
transmission of influenza was developed by Carpenter and Sattenspiel (2009). 
Nigmatulina and Larson (2009) used a deterministic compartmental model with 
heterogeneous mixing to examine the inclusion of behavioral feedback to capture the 
changing behavior of people due to perceived threats during the epidemic phase on the 
modeled effect of non-pharmaceutical intervention. The role of memory and adaptation 
on decision-making around vaccination coverage based on two incentives (commitment 
and family incentive) was assessed by Vardavas et al. (2007) using a deterministic 
homogeneous mixing compartmental model. The effect of different mobility networks 
(long-range air travel versus short-range commuting patterns) on the global and local 
spread of influenza epidemics was investigated using stochastic SEIR metapopulation 
models (Balcan et al., 2009).  
In general, it is apparent that stochastic approaches have only recently been used to 
model influenza in humans. However, since the paper by Longini et al. (2004) this has 
been an increasingly important trend (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, Wu et al., 2006, van den Dool et al., 2008, Basta et al., 2009, 
Gojovic et al., 2009, Yang et al., 2009, Yasuda and Suzuki, 2009, Chao et al., 2010, Lee 
et al., 2010a, Tsai et al., 2010). Stochastic approaches have some advantage over 
deterministic models, primarily through the incorporation of more flexible methods to 
represent variability and uncertainty. The introduction of a disease may or may not 
necessarily lead to epidemic outbreak under similar condition based on chance alone. 
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This is particularly relevant in situations where numbers of infectious individuals and 
susceptible populations are small, when the infectious agent is not highly infectious, 
where spread occurs over smaller areas or where control measures are effectively 
implemented early in an outbreak (Roberts et al., 2007, Britton and Lindenstrand, 2009, 
Keeling and Danon, 2009, Lunelli et al., 2009). Furthermore, Britton & Lindenstrand 
(2009) demonstrated that the risk of a major outbreak is heavily dependent on the 
variability of the duration of the infectious period but not the latent period, whereas the 
initial growth rate of an influenza epidemic is greatly influenced by randomness in both 
periods. It is therefore likely that adopting a model which has limited capacity to capture 
stochastic behavior will, under these conditions, result in unrealistic predictions. 
In general, most recent studies of pandemic influenza in humans have structured 
population by age, community (schools and daycare, workplace, households, etc.) and in 
some cases into high-risk and low-risk groups, using both deterministic and stochastic 
compartmental models (Brauer, 2008, Fraser et al., 2009, Gojovic et al., 2009, Milne et 
al., 2009, Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2009, Tuite et al., 2009, Lee et al., 2010b). 
Deterministic models with heterogeneous mixing which stratified populations into 
different subgroups were considered a balanced approach, as they are more realistic than 
homogeneous mixing, while remaining more efficient than stochastic, individual-based 
models in terms of simulation time and complexity (Eichner et al., 2007, Brauer, 2008). 
More complex and realistic models used to simulate influenza spread and evaluate 
intervention strategies included stochastic individual-based models (22 of the 93 
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articles), network models (8 articles), or spatially explicit agent-based and network 
models (3 articles). Some examples of these models include: individual-based models 
(Basta et al., 2009, Carpenter and Sattenspiel, 2009, Yang et al., 2009, Yasuda and 
Suzuki, 2009, Chao et al., 2010, Lee et al., 2010b, Perlroth et al., 2010, Tsai et al., 2010) 
, stochastic network models (Ajelli and Merler, 2008, Davey and Glass, 2008, Chao et 
al., 2010, Hsu and Shih, 2010, Perlroth et al., 2010), spatially explicit agent-based or 
network models (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, Halloran et al., 2008). The 
importance of incorporating spatial components in disease modeling were recognized 
both for evaluating spread and assessing the effect of control measures in humans 
(Ferguson et al., 2005, Halloran et al., 2008, Colizza et al., 2009, Lunelli et al., 2009) 
and in birds (Le Menach et al., 2006, Savill et al., 2006, Sharkey et al., 2008) as disease 
tended to spread more within localized areas. These models were considered to better 
represent real world conditions by capturing individual level behavior, heterogeneity in 
contact structure and hence the ability to capture phenomena such as super-spreading. In 
addition, these modeling approaches allow more flexibility in assessment of targeted 
intervention measures (e.g. towards high-risk individuals or groups) and policy 
planning. While these models add more realism, they have disadvantages in terms of 
computational efficiency, requiring long hours of simulation to assess a plausible range 
of parameter values (particularly if population size is large). They also tend to require 
parameter specification at a finer level of resolution and detail (e.g. individual-level 
contact structures, individual-level or age specific transmission parameters, etc.). In 
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addition, carrying out sensitivity analysis can be challenging since isolating influential 
parameters is difficult in the context of a large number of interacting parameters 
(Brauer, 2008, Gojovic et al., 2009). Therefore, it has been argued that simple 
deterministic compartmental models with heterogeneous mixing, which are also much 
easier to implement, represent a better alternative to these complex approaches for 
assessing disease management strategies during the early phase of an outbreak, 
particularly when little is known about model parameters (Chowell et al., 2006b, 
Eichner et al., 2007, Nuño et al., 2007a, Brauer, 2008). The qualitative results using 
simpler models for evaluating influenza control measures such as social distancing, 
antiviral treatment or vaccination (Nuño et al., 2007a) can be shown to be similar to 
those resulting from the creation of more complex models (Longini et al., 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini and Halloran, 2005, Longini et al., 2005, Ferguson et al., 
2006, Germann et al., 2006). The choice of the most appropriate model: deterministic 
versus stochastic; compartmental versus individual-based; etc.; will depend on the 
nature of the agent or disease, the purpose of the research, the availability of parameters 
and the time-frame within which guidance is required (Nuño et al., 2007a, Brauer, 2008, 
Britton and Lindenstrand, 2009). A complete list of articles that used each of these 
different types of modeling approaches is provided in Table S1. 
Only a few studies have investigated the spread of influenza at the household level 
using either deterministic or stochastic heterogeneous mixing compartmental models 
(Cauchemez et al., 2004, Fraser, 2007, Shaban et al., 2009), or a stochastic individual-
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based model (Wu et al., 2006). These studies investigated the spread of influenza within 
and between households through contacts between infected and susceptible individuals 
locally (within household) and globally (between households). They also evaluated the 
effects of various intervention measures. This approach to modeling the spread of 
influenza at household level is analogous to disease spread at farm or herd level in 
animal populations, which often includes an assessment of similar intervention 
strategies (vaccination, quarantine, isolation, etc.). Modeling influenza spread at 
household and farm levels may be one approach for modeling the spread of influenza 
amongst and between animal and human populations that can effectively address 
different requirements in terms of model granularity. 
2.4.2.2 Animals 
There were 11 articles relating to studies that modeled influenza spread in birds. 
However, no papers reported the modeling of zoonotic influenza in swine or other 
animals (excluding one study of influenza viruses in equine populations (Garner et al., 
2011), for which zoonotic importance is not yet known). Of the 11 avian articles, 6 
assessed intervention strategies either alone or in combination with other questions of 
interests, 2 estimated parameters (van der Goot et al., 2003, Arinaminpathy and 
McLean, 2009), and 3 articles assessed the spread of avian influenza viruses (Bos et al., 
2007, Guberti et al., 2007, Bavinck et al., 2009). Different types of models were adopted 
to address these questions in bird populations as summarized in Figure 2.1 and Table S1. 
These included simple deterministic compartmental models (Bos et al., 2007, Guberti et 
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al., 2007, Elbakidze, 2008, Arinaminpathy and McLean, 2009, Iwami et al., 2009), 
stochastic compartmental models (van der Goot et al., 2003, van der Goot et al., 2005, 
Bavinck et al., 2009), and a stochastic individual-based model (Savill et al., 2006). In 
addition, more complex models such as a deterministic network model (Aparicio and 
Pascual, 2007), a stochastic spatially explicit agent-based model (Le Menach et al., 
2006), and a stochastic spatially explicit network (Sharkey et al., 2008) model for avian 
influenza viruses H5N1 and H7N7 were also used. 
2.4.2.3 Multispecies zoonotic models 
A key focus of this review was to characterize the literature related to modeling for 
multi-species zoonotic influenza spread. This review could identify only five articles 
relating to such modeling studies (Saenz et al., 2006, Arino et al., 2007, Iwami et al., 
2007, Rao et al., 2009, Kim et al., 2010). Of these, one focused on methods and platform 
development to model the spread of avian influenza (A/H5N1 virus) from wild 
migratory water birds to domestic birds and humans as a function of spatially 
overlapping population densities (derived from spherical geometry based on great-circle 
distances to elicit interactions amongst water birds, poultry and humans) using an SIR 
model with Markov processes. Specifically designed software called SEARUMS 
(Studying the Epidemiology of Avian Influenza Rapidly Using Modeling and 
Simulation) was developed to facilitate this modeling (Rao et al., 2009). Another study 
investigated the spread of low pathogenic avian influenza (with the assumption that the 
virus mutated to become a pandemic virus) from birds to human and assessed the effect 
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of quarantine in both species using deterministic metapopulation modeling (Arino et al., 
2007). Two studies used deterministic mathematical models to examine the mechanisms 
of spread of avian influenza from birds to humans (Iwami et al., 2007, Kim et al., 2010). 
They examined at what Ro values and contact rates the disease would be maintained or 
undergo extinction in bird and human populations, assuming a mutant form of the AI 
virus capable of human to human transmission emerged. All these studies assumed there 
was no back-transmission of influenza virus from humans to birds. 
Only one study investigated the spread of novel influenza virus between humans and 
swine species in a rural setting, using a simple deterministic model with homogenous 
mixing (Saenz et al., 2006). It investigated the amplifying effect on epidemic size of 
influenza spread in confined animal feeding operations (CAFO) and transmission back 
to humans through CAFO workers. It was assumed that transmission of the influenza 
virus between CAFO species and the general community occurred only through CAFO 
workers. This study showed that human influenza cases would increase by 42±86% 
assuming that swine workers comprised between 15±45% of a given community, while 
vaccination of 50% of the CAFO workers effectively nullified any amplification. This 
study provided good preliminary insights into the effect of influenza spread between 
CAFO species and workers in a local setting. It would be worthwhile to apply more 
advanced modeling methods to assess other control strategies such as the effectiveness 
of biosecurity, impacts of early detection and control measures, contact reduction 
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between sick CAFO workers and swine, and a reduction in transmission probability 
through personal hygiene measures. 
Another study assessed the exposure risk of susceptible domestic species to pandemic 
influenza A/H1N1 2009 upon its successful introduction into various populations in 
Vietnam (Boni et al., 2009). This study investigated the spread of pH1N1 2009 in 
humans by developing an age-structured gravity model and tracked the number of 
livestock owners (rearing swine and poultry) and non-livestock owners infected. From 
the number of livestock owners infected, they estimated the number of livestock 
exposed to the pandemic virus indirectly. 
,QWHUPVRIEXLOGLQJDµRQH-KHDOWK¶PRGHOWRVLPXODWHVSUHDGRI]RRQRWLFLQIOXHQ]D
between animals and humans it is apparent that the most important differences relate to 
the unit of simulation as well as to the spatial and temporal scales involved. For humans, 
the unit of simulation is most often the individual. Individuals were assigned to spend 
differing amounts of time in various locations, such as at school, workplace or home, 
and disease spread was simulated in either continuous time-steps (Gani et al., 2005, 
Duerr et al., 2007, Nuño et al., 2007b, Brauer, 2008) or using two to four time-steps per 
day (Carrat et al., 2006, Ferguson et al., 2006, Ajelli and Merler, 2008, van den Dool et 
al., 2008, Basta et al., 2009). In animal populations the unit of simulation was mostly the 
farm, typically modeled in time-steps of one day (Le Menach et al., 2006, Guberti et al., 
2007, Bavinck et al., 2009). Despite these differences, it seems feasible to simulate the 
spread of influenza between human and animal populations by adopting a relatively 
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simple approach which models at the household level. The household level model can 
be justified on the basis that it is pragmatic to implement most intervention measures 
such as antiviral drugs, vaccination, quarantine or isolation at the household level. 
2.4.3 Intervention strategies 
2.4.3.1 Humans 
In general, the intervention strategies evaluated against pandemic influenza included: 
antiviral drugs for both prophylaxis and treatment of cases; vaccination; school, daycare 
and work place closure; personal hygiene; and other social distancing measures such as 
quarantine, isolation and travel restriction. These measures were evaluated either singly 
or in combination. A total of 63 articles evaluated different intervention strategies to 
control influenza in humans. The intervention evaluated most frequently was 
vaccination, either alone (14 articles) or in combination with other intervention 
measures (22 articles). This was followed by antivirals, either alone (6 articles) or in 
combination (30 articles). Eight articles evaluated social distancing measures, including 
one which specifically evaluated different strategies of school closure, such as isolating 
only sick students, closing individual schools or whole school system closures (Lee et 
al., 2010a). Four articles evaluated travel bans solely and five more studied travel ban in 
combination with other interventions as a means of controlling an influenza pandemic. 
This included three that specifically evaluated the effect of air travel restrictions in 
mitigating a pandemic. They observed that unless air travels restriction were imposed in 
approximately 100% of the affected countries, there would be no effect on influenza 
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spread, even though these measures delayed the peak of the influenza epidemic to 
varying degrees (Cooper et al., 2006, Hollingsworth et al., 2006, Wood et al., 2007). 
One article studied the effect of travel restriction between neighboring communities 
during a pandemic with similar results (Nigmatulina and Larson, 2009). The various 
types of models applied in the evaluation of these intervention measures are summarized 
in Figure 2.2. The two articles that assessed the effect of targeted antiviral prophylaxis 
and quarantine on containing a pandemic at source of origin, taking southeast Asia as 
the example case, were also the most highly cited references in the case of pandemic 
influenza modeling in human population (Longini et al., 2004, Ferguson et al., 2005). 
All interventions using prophylactic antiviral treatment, vaccination or social 
distancing (such as quarantine and isolation) were evaluated based on the assumption 
that these measures were implemented at household, school or health care settings 
(Longini et al., 2004, Longini et al., 2005, Wu et al., 2006, Vardavas et al., 2007, van 
den Dool et al., 2008, Ander Heiden et al., 2009, Shaban et al., 2009, Lee et al., 2010b). 
It was difficult to compare the results of these studies as they evaluated the intervention 
measures under varying assumptions and population settings. However, all of these 
measures produced a positive effect on the containment of any influenza pandemic when 
implemented either singly or in combination with others. 
The effects of these interventions were assessed by parameterizing the models 
through percentage reduction in contact rates (in the cases of social distancing measures 
such as school or workplace closure, or quarantine measures, etc.) and reduction in 
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susceptibility to infection and infectivity or duration of infectiousness (in the cases of 
antiviral treatment and vaccination). Parameters used in assessing these intervention 
PHDVXUHVDUHGHVFULEHGLQWKH³PRGHOLQJSDUDPHWHUV´VHFWLRQEHORZ,QJHQHUDOWKH
outcome of these models were assessed in terms of clinical attack rates, secondary attack 
rates, hospitalization rates, case fatality rates, duration of epidemic, and day to epidemic 
peak. 
2.4.3.2 Birds 
Five articles investigated intervention strategies for influenza in birds. They included 
movement control, quarantine, isolation, depopulation (Le Menach et al., 2006, 
Elbakidze, 2008, Sharkey et al., 2008), and vaccination (Savill et al., 2006, Iwami et al., 
2009) against avian influenza A/H5N1 and H7N7. Outcomes of these models were 
assessed in terms of R0 values, size of epidemic (number of infected premises), numbers 
depopulated and duration of epidemic. 
2.4.3.3 Multispecies zoonoses 
Two articles evaluated the effect of intervention measures on zoonotic spread. One 
considered the effect of vaccinating certain high-risk populations (50% of CAFO 
workers) against a novel influenza virus (Saenz et al., 2006), while the other examined 
the effect of quarantine measures on the spread of low pathogenic avian influenza in 
birds and humans (Arino et al., 2007). 
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2.4.4 Modeling software/platforms 
The main purpose of this section is to provide an inventory of the software used for 
modeling rather than to describe features of each of these tools, which is beyond the 
scope of this review. Only 13 articles specified the modeling software or platform used; 
details are given in Table 2.1. Four modeling software were described fully for 
modeling influenza in humans. FluTe is a stochastic individual-based modeling platform 
capable of simulating large-scale spread of influenza and evaluation of intervention 
measures against pandemic influenza across major metropolitan areas or the continental 
US (Chao et al., 2010). InfluSim is a simple deterministic SEIR compartmental model 
that captures heterogeneous mixing (Eichner et al., 2007), while EpiFlex is a stochastic 
individual-based model which can simulate other diseases such as HIV and smallpox in 
addition to influenza (Hanley, 2006). Pandemic Influenza Policy Model (PIPM) is an 
agent-based model specifically designed for military settings (Feighner et al., 2009). All 
these modeling platforms can handle populations partitioned by demographic and 
clinical parameters and are available freely. Other modeling platforms mentioned in the 
literature were AnyLogic (two articles), Berkely Madonna, MATLAB, and RePAST 
(Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit), all of which are generic modeling 
platforms. Finally, GLEaM (Global Epidemic and Mobility Modeler), a stochastic 
metapopulation modeling platform for simulating large-scale spread of influenza 
viruses, was noted in one article (Balcan et al., 2009). 
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2.4.5 Modeling parameters  
 Parameters used in models related to the natural history of influenza viruses, contact 
and transmission parameters, as well as intervention measures are summarized in Table 
2.2 to 2.15. Detailed lists of references from which these parameters were extracted are 
presented in Tables S3 to S6. 
2.4.5.1 Natural history 
Parameters associated with the natural history of influenza infection include those used 
to model: incubation, latency, subclinical (asymptomatic infectious), clinically 
infectious, and immune, periods. These parameters are presented according to influenza 
strains reported in the literature for humans in Table 2.2 to 2.3, and for birds and swine 
in Table 2.4 and 2.5. In addition, percentages of pre-existing immunity used in some of 
these studies for humans are presented under the natural history of influenza section in 
Table 2.3. 
Parameters relating to disease state duration for different influenza viruses in humans 
were similar. Apparently modeling studies conducted after 2005 and prior to the pH1N1 
2009 outbreaks (Flahault et al., 2006, Colizza et al., 2007, Duerr et al., 2007, Fraser, 
2007, Halloran et al., 2008, Basta et al., 2009, Carpenter and Sattenspiel, 2009, Gojovic 
et al., 2009) mainly adopted the parameters (disease states durations, transmission 
parameters, contact frequencies and probabilities) specified in Ferguson et al. (2005, 
2006), German et al. (2006), Longini et al. (2004, 2005) and Mills et al. (2004). Articles 
published after the outbreaks of pH1N1 2009 (Yang et al., 2009, Lee et al., 2010b, 
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Perlroth et al., 2010, Tuite et al., 2010) tended to use parameters from Boëlle et al. 
(2009), Fraser et al. (2009), and Pourbohloul et al. (2009). Distributional characteristics 
of parameters used for the natural history of influenza infection in humans and birds are 
presented in Table 2.6. The most commonly used distributions for incubation and 
latency period in human studies was a mean of 1.9 days with empirical distribution of 
one day (30%), 2 days (50%) and 3 days (20%) (Longini et al., 2004, Longini et al., 
2005, Germann et al., 2006, Colizza et al., 2007, Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2007, Chao et 
al., 2010, Tsai et al., 2010), and the clinically infectious period with a mean of 4.1 days 
with empirical distribution of 3 days (30%), 4 days (40%), 5 days (20%) and 6 days 
(10%) (Halloran et al., 2002, Longini et al., 2004, Longini et al., 2005, Weycker et al., 
2005, Germann et al., 2006, Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2009, Tsai et al., 2010). No study 
estimated the duration of disease state parameters for any influenza virus at the 
household level in humans (which would be required if spread of influenza were to be 
modeled at the household level). None of the articles included in this review provided 
information on distributions related to the natural history of influenza infection in swine. 
2.4.5.2 Contact parameters 
Daily contact frequencies for different age groups, household sizes, student groups, risk 
behaviors (highly active or less active subgroups of a population), and different 
community structures are summarized in Table 2.7. Parameters relating to contact 
frequencies used for modeling in human populations were either derived from small 
pilot surveys (Longini et al., 2005, Yang et al., 2009, Yasuda and Suzuki, 2009, Lee et 
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al., 2010a) or from a large-scale survey carried out in eight European countries 
(Mossong et al., 2008, Hens et al., 2009). These contact frequencies were defined as 
adequate contact (sufficient to transmit influenza virus between infectious and 
susceptible individuals) of a physical nature such as skin-to-skin contact, kiss or 
handshake, or a two-way conversation consisting of three or more words. Although, the 
latter two articles used the same survey data, there were minor differences in the way 
contact frequencies were estimated, in particular, number of contacts at works were 
included in the article by Hens et al. (2009). A number of recently published articles 
(Medlock and Meyers, 2009, Tuite et al., 2009, Chao et al., 2010, Tuite et al., 2010) 
used the contact frequencies estimated by Mossong et al. (2008). Estimates of daily 
contact frequencies used in other articles are summarized separately in Table 2.7. Both 
direct and indirect contact rates between poultry or poultry farms, extracted from two 
articles (Elbakidze, 2008, Sharkey et al., 2008), are also summarized in Table 2.7. 
2.4.5.3 Transmission parameters 
Transmission parameters in disease spread models use either R0 in combination with a 
generation interval, or a transmission coefficient derived by multiplying contact 
frequency and transmission probability per contact and duration of relevant disease 
states. Some models used a single value of ȕdefined as the per capita rate at which two 
individuals come into effective contact (i.e. adequate contact that will lead to infection if 
one is infectious and other is susceptible) (Vynnycky and White, 2010) . Not all 
adequate contact will be effective (e.g. an adequate contact between infectious 
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individual and immune individual will not be effective contact). Transmission 
probability per adequate contact (including contact frequencies) or transmission 
coefficient/contact rates (without requiring knowledge of contact frequency) were all 
estimated by calibrating these to match the attack rates (proportion of newly infected 
individuals in a exposed population) or R0 values of past influenza pandemics (pandemic 
influenza A/H1N1 1918-1919, influenza A/H2N2 1957-58, and influenza A/H3N2 
1968-1969). Transmission probabilities were estimated using varying units of contact 
frequency, such as frequency per day (Longini et al., 2005, Chao et al., 2010), frequency 
per hour (Gojovic et al., 2009), contact duration expressed in minutes per day (Lee et al., 
2010a), or as a probability per simulation time-step (Viboud et al., 2004). The 
transmission probabilities presented in Table 2.8 are a summary of all these estimates. 
Transmission probabilities for within-flock bird to bird and per dangerous contact 
through trucks picking up birds for slaughterhouse are also presented in Table 2.8.  
Similarly transmission coefficients/rates were expressed in units of continuous time, 
per-day or certain hours/day. Transmission coefficients/rates which were expressed in 
terms of daily or 8 to 12 hourly intervals were summarized together, whereas those 
expressed in continuous time unit from seconds to hourly intervals were summarized 
separately and are presented in Table 2.9. Assumed values of transmission 
coefficient/rates for between-species transmission of influenza are also presented in the 
same table. Since these transmission probabilities and coefficients were calibrated under 
different disease spread scenarios and other assumptions, they are intended only to 
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provide readers with an overview of the ranges of values used. In addition, all these 
parameters were summarized over all contact types. For more detailed information 
relating to specific contact patterns and transmission probabilities, readers may refer the 
original articles. 
Estimates of mean R0 values, with and without 95% confidence intervals, for 
different influenza viruses in different human populations are presented in Tables 2.10 
and 11 respectively. Reproductive numbers based either on references from other 
literature or assumed within the reported models in human population are also presented 
in Table 2.11. Chowell et al. (2006a) and (2007a) have estimated ranges of R0 values for 
pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 based on different datasets collected around spring 
and autumn waves of outbreaks in Geneva, Switzerland. Autumn outbreaks had 
significantly higher R0 values than spring waves. They also estimated R0 values based 
on a different set of outbreak data from San Francisco, California, and by applying 
different modeling methods with some differences in the estimates. Estimates of R0 
values for the most recent pH1N1 2009 virus were reported in Pourbohloul et al., 
(2009), Tuite et al., (2010) and using four different approaches by Boëlle et al., (2009). 
The estimates from the first two studies were significantly lower compared with those of 
Boëlle et al., (2009). In general, R0 values for all pandemic influenza outbreaks ranged 
from 1.1 to 4.0. Two articles estimated R0 values for influenza spread at the household 
level (Fraser, 2007, Shaban et al., 2009). The effect of household size on the basic 
reproductive number was evaluated by taking examples of small and large household 
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size distributions for populations in Sweden and Tanzania respectively (Shaban et al., 
(2009). This study found that the R0 for between-household spread was much higher in 
populations with larger family size (R0 = 6) than in those with smaller family size (R0 = 
2). 
Basic reproductive numbers estimated with 95% CI for different influenza viruses in 
birds at individual and flock levels are presented in Table 2.12. Summary of R0 
estimated (without 95% CI), referenced and assumed at the individual, flock and village 
levels in the literature are summarized in Table 2.13. Different R0 values assumed for 
different species in modeling zoonotic transmission of novel influenza virus between 
human and swine or birds are also presented in Table 2.13. 
Summary estimates of generation intervals or serial intervals (time from onset of 
primary case to a secondary case (Vynnycky and White, 2010)) are presented in Table 
2.14. Generation intervals are estimated by adding the averages of incubation or latency 
period and infectious period stated in the models. 
2.4.5.4 Parameters for intervention measures 
Parameters used for assessing different intervention strategies in human and bird 
populations are presented in Table 2.15. The estimated efficacy of antiviral treatment 
ranged from 61±90% (Hayden and Aoki, 1999, Lipsitch et al., 2003), whereas efficacy 
values used for modeling ranged from 28±100%. Reduction in infectivity by infected 
person through treatment used for modeling ranged from 28±100%, and for 
susceptibility through prophylactic treatment from 25±100%. The antiviral coverage 
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rate, treatment duration including compliance rate are provided in the same table. The 
estimated vaccine efficacy for influenza in human ranged from 19±68% (Vu et al., 2002, 
Hayden et al., 2004). However, its values used (referenced or assumed values) in the 
models ranged from, 5±100%. Reduction in infectiousness by infected person due to 
vaccination used in the models ranged from 20±100% with a delay to immunity from no 
delay to 15±42 days. The vaccination coverage evaluated ranged from 18±100% in 
humans.  
Assessment of school and day-care closure were modeled through contact reduction 
ranging from 30±100% with the closure period ranging from 7±300 days. The delay to 
school closure from the first case ranged from without any delay to 7±56 days. The 
values used for reduction in contacts as a result of quarantine or isolation in human 
populations ranged from 40-100% while the duration of quarantine or isolation periods 
ranged from 1±21 days. A quarantine period of 21±31 days with 100% effectiveness was 
assumed for infected bird flocks (Sharkey et al., 2008).  
It was apparent that there is adequate information on disease states and transmission 
parameters to model spread of influenza viruses in human population, including the 
recently emerged pH1N1 virus. While some data exist for influenza viruses in birds, 
very little information on parameters other than disease state duration (Brookes et al., 
2010, Pasma and Joseph, 2010, Vincent et al., 2010) exists for swine influenza viruses 
(including the pH1N1 virus) for the review period considered; despite the fact that many 




This study has provided a synopsis of the different methods and approaches applied to 
modeling the spread of zoonotic influenza in humans and animal populations, including 
a summary of important modeling parameters. It was apparent that the majority of recent 
influenza modeling studies applied to human populations had been motivated by the 
perceived threat of the emergence of a mutant strain of the avian influenza A/H5N1 and 
pH1N1 viruses. However, only four studies modeled the transmission dynamic of 
influenza spread between birds and humans, and one study modeled its spread at swine-
humans interface. In spite of the recognized role of swine as a potential mixing host for 
different influenza viruses (particularly avian and human influenza viruses) in 
generating novel viruses through reassortment, and considering the fact that the pH1N1 
virus is known to readily transmit between swine and humans, modeling research at the 
animal-human interface has been relatively sparse. Significant gaps in the knowledge of 
parameters such as frequency of evolution of novel viral strains in pigs, farm-level 
natural history of influenza infection in swine, incidences of its transmission between 
farms, and between pigs and humans are clearly evident. Given the potential benefits of 
simulation studies not only for understanding the transmission dynamics of zoonotic 
influenza but also in investigating various scenarios for contingency planning and 
developing sound early warning systems, it seems clear that priority must be given to 
research at the animal-human interface. This is imperative bearing in mind the continued 
threat posed by the repeated emergence of pandemic influenza viruses and the potential 
 61 
 
role animals may play in generating novel influenza viruses. It was also evident that 
there are adequate numbers of both generic and specific software (both for commercial 
and free) available for modeling influenza spread in human and animal populations 
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Table 2.1: Inventory of modeling software/platforms either specifically developed and/or used 
for influenza spread in human and animal Populations. 
Platform Description  Agent  Question of 
interest 




General modeling platforms 
that supports all three major 
modeling approaches; system 
dynamics, discrete event 
simulation, agent-based 
modeling and hybrid of any of 










(Tuite et al., 
2009, Tuite et 
al., 2010)1 




General modeling platform Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
P Human-human (Fraser et al., 
2009) 
EpiFlex Stochastic individual-based 
modeling platform  
Influenza viruses T Human-human (Hanley, 2006) 




and A/H1N1 2009 







on global scale 
Stochastic metapopulation 
modeling platform for 
modeling large-scale spread 
of influenza viruses 
Pandemic influenza 
viruses 
MS Human-human (Balcan et al., 
2009) 
InfluSim Deterministic homogeneous 
mixing compartmental model 
Influenza virus in 
general 
T Human-human (Duerr et al., 
2007, Eichner et 
al., 2007) 
MATLAB General modeling platform  Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918-1919  
















general modeling platform 
Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918-1919 











spatially explicit model 
Avian influenza 
A/H5N1 
MT Bird-bird and 
bird-human 
(Rao et al., 
2009) 
Key: I = evaluate different intervention strategies; M = describe new modeling methods and approaches; P 
= parameter estimation; S, evaluate spread; T = development of modeling software/platforms. 
Combination of these letters indicates combination of research questions of interest. Superscript numbers 




Table 2.2: Natural history parameters of influenza infection in humans estimated with 95% 















Table 2.3: Natural history parameters of influenza infection in humans estimated without 95% 
confidence interval, referenced or assumed for modeling. All values are reported in days. 
Summary estimates are medians (ranges) of means, minimum and maximum values of two or 
more articles. Single value represented value from either a single article or exactly same value 
from two or more articles. 
  
Disease states Agent 
Mean (95% CI) in 
days References  
1. Incubation period  1. Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009  
4.3 (2.6±6.6)  (Tuite et al., 2010) 
2. Latent period  1. Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009  
2.6 (2.4±3.1) (Tuite et al., 2010) 
3. Subclinical infectious period  1(a). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918 (Spring wave) 
2.9 (2.8±3.1) (Chowell et al., 2006a) 
 1(b). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918 (Autumn 
wave) 
2.2 (1.9±2.7) (Chowell et al., 2006a) 
4. Clinical infectious period 1(a). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918 (Spring wave) 
1.2 (1.1±1.3) (Chowell et al., 2006a)  
 1(b). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918 (Autumn 
wave) 
2.6 (2.43±2.8) (Chowell et al., 2006a) 
 2. Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
3.4 (2.1±4.7) (Tuite et al., 2010) 
 3. Seasonal influenza 
A/H1N1 
4.5 (3.7±5.3) (Carrat et al., 2008) 
 4. Seasonal influenza 
A/H3N2 
5.1 (4.5±5.8) (Carrat et al., 2008) 
 5. Influenza viruses 4.8 (4.3±5.3) (Carrat et al., 2008) 
Disease states Agent 
Median of 




Median of max. 
values (Range) 
1. Incubation period     
a) Estimated values  
 
1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 2.0 1.0 (1.0±2.0) - 
2. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1  - 1.0 - 
3. Seasonal influenza virus A/H3N2 2.0 1.0 3.0 
b) Referenced values  1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 1.0  - - 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 2.0 (1.5±3.0) 1.0 5.0 
 3. Novel influenza viruses  1.9 (1.0±2.0) 1.0  3.0  
 4. Seasonal influenza virus A/ H1N1 - 1.0 4.0 
 5. Seasonal influenza virus A/H3N2 - 1.0 3.5 (3.0±4.0) 
 6. Influenza viruses  2.4 (1.9±2.9) 1.0 3.0 (3.0±4.0) 
c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 - 1.0 3.0 
2. Novel influenza viruses  2.0  - - 
2. Latent period     
a) Estimated values 1. Influenza viruses 1.0 - - 
b) Referenced values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 1.9 (1.0±3.5) 1.2 (0.8±1.5) 1.7 (1.5±1.9) 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 1957 1.9 - - 
 3. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.5 (1.0±3.5) 0.9 (0.7±1.0) 4.0 (2.0±5.0) 
 4. Novel influenza viruses 1.5 (0.5±2.0) 1.0 (1.0±1.2) 2.0 
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Table 2.3: (continued) 
    
Disease states Agent 
Median of 




Median of max. 
values (Range) 
 5. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1  1.9 1.0 3.0 
 6. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 1.9 1.0 3.0 
 7. Influenza viruses 1.9 (0.6±2.1) 1.0 3.0 (2.0±3.0) 
c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 2.0  1.0 3.0 
2. Novel influenza viruses  2.3 (1.5±3.0) - - 
3. Influenza viruses  1.0 - - 
3. Subclinical infectious period 
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918  - - - 
b) Referenced values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.0 (0.5±2.5) - 2.0 
 2. Novel influenza viruses  1.0 (0.3±4.1) 0.5 0.7 
 3. Influenza viruses  3.0 (0.5±4.1) - - 
c) Assumed values  1. Novel influenza viruses 0.5 - - 
4. Clinical infectious period     
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 1.8 (1.7±3.0) 1.7 (1.6±1.7) 1.9 (1.8±1.9) 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 5.6 1.0 10.0 (8.0±12.0) 
 3. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 3.8 3.1 4.6 
b) Referenced values 1. Pandemic influenza A/ H1N1 1918 4.6 (4.1±5.0) 2.6 (1.5±3.3) 4.15 (2.9±10) 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 1957 4.1 - - 
 3. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 3.8 (2.5±7.0) 3.8 (1.9±4.0) 5.5 (2.9±10) 
 4. Novel influenza viruses 4.0 (1.0±7.0) 3.3 (2.5±5.0) 7.0 (4.1±12.0) 
 5. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1  4.1 2.0 8.0 
 6. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 4.1(3.8±4.1) 2.0 8.0 
 7. Influenza viruses  4.1 (1.4±7.0) 3.0 (2.0±3.0) 6.0 (6.0±10.0) 
c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 1957 - 3.8 5.3 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H3N2 1968 3.0 - - 
3. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 5.0 (3.0±5.0) 3.0 7.0 
4. Novel influenza viruses 4.0 2.0 3.0 
5. Influenza viruses 3.0 - - 
5. Immunity period  1. Novel influenza viruses -  365 - 
6. Pre-existing immunity (%) 
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 - 4.0 34.0 
b) Referenced values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 50.0 10.0 20.0 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 34.0 (5.0±50.0) 30.0 50.0  
(15.0±70.0) 
 3. Novel influenza viruses  30.0 - 63.5 (27.0±
100.0) 
 4. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 - - 27.0 
 5. Influenza viruses  - - 30.0 
c) Assumed values  1. Novel influenza viruses 25.0 - - 
 2. Influenza viruses - - 62.5  
(50.0±75.0) 
(a) Estimated values = those estimated from empirical data of experimental or observational studies; (b) 
Referenced values = those values taken from other articles; (c) Assumed values = values assumed based 
RQH[SHUW¶V opinion and other unpublished sources. These definitions apply to subsequent tables from 
Table 2.4 to Table 2.15. 
 
Table 2.4: Natural history parameters of influenza infection in birds estimated with 95% CI 
either from experimental, observational or modeling studies. 
Disease states Agent 
Mean (95% CI) 
in days References  
Clinical infectious period  1. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N2 6.8 (4.9±8.7) (van der Goot et al., 2003) 
 2. Low pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N2 4.3 (2.6±5.9) (van der Goot et al., 2003) 




Table 2.5: Natural history parameters of influenza infection in swine and birds estimated 
(without 95% CI), referenced or assumed for modeling. 
 
 








Median of max. 
values (Range) 
A. Swine      
1. Incubation period     
a) Estimated values  1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 - 1.0 (1.0±2.0) 2.5 (1.0±3.0) 
2. Latent period       
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 - 1.0 2.0 (2.0±5.0) 
  2. Swine influenza H1N1 virus - - 3.0 
3. Clinical infectious period  
a) Estimated values 
 
1(a). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009 (Individual level) 
- 7.0 (3±7.0) 8.0 (5.0±15.0) 
 1(b). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009 (Herd level) 
- 10.0 31 (20.0±42.0) 
  2. Swine influenza A/H1N1 - 3.0 5.0 
b) Referenced values 1. Novel influenza virus 7.0 - - 
4. Immunity period        
a) Estimated values  1. Swine influenza A /H1N1 - 365.0 692.5 
 (545.0±840.0) 
B. Birds     
1. Incubation period        
a) Referenced values 1(a). Avian influenza A/H5N1 
(Individual level) 
5.0 - - 
1(b). Avian influenza A/H7N1 
(Individual level) 
- - 6.0 
2. Avian influenza A/H7N7  - - 3.0 
b) Assumed values  1. Avian influenza A/H7N1  - 2.0 - 
 2. Avian influenza A/H7N7 - 1.0 - 
2. Latent period     
b) Referenced values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 1.75 (1.5±2.0) 1.0 2.0 
  2. Avian influenza A/H7N7 2.0 - - 
c) Assumed values 1. Avian influenza A/H7N7 2.0 - - 
3. Subclinical infectious period 
b) Referenced values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 1.0 - - 
 2. Avian influenza A/H7N7 4.0 - 6.0 
4. Clinical infectious period 
b) Referenced values 1(b). Avian influenza A/H5N1 
(Flock level) 
10.0 - - 
 2(a). Avian influenza A/H7N7 
(Individual level) 
6.3 1.0 6.0 
 2(b). Avian influenza A/H7N7 
(Flock level) 
13.8 4.0 12.0 
  3. Avian influenza virus 14.0 - - 
c) Assumed values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1  
(Village level) 
7.0 - - 
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Table 2.6: Distributions of natural history parameters of influenza infection in human and bird 
populations estimated from experimental, observational studies, referenced from other articles, 
or assumed for modeling. 
Species and disease states Agent Distribution  
A. Human   
1. Incubation period 
  a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
Log-normal with a mean of 4.3 days and 95%CI 2.6±6.6 days. 
b) Referenced/assumed 
values 
1. Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
Uniform with a range of 1±3 days; Exponential with a mean of 1.4 
days.  
 2. Novel influenza 
viruses 
Mean of 1.9 days with empirical distribution of 1 day (30%); 2 
days (50%); 3 days (20%); Gamma with a mean of 1.9 days and 
coefficient of variation of 37.8%. 
 3. Seasonal influenza 
viruses 
Right-shifted Weibull with a fixed offset of 0.5 day (lower bound 
cut-off value), shape parameter of 2.21 (95% CI 1.36±3.37) and 
scale parameter of 1.10 (95%CI 0.83±1.42) resulting in a mean 
incubation period of 1.48 days and standard deviation of 0.47 day. 
2. Latent period   
a) Estimated values 1. Novel influenza 
viruses  
Right-shifted Weibull with a fixed offset of 0.5 day (lower bound 




1. Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
Exponential with a mean of 1.25 days with an offset of 0.75 day 
(lower bound cut-off value). 
 2. Novel influenza 
viruses  
Mean of 1.9 days with empirical distribution of 1 day (30%) 2 
days (50%) and 3 days (20%); Exponential with a mean of 1.2 
days; Exponential with a mean of 1.4 days; Right-shifted Weibull 
with a fixed offset of 0.5 day (lower bound cut-off value), shape 
parameter of 2.24 and scale parameter of 1.11; Weibull with a 
fixed offset of 0.5 day (lower bound cut-off value), shape 
parameter of 2.21 and variable scale parameter values selected 
based on the serial intervals (which in turn were randomly selected 
from a range between latent and infectious periods).  
 3. Seasonal influenza 
viruses 
Exponential around mean of 1.25 days with an offset of 0.75 day 
(lower bound cut-off value). 
3. Clinical infectious period     
b) Referenced/assumed 
values 
1. Pandemic influenza 
A/ H1N1 1918 
Exponential around a mean of 3 days. 
 2. Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
Exponential around mean of 3 days; gamma with mean varied 
between 3.8±5.5 days ; uniform with a range of 3±7 days; log-
normal with a mean of 9.3 (95% CI 2.6±24.2) days.  
 3. Novel influenza 
viruses  
Mean of 4.1 days with empirical distribution of 3 days (30%); 4 
days (4%); 5 days (20%); 6 days (10%); exponential around a 
mean of 3 days; log-normal with a mean of log(-0.72 and 95%CI -
1.64± -0.09 days) and a standard deviation of log(1.8 and 95%CI 
1.3±2.5 days); gamma with a mean of 5 days and coefficient of 
variation of 33.3%. 
 4. Seasonal influenza 
A/H1N1 
Log-normal with variable median values selected based on serial 
intervals (which in turn were randomly selected from a range 
between latent and infectious periods) and a variance of 0.23. 
 5. Seasonal influenza 
A/H3N2 
Gamma with a mean of 3.8 days and standard deviation of 2 days, 
and infectious period truncated at 10 days; gamma with scale 
parameter of 2 days and shape parameter of 2.05 days. 
 6. Influenza viruses Exponential with mean of 3 days; Exponential with a mean of 1.4 
days; Mean of 4.1 days and empirical distribution of 3 days (30%), 







Table 2.7: Summary of daily contact frequencies in human and bird populations estimated either 
from survey, referenced from other articles or assumed for modeling. 
Table 2.6: (Continued) 
  
Species and disease states Agent Distribution  
B. Bird   
1. Latent period   
b) Referenced/assumed 
values 
1. Avian influenza 
A/H5N1 
Latent period of 48 hours + Binomial(48, 0.25) where p = 
probability of remaining in the latent period; Normal with a mean 
of 1.5 days and standard deviation of 1 day. 
 2. Avian influenza 
A/H7N7 
Gamma with a mean of 0.159 per day with a shape parameter of 
20. 
2. Subclinical infectious period     
b) Referenced/assumed 
values 
1. Avian influenza 
A/H5N1 
Subclinical infectious period of 24 hours + Binomial(24, 0.25) 
where p = probability of remaining in this state. 
3. Clinical infectious period     
b) Referenced/assumed 
values 
1. Avian influenza 
A/H5N1 
Binomial(96, 0.05) where p = probability of remaining in this state 
(unit in hours) 
 2. Avian influenza 
A/H5N1 
Gamma with a mean of 0.159 per day with a shape parameter of 
20; exponential around a mean of 6.3 days with 95%CI 3.9±8.7 
days. 





Median of max. 
values (Range) 
A. Human-human A. Age     
a) Estimated values  
 
<5 10.21 (7.65) - - 
5-9 14.81 (10.09) - - 
10±14 18.69 (13.4) - - 
15±19 19.93 (21.14) - - 
20±29 17.18 (25.72) - - 
30±39 17.83 (21.68) - - 
40±49 17.51 (23.29) - - 
50±59 15.96 (20.84) - - 
60±69 10.51 (14.47) - - 
70+ 7.71 (10.97) - - 
 B. Household    
 Household size 1 11.23 (18.26) - - 
 Household size 2 13.32 (17.89) - - 
 Household size 3 14.67 (16.44) - - 
 Household size 4 17.71 (17.67) - - 
 Household size 5 19.49 (29.12) - - 
 Household size 6+ 19.3 (13.14) - - 
 C. Students    
 Students -classmates 38.4 - - 
 Students ±non-classmates 14.8 - - 
b) Referenced values  A. Activity based    
 1. Low activity 2.0 - - 
 2. Medium activity 10.0 - - 
 3. High activity  50.0 - - 
 B. Age group    
 1. Children (0±11 years) 14.0 (3.0±24.0) - - 
 2. Teen (12±18 years) 4.0 (3.0±4.0) - - 
 3. Adult (19±64 years) 6.0 (3.0±13.0) - - 







Table 2.8: Summary estimates of transmission probability per contact of influenza viruses in 
humans and birds estimated, referenced, or assumed for modeling. 
 
  
Table 2.7: (Continued) 





Median of max. 
values (Range) 
 C. Occupational/community structure 
 1. Community in general  16.0 (1.0±32.0) 5.0 (5.0±14.0) 27.0 (24.0±50.0) 
 2. Health care worker - coworkers  2.0 (2.0±8.0) - - 
 3. Health care worker with 
patients 
30.0 - - 
 4. Student with classmates 14.0 (14.0±15.0) - - 
 5. Student with non-classmates 15.0 - - 
c) Assumed values A. Age group     
 1. Children (0-11 years) 6.0 - - 
 B. Community structure    
 1. Community in general 1.0 (1.0±2.0) - 1.0 
B. Bird-bird     
a) Estimated values 1. Maximum farms visited by feed 
lorry/trip 
- - 6.0 
b) Referenced values 1. Flock to flock contact rate/day  - 0.2 0.3 
c) Assumed values  1. Inter-company contact /day 3.0 - - 
 2. Maximum farms visited by 
slaughter lorry/day  
- - 4.0 
Species and transmission 
parameter Agent 
Median of 
means (Range)  





A. Human-human (all contact types combined)  
a) Estimated/calibrated 
values 
1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918  
0.51  - 
 2. Novel influenza viruses  0.24  
(0.1±0.024) 
- - 
 3. Influenza viruses 0.24  0.39 0.78 





 2. Novel influenza viruses  0.55 (0.5±0.6) 0.7 
 3. Influenza viruses  0.2503 (0.0006±0.5) 0.0012 
B. Bird-bird     
c) Assumed values  1. Avian influenza 
A/H5N1(within flock/day) 
0.5 - - 
  2. Avian influenza A/H5N1 (per 
dangerous slaughterhouse contact) 
0.25 - - 
 82 
 
Table 2.9: Summary of transmission coefficients/rates of influenza infection in humans, birds, 
and swine estimated, referenced or assumed for modeling. 
 
  
Species and transmission 
parameter 





Median of max. 
values (Range) 
I. Discrete time (8, 12 or 24 hourly intervals) 
A. Human-human  





 2. Novel influenza viruses  0.00058 0.00029  0.00102 
 3. Influenza viruses - 0.000005 0.08 
b) Referenced values  1. Pandemic influenza A/ 




c) Assumed values  1. Novel influenza viruses - 0.58 0.64 
B. Bird-Bird     
a) Estimated values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 
(bird level) 
2.66 2.01 2.55 
 2. Avian influenza A/H5N1 
(flock level) 
0.66 0.5 0.87 
 3. Avian influenza A/H5N2 
(bird level) 
0.24 0.12 0.45 
 4. Avian influenza A/H7N7 
(bird level) 
33.0 -  
 5. Avian influenza viruses 0.22 - 0.42 
C. Zoonotic spread 1. Novel influenza virus    
c) Assumed values a) Bird-human  0.012 - - 
 b) Human-human 0.03 - - 
II. Continuous time (seconds to hourly) 
A. Human-human  
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
- 0.00001 0.0125 
 2. Influenza viruses 0.581 0.199 0.425 
b) Referenced values 1. Novel influenza virus 0.00017 - - 
B. Zoonotic spread     
1. Between bird-human 1. Novel influenza virus    
c) Assumed values a) Bird-bird 0.15 (0.1±0.2) - - 
 b) Human-human  0.0006 0.0015 0.0025 (0.002±0.003)  
2. Animal-human 1. Novel influenza virus    
c) Assumed values a) Swine-swine  0.2857 - - 
 b) Swine-human 0.00123 - - 
 c) Human-human 0.3 - - 
 d) Human-swine  0.122851  - - 
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Table 2.10: Estimates of basic reproduction numbers (R0) with 95% CI of influenza infection in 
human population estimated either from experimental, observational or modeling studies. 
* Median and its 95% CI values instead of mean  
 
  
Agent Mean (95% CI)  Reference 
1(a). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using first 10 days data 
of spring wave of Geneva) 1.6 (1.5±1.7) (Chowell et al., 2007a) 
1(b). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using first 10 days data 
of autumn wave of Geneva)  3.1 (2.8±1.7)  (Chowell et al., 2007a) 
1(c). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using non-hospitalized 
and asymptomatic cases of 1st phase/spring wave in 
Geneva) 1.5 (1.5±1.5) (Chowell et al., 2006a) 
1(d). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using non-hospitalized 
and asymptomatic cases of 2nd phase/autumn wave of 
Geneva) 3.8 (3.6±3.9) (Chowell et al., 2006a) 
1(e). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using early exponential 
growth phase of autumn wave daily case notification data of 
San Francisco, California) 3.0 (2.7±3.3) (Chowell et al., 2007b) 
1(f). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using deterministic SIR 
compartmental model of daily case notification data of 
autumn wave in San Francisco, California) 2.4 (2.2±2.6) (Chowell et al., 2007b) 
1(g). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using complex SEIR 
model of daily case notification data of autumn wave in San 
Francisco, California) 2.2 (1.6±2.1) (Chowell et al., 2007b) 
1(h). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using SIR Bayesian 
approach of daily case notification data of autumn wave in 
San Francisco, California) 2.1 (1.1±3.0) (Chowell et al., 2007b) 
1(i). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 2.0 (1.7±2.3)*  
2(a). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.3 (1.3±1.4) (Tuite et al., 2010) 
2(b). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.4 (1.4±1.5) (Pourbohloul et al., 2009) 
2(c). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 (using intrinsic growth 
rate and generation interval obtained from households 
study) 2.2 (2.1±2.4) (Boëlle et al., 2009) 
2(d). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 (using intrinsic growth 
rate and generation interval obtained from viral excretion of 
experimental influenza infection study) 2.6 (2.4±2.8) (Boëlle et al., 2009) 
2(e). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 (using intrinsic growth 
rate and generation interval obtained from hypothetical 
distribution from Elveback et al., (1976) 3.1 (2.9±3.5) (Boëlle et al., 2009) 
2(f). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 (using real time 
estimation of averaging the number of secondary cases 
across all possible chains of transmissions of epidemic 
curve) 3.2 (2.1±4.0)* (Boëlle et al., 2009) 
3. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1 1.2 (0.8±1.7)* (Chen and Liao, 2010)  
4. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 1.4 (0.9±2.2)* (Chen and Liao, 2010) 
5. Influenza viruses  1.3 (1.2±1.4) (Chowell et al., 2008b) 
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Table 2.11: Summary of basic reproductive number (R0) of influenza infection in human, bird 
and swine populations estimated, referenced or assumed for modeling. 
 
 
Table 2.12: Estimates of basic reproduction numbers (R0) with 95% CI estimated either from 
experimental, observational or modeling studies in birds. 
 
Species and 











    a) Estimated values  1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918  2.2 (1.8±2.7) 1.3 (1.2±2.8) 2.2 (1.2±3.1) 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H3N2 1968 - 1.2 3.0 
 
3. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.5 1.34 (1.1±2.3) 1.9 (1.3±2.9) 
 
4. Novel influenza viruses 2.1 1.5 1.8 
 
5. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1 1.1 - 1.4 
 
6. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 1.5 (1.4±1.7) 1.4 (1.3±1.5) 1.7 (1.6±1.8) 
 
7. Influenza viruses (between households) 3.9 (2.0±6.0) - - 
b) Referenced values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 1957 1.7 (1.7±1.7) - - 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.5 (1.3±1.8) 1.3 (1.2±1.6) 2.0 (1.3±2.2)  
 
3. Novel influenza viruses 1.9 (1.4±3.1) 1.4 (0.3±1.9) 2.4 (1.4±3.3) 
 
4(a). Influenza viruses  
(individual level)  2.1 (1.7±2.5) 1.4 (1.3±1.6) 2.4 (1.4±2.73)  
 
4(b). Influenza viruses 
 (between households)  1.2 - - 
c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H3N2 1968 - 1.5 3.5 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.7 1.4 2.4 
 
3. Novel influenza viruses 1.9 1.3 2.3 (1.7±3.5) 
 
4. Influenza viruses  2.0 1.5 3.0 
B. Bird-bird 
    a) Estimated values 
 
1(a). Avian influenza A/H5N1  
(within flock) - 25.0 66.0 
1(b). Avian influenza A/H5N1  
(between villages) 2.5 (2.2±2.7) 2.0 2.1 
2(b). Avian influenza A/H7N1  
(between farms) - 0.6 1.8 
3(a). Avian influenza A/H7N7  
(within flock) - 1.3 - 
3(b). Avian influenza A/H7N7  
(between farms) 3.3 (1.3±5.2) 3.6 (3.1±4.0) 6.7 (6.5±6.9) 
b) Referenced values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 
(within flock) - 25.0 66.0 
 
2. Avian influenza A/H7N7  
(between farms)  - 0.8 6.5 
C. Zoonotic spread articles  
c) Assumed values 1. Novel influenza virus    
 a) Human-human 1.0 2.0 (0.6±3.5) 4.1 (1.1±7.1) 
 
b) Swine-swine 2.0 - - 
 
c) Bird-bird 1.1 0.4 (0.1±0.8) 1.8 (1.1±2.5) 
Agent  Mean (95% CI)  Reference 
1(a). Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 (within-flock using 1 
day infectious period) 2.3 (2.0±2.6) (Tiensin et al., 2007) 
1(b). Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 (within-flock using 4 
days infectious period) 2.6 (2.0±3.5) (Tiensin et al., 2007) 
2. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/ H5N2 (between flock level) 1.0 (0.0±2.4) (van der Goot et al., 2003) 
3. Low pathogenic avian influenza A/LPAI H5N2 (between flock level) 1.0 (0.0±2.3) (van der Goot et al., 2003) 
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Table 2.13: Summary of basic reproductive number (R0) of influenza infection in bird and 





Table 2.14: Summary estimates of generation intervals of influenza infection in human 















    a) Estimated values 
 
1(a). Avian influenza A/H5N1 (within flock) - 25.0 66.0 
1(b). Avian influenza A/H5N1 (between villages) 2.5 (2.2±2.7) 2.0 2.1 
2(b). Avian influenza A/H7N1 (between farms) - 0.6 1.8 
3(a). Avian influenza A/H7N7 (within flock) - 1.3 - 
3(b). Avian influenza A/H7N7 (between farms) 3.3 (1.3±5.2) 3.6 (3.1±4.0) 6.7 (6.5±6.9) 
b) Referenced values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 (within flock) - 25.0 66.0 
 
2. Avian influenza A/H7N7 (between farms)  - 0.8 6.5 
C. Zoonotic spread 
 
      
c) Assumed values 1. Novel influenza virus    
 a) Human-human 1.0 2.0 (0.6±3.5) 4.1 (1.1±7.1) 
 
b) Swine-swine 2.0 - - 
 
c) Bird-bird 1.1 0.4 (0.1±0.8) 1.8 (1.1±2.5) 
Transmission 
parameter Type of spread and agent 
Median of 
means (Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range)  
Median of max. 
values (Range)  
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918  2.6 - - 
 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 3.5 2.6 (2.2±4.0) 3.2 (2.6±5) 
 
3. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1  2.1 (1.9±2.3) 1.6 (1.5±1.6) 3.8 
 
4. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2  3.1 2.2 4.0 
 
5. Influenza viruses  3.5 (3.4±3.6) 2.9 4.3 
 
6. Novel influenza viruses 2.4 1.0 3.9 
b) Referenced values  1. Pandemic influenza A/ H1N1 1918 6.0 2.8 (2.6±3.0) 5.0 ( 4.0±6.0) 
 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 3.0 (1.9±4.6) 1.6 (1±6.6)  5.0 (2.7±7.4) 
3. Novel influenza viruses  2.9 (2.6±3.4)  2.6 (2.1±3.0)  3.0 (2.7±3.8) 
 
4. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 2.4 - - 
 
5. Influenza viruses  2.8 (2.8±2.9) - - 
c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H3N2 1968 3.9 (3.5±4.2) - - 
 
2. Novel influenza viruses 2.6 2.8 4.0 
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Table 2.15: Summary of intervention parameters estimated, referenced or assumed for modeling 
influenza infection in human and bird populations. 
 
  
Intervention type  Parameter  
Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range)  
Median of max. 
values (Range)  
A. Human  
1. Antiviral treatment (AV) 
a) Estimated values 1. AV efficacy  - 70.0 75.5 (61.0±90.0) 
b) Referenced values 1. AV efficacy (%) - 30.0 (28.0±30.0) 70.0 (30.0±100) 
 2. Reduction in infectiousness (%) - 30.0 60.0 (28.0±80.0)  
 3. Reduction in susceptibility (%) - 30.0 (25.0±30.0) 30.0 (30.0±90.0) 
 4. AV coverage (%) - 50.0 (0.0±60.0) 90.0 (50.0±100) 
 5. AV treatment duration (day) - 10.0 (5.0±10.0) 10.0 (5.0±10.0) 
 6. AV use compliance (%) - 48.0 (5.0±90.0)  90.0 
c) Assumed values  1. AV efficacy (%) - 50.0 30.0 (30.0±100) 
 2. Reduction in infectiousness (%) - - 62.0 (30.0±100) 
 3. Reduction in susceptibility (%) - - 30 (30.0±100) 
 4. AV coverage (%) - 50.0 (2.0±80.0) 100 (6.0±100) 
 5. AV treatment duration (day) - 7.5 (5.0±10.0) 5.0 
 6. AV use compliance (%) - 5.0 100 (80.0±100) 
2. Vaccination      
a) Estimated values 1. Vaccine efficacy (%) - 38.75 (19.0±58.5) 57.5 (47.0±68.0) 
b) Referenced values 1. Vaccine efficacy (%) - 40.0 (20.0±70.0) 73.0 (30.0±100) 
 
2. Reduction in infectiousness (%) - 30.0 (20.0±50.0)  70.0 (40.0±90.0) 
 
3. Vaccine immune delay (days) - 7.0 42.0 
4. Vaccination coverage (%) 60.0 (50.0±60.0) 25.5 (18.0±26.0) 87.5 (69.0±100.0) 
c) Assumed values  1. Vaccine efficacy (%) - 30.0 (5.0±50.0) 70.0 (30.0±100) 
 
2. Reduction in infectiousness (%) - 50.0 (30.0±50.0) 80.0 (40.0±100) 
3. Vaccine immune delay (days) - 15.0 (0.0±15.0)  14.0 (0.0±14.0) 
 4. Vaccination coverage (%) 50.0 (30.0±50.0) 20.0 (0.0±50.0) 75.0 (7.0±100) 
3. School closure    
c) Assumed values 1. School closure contact reduction (%) 75.0 (50.0±80.0)  31.5 (30.0±33.0) 25.0 (7.0±300.0) 
 2. School closure duration (days) 14.0 (7.0 ± 28.0) 7.0 (7.0±60.0) 7.0 (0.0±56.0) 
 3. School closure delay (days) - 0.0±14.0   
4. Quarantine     
c) Assumed values 1. Quarantine contact reduction (%) 50.0 55.0 (40.0±60.0) 85.0 (30.0±100) 
 2. Quarantine period (days) 10.0 (2.0±10.0) 1.0 7.0 (3.0±21.0) 
B. Birds     
1. Quarantine     





Figure 2.1: Different model types used for modeling spread of influenza viruses in human and 
animal populations to address various research questions. Key: I = evaluate intervention 
strategies; M = describe new modeling methods and approaches; P = estimate parameters; S = 
evaluate spread; T = develop modeling platform or tool. A combination of these letters indicates 
combination of research questions of interest. (a) AA-AH-HA-HH = spread within and between 
swine and human simultaneously; (b) BB = spread between bird species; (c) BB-BH = spread 
within bird species and birds to humans; (d) BB-BH-HH = spread between birds, birds to 
humans and humans to humans; (e) HH = spread between humans. No distinction of spread is 






Figure 2.2: Different model types used for assessing various intervention strategies against 
influenza in human and animal populations. Key: A = antiviral for either or both prophylactic 
and treatment; D = include workplace closure, contact tracing, quarantine, isolation, cancellation 
of community and mass gathering, use of personal hygiene and protective equipment; M = 
movement control and depopulation in animals (including birds); S = specifically school and 
daycare closure; T = air travel restriction; V = vaccination prior to outbreak or during the 
outbreak. Combinations of letters indicate combination of these measures. (a) AA-AH-HA-HH 
= spread within and between swine and human simultaneously; (b) BB = spread between bird 
species; (c) BB-BH = spread within bird species and birds to humans; (d) BB-BH-HH = spread 
between birds, birds to humans and humans to humans; (e) HH = spread between humans. No 





Figure 2.3: Temporal trend in the research questions of interest for modeling influenza viruses in 
human and animal populations. Temporal trend in the research questions of interest for modeling 
influenza viruses in human and animal populations. Key: I = evaluate intervention strategies; M 
= describe new modeling methods and approaches; P = estimate parameters; S = evaluate 
spread; T = develop modeling platform or tool. A combination of these letters indicates 
combination of research questions of interest. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Temporal trend over the past decade in the types of modeling methods applied to 
research on influenza viruses spread and control in human and animal populations. Key: 
CHoMM = Compartmental homogeneous mixing models; CHeMM = Compartmental 
heterogeneous mixing models; IBM = Individual-based/agent-based model; NetM = Network 









One-Health Simulation Modeling: A Case Study of Influenza 




                                                     
* Dorjee, S., C. W. Revie, Z. Poljak, W. B. McNab and J. Sanchez, 2013: One-Health simulation 
modeling: A case study of influenza spread between human and swine populations using NAADSM. 




The circulation of zoonotic influenza A viruses including pH1N1 2009 and H5N1 
continue to present a constant threat to animal and human populations. Recently an 
H3N2 variant has spread from pigs to humans and between humans in limited numbers. 
Accordingly, this research investigated a range of scenarios of the transmission 
dynamics of pH1N1 2009 virus at the swine-human interface while accounting for 
different percentages of swine workers initially immune. Furthermore, the feasibility of 
using North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM) applied as a one-
health simulation model was assessed. The study population included 488 swine herds 
and 29,707 households-of-people within a county in Ontario, Canada. Households were 
categorized as: (i) rural households with swine workers, (ii) rural households without 
swine workers, and (iii) urban households without swine workers. Forty eight scenarios 
were investigated, based on the combination of six scenarios around the transmissibility 
of the virus at the interface and four vaccination coverage levels of swine workers (0% 
to 60%), all under two settings of either swine or human origin of the virus. Outcomes 
ZHUHDVVHVVHGLQWHUPVRIVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶IUDFWLRQVL]HDQGWLPHWRSHDNHSLGHPLF
day, overall size and duration of the outbreaks. The modeled outcomes indicated that 
minimizing influenza transmissibility at the interface and targeted vaccination of swine 
workers had significant beneficial effects. Our results indicate that NAADSM can be 
used as a framework to model the spread and control of contagious zoonotic diseases 
among animal and human populations, under certain simplifying assumptions. Further 
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evaluation of the model is required. In addition to these specific findings, this study 
serves as a benchmark which can provide useful input to future one-health influenza 
modeling studies. Some pertinent information gaps were also identified. Enhanced 
surveillance and the collection of high quality information for more accurate 
parameterization of such models are encouraged. 




The on-going threat of an influenza pandemic emerging in people was highlighted with 
the novel pandemic H1N1 influenza virus (pH1N1) in 2009. The pH1N1 was first 
reported in March to April of 2009 in Mexico, and spread rapidly across the world 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 2009, Fraser et al., 2009, WHO, 
2009). By 11 June 2009 a full scale pandemic was declared by the World Health 
Organization (WHO, 2009). Molecular analyses showed that the virus was genetically 
similar to contemporary viruses circulating in swine, based on livestock surveillance 
data in different continents (Garten et al., 2009, Smith et al., 2009). However, the origin 
of the virus and the exact host species involved in the reassortment remains unknown. 
The first detection of pH1N1 in swine was reported from the province of Alberta, 
Canada in May of 2009 (OIE, 2009). It was introduced into the herd by an employee 
 94 
 
(i.e. human-to-animal spread of pH1N1), who had recently returned from a vacation in 
Mexico (Howden et al., 2009). Swine-to-swine transmission of pH1N1 was 
subsequently demonstrated in several experimental (Itoh et al., 2009, Lange et al., 2009, 
Vincent et al., 2009, Brookes et al., 2010) and observational studies (Howden et al., 
2009, Lange et al., 2009, Pasma and Joseph, 2010). By April of 2010, 20 different 
countries had reported outbreaks of pH1N1 in swine (Hofshagen et al., 2009, OIE, 
2009-2010, Moreno et al., 2010, Pasma and Joseph, 2010, Pereda et al., 2010, Song et 
al., 2010, Sreta et al., 2010, Welsh et al., 2010, Forgie et al., 2011). Although the 
respective sources of many of these outbreaks remain unknown, some were confirmed 
(Norway, in addition to Canada), or were suspected (Finland, Iceland and Russia) of 
having involved human-to-swine transmission (Hofshagen et al., 2009, Howden et al., 
2009, Forgie et al., 2011). In light of these reports of pH1N1 outbreaks in swine in 
several countries, it is surprising that no studies have reported either temporal or 
temporo-spatial spread of the virus between swine farms (Torremorell et al., 2012, 
Dorjee et al., 2013). Immediately after the reported outbreaks of pH1N1 in swine in 
Canada, restrictions on the export of live pigs and pork were imposed by several 
countries (Lynn, 2009, Reuters, 2009). Even without significant documented spread of 
pH1N1 from swine to humans, the social and economic consequences arising from the 
subsequent trade restrictions were devastating. Accordingly, zoonotic influenza A 
viruses are of interest to animal and public health authorities, given their significant 
implications for public health, animal health and trade. 
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Influenza pandemics remain a major zoonotic threat to mankind, occurring every one 
to four decades since 1918 (Brown, 2000, Ma et al., 2009, Zimmer and Burke, 2009). 
Since the first report of transmission of the H1N1 1918 virus from humans-to-pigs 
(Shope, 1931), the transmission of influenza A viruses back and forth between people 
and swine has been well documented (Hinshaw et al., 1978, Easterday, 1980, Dacso et 
al., 1984, Myers et al., 2007). There is much evidence of reassortments of swine, human 
and avian influenza viruses occurring in pigs in Europe (Brown et al., 1998) and in 
North America (Zhou et al., 1999, Karasin et al., 2000, Lekcharoensuk et al., 2006, 
Olsen et al., 2006). The transmission of influenza viruses from pigs to people has been 
reported in a number of studies (Brown, 2000, Myers et al., 2007, Robinson et al., 2007, 
Ma et al., 2009, Zimmer and Burke, 2009). Recently the transmission of the H3N2 
variant from pigs-to-humans, and a subsequent limited spread between humans, was 
reported in the US (Lindstrom et al., 2012). Based on the findings of this study, swine 
should be considered potential hosts for the emergence of novel pandemic influenza 
strains. Cross-sectional serological studies found that those employed in occupations 
involving direct contact with pigs (e.g. swine-farmers, veterinarians, abattoir-workers) 
are at higher risk of zoonotic influenza infection. Swine farmers were relatively at 
higher risk than veterinarians and abattoir-workers (Olsen et al., 2002, Myers et al., 
2006). The shift to large-scale swine operations involving frequent restocking of young 
susceptible pigs has facilitated the persistence of influenza viruses in herds (Vincent et 
al., 2008, Gray and Baker, 2011). The persistent transmission pressure between swine 
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and those working with pigs in commercial swine enterprises increases the opportunity 
for zoonotic spread of novel influenza viruses (Myers et al., 2006). This being the case, 
it is important to understand the transmission dynamics of influenza at the swine-human 
interface, to devise intervention strategies. 
Recently, mathematical models and simulation tools have been developed to study 
the spread and control of influenza among human (Longini et al., 2004, Longini et al., 
2005, Flahault et al., 2009, Gojovic et al., 2009) and avian (Le Menach et al., 2006, 
Guberti et al., 2007, Tiensin et al., 2007) populations. A small number of studies have 
investigated the spread of influenza from birds-to-birds and from birds-to-humans 
(Arino et al., 2007, Iwami et al., 2007, Kim et al., 2010), whereas to the best of our 
knowledge only one study investigated the spread of influenza within and between 
swine and human populations simultaneously (Saenz et al., 2006). 
Given, (a) the impact of influenza on human health and the economy, (b) the 
importance of swine in the generation of novel influenza viruses, and (c) the utility of 
models in providing a better understanding of disease transmission and control 
dynamics; it is imperative to investigate key parameters influencing the spread and the 
effectiveness of mitigation strategies against influenza at the swine-human interface 
through simulating a range of possible scenarios. Such information can be used to guide 
the development of contingency measures to prevent and control the emergence of 
future influenza pandemics. 
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A number of computer software have been developed to implement models to assess 
the spread and control of highly contagious animal diseases, such as AusSpread (Garner 
and Beckett, 2005), InterSpread Plus (Stevenson et al., 2013) and NAADSM (Harvey et 
al., 2007, NAADSM Development Team, 2008). To date, these tools have been used to 
model single or multiple livestock species but have not attempted to incorporate spread 
between domestic animal and human populations. Most published models used to study 
spread of diseases among domestic livestock populations use the herd, rather than the 
individual animal, as the unit of interest. In contrast, most models used to study 
influenza spread among people use the individual, rather than the household or group of 
people as the unit of interest. However, a few studies in humans have investigated the 
spread and control of influenza at the individual household level (Wu et al., 2006, 
Fraser, 2007, Shaban et al., 2009). The NAADSM disease modeling framework was 
originally developed to accommodate different parameters of disease spread between 
different types of livestock herds or flocks (e.g. dairy cattle, vs. beef cattle, vs. swine, 
vs. sheep vs. goats in the spread of foot-and-mouth disease) (Harvey et al 2007). While 
the concept of using NAADSM WRPRGHOKRXVHKROGVRISHRSOHDVDW\SHRI³KHUG´ZDV
not originally envisioned in development, it was subsequently proposed by McNab 
(McNab 2009, personal communication). This approach provided the opportunity to 
model the interface of the spread and control of zoonotic diseases within and between 
groups of animals and people under certain simplifying assumptions. 
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The overall objective of this study was to identify the relative importance of disease 
transmission parameters affecting the spread and control of contagious pathogens shared 
between people and swine, using influenza as an example. Specific objectives included: 
(i) investigation of the feasibility of using NAADSM as a tool to model the spread and 
control of zoonotic diseases; (ii) a study of the transmission dynamics of influenza at the 
swine-human interface using characteristics of pH1N1 as an example; and (iii) an 
investigation of the utility of applying targeted vaccination against influenza at the 
animal-human interface. We chose to use pH1N1 as our example of zoonotic pathogen 
due to the fact that: (i) it is easily transmissible between humans, swine, and human and 
swine populations, (ii) information about the biology of this virus is relatively abundant, 
and (iii) there were several questions arising from pH1N1 concerning its dynamics at the 
human-swine interface. 
3.3 Materials and Methods 
3.3.1 Study area and populations 
A county within the province of Ontario, Canada, with a relatively high density of swine 
farms along with the existence of a range of rural and urban areas (one small city and 
four towns) was selected for this study. The following spatially explicit units were 
LQFOXGHGDV³SURGXFWLRQW\SHV´LQWKHPRGHOVLVZLQHKHUGV6+LLUXUDOKRXVHKROGV
with at least one swine worker (SWH), (iii) rural households with no swine workers 
(RH), and (iv) urban households without swine workers (UH). Swine workers 
(owners/managers/labourers of swine farms) served as the bridging population for 
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pH1N1 transmission between swine and human populations. Population data to ensure a 
representative mixture of each type of unit within the model were extracted from the 
2006 official census of Statistics Canada (Statistics Canada, 2007, Statistics Canada, 
2007(b)). A total of 488 SH with 664,508 pigs were recorded in the census year of 2006 
for the county. As only the aggregate number of SH and pigs were available at the 
census consolidated subdivision level, the number of animals per farm in the model was 
generated using a uniform distribution with minimum and maximum values of 500 and 
2500 animals respectively (±4 standard deviation from a mean of ~1500 animals). The 
number of SWH was approximately 1.5 times the number of SH, based on the data for 
swine operators and agricultural laborers (a general figure not reported by enterprise 
type) recorded in the 2006 official census. A total of 25,297 people in 8,612 rural 
households were reported in this county. Therefore an appropriate number of RH (7,879) 
was generated by subtracting the number of SWH (733) from the total rural households. 
The numbers of UH and people recorded in the five urban areas were as follows: City A 
- 13,316 households with 30,461 people; Town B - 2,733 households with 6,617 people; 
Town C - 2,731 households with 6,303 people; Town D -1,714 households with 4,220 
people; and Town E - 601 households with 1,446 people. A Poisson distribution with a 
mean of 3 and truncated at two and seven for SWH, and one and six for RH and UH 
were assumed for the number of people living in each household as per the census 




3.3.2 Swine farm and household locations 
Digital vector maps delineating the boundaries of rural and urban areas of this county 
were obtained from Statistics Canada (Statistics Canada, 2007(c), Statistics Canada, 
2007(d)). Since the specific geographic coordinates of SH, SWH, and RH were not 
available in the official census data, their locations were randomly distributed spatially 
within the agricultural areas of the county using a Geographic Information System. A 
minimum distance of one kilometer was specified between swine herds. Swine-worker 
household locations of owners/managers and laborers were generated within the radii of 
100-300 meters and 300-500 meters of SH respectively. Although some swine workers 
stay in towns, this was done to restrict the contact of a SWH to a specific farm for all 
iterations. This was achieved by also specifying the maximum contact distance between 
SWH and SH to 0.5 km. The RH locations were generated randomly in agricultural 
polygons with the additional constraint that they must be outside a 500 meters radius of 
any SH and at least a distance of 10 meters away from any other household. Similarly 
locations of UH were randomly distributed within the five urban boundaries, specifying 
a minimum distance of 10 meters between any two households. All spatial data 
manipulation and random spatial locations were generated using Quantum GIS (QGIS) 
version 6.1.0 (Open Source Geospatial Foundation Project. http://qgis.osgeo.org). 
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3.3.3 Model structure  
3.3.3.1 North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM)  
The supercomputer version of the NAADSM 3.1.24 (NAADSM Development Team, 
2008) was used for the construction and simulation of models for pH1N1 spread in 
swine and human populations. The NAADSM is an agent-based platform that simulates 
the spread of diseases in populations using stochastic, spatially explicit, state-transition 
methods. The epidemiological unit of interest within NAADSM is an aggregation of 
animals managed together as a single unit at a single geographic location, typically as a 
herd or flock. The platform was developed to simulate the spread and control of 
contagious animal diseases (e.g. foot-and-mouth disease) between spatially explicit 
groups of animals, either of the same or different species and production types. It is 
flexible in the manner in which users can define the spread of a disease between 
different pairs of units (e.g. dairy cattle to beef cattle; swine farrowing operation to 
swine grower/finisher operations, etc.). It models disease transmission between farms by 
direct contact (through movement of live animals between farms), indirect contact 
(through the movement of people and contaminated fomites) as well as airborne and 
local area spread. The local area spread feature enables a user to specify other 
mechanisms of disease spread locally through insect pests, between animals of two 
adjacent farms across the fence and as a result of lapses in biosecurity measures. It has 
provisions to quantify the predicted number of infected premises arising from a number 
of different disease intervention strategies, such as quarantine and movement control, 
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vaccination, depopulation, and zoning. Each unit is initially assigned attribute data, 
including: a unique unit ID; the type of unit (e.g. dairy, beef, swine, etc.); number of 
animals in that unit; location of the unit (i.e. point geo-coordinates in longitude and 
latitude), and disease transition state. A detailed description of NAADSM has been 
provided by Harvey et al., (2007) and Hill and Reeves (2006). 
3.3.3.2 Disease states  
A susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered (SEIR) model structure was used for each 
of the types of epidemiological units of interest described in this study (that is, SH, 
SWH, RH and UH). Susceptible units were herds or households susceptible to infection 
but not infected; exposed/latent units were those that had been infected but were not 
shedding the virus; infectious units were units shedding organisms; while recovered 
units were those that had recovered and were immune to further infection. The unit-level 
latent period was assumed equal to the time from the first individual within the unit 
became infected to the time when the first individual transited to the infectious state. 
The unit remained in the infectious state from the time when the first individual within 
the unit became infectious to the time until the last individual in that unit transited to the 
recovered state. Therefore, the unit-level latent period was equal to the duration of 
individual-level latent state, whereas a unit-level clinical infectious period varied with 
the size of the infected unit. Following infection, a susceptible unit transited through the 
subsequent disease states beginning on the day following infection in a cyclic fashion in 
the absence of any intervening control measures, such as vaccination or depopulation. 
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The duration of each of these disease states for any particular unit type was either based 
on a fixed value or was chosen stochastically from the defined probability distribution as 
described in the model parameters section below. Permanent immunity was simulated by 
setting a naturally immune duration which exceeded the duration of the simulated period 
(365 days). 
3.3.3.3 Disease transmission 
To investigate the transmission dynamics of pH1N1 between swine and human 
populations, its spread was simulated between different combinations of pairs of unit 
types as follows: (a) amongst swine herds (SH to SH), (b) between SH and SWH, and 
(c) amongst SWH, RH and UH, simultaneously. The influenza transmission among 
swine herds was simulated by both direct and indirect contacts, while the spread 
between SH and SWH, and amongst households occurred only through direct contact. A 
latently infected SH unit was also assumed infectious to other susceptible SH units by 
direct contact, as shipment of latently infected pigs to susceptible units would most 
likely result in transmission of infection. In all other cases only the infectious units 
could transmit the infection to the susceptible units. For the disease spread from SH to 
SWH and vice-versa, direct contacts were assumed to have occurred when the swine 
workers came in contact with pigs on farms (SH) during the course of their daily work. 
To ensure that each SWH was assigned to a specific farm throughout the simulation, a 
movement distance restriction zone of uniform distribution between 100±500 metres 
was created as per the synthetically generated locations of SWH described above. 
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For influenza spread amongst households, a direct contact was assumed to have 
occurred implicitly when an individual from an infectious household established contact 
with individuals from other households at any place, such as schools, workplaces or 
other areas where individuals congregate (not necessarily moving into recipient 
households in NAADSM context). Individuals who become newly infected as a result of 
contact with an infectious person outside their home could, in turn, infect infect 
individuals with their home and outside of their home. Similar assumptions have been 
made in modeling influenza spread at the household level (Wu et al., 2006, Fraser, 2007, 
Shaban et al., 2009). The influenza transmissions between infectious and susceptible 
units through direct and indirect contacts were simulated as a function of contact rate, 
the probability of infection per contact and movement distance distribution between the 
units. 
3.3.4 Model parameters 
3.3.4.1 Duration of disease states 
Parameters for both the individual and unit level duration of the different disease states 
for swine and human populations are presented in Table 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. The 
individual level parameters for swine and human populations were extracted from the 
published literature (references are provided in tables). Since no information for clinical 
infectious period existed at the herd or household levels, they were generated from the 
individual-level parameters using the WithinHerd (WH-within herd disease spread 
model) software version 0.9.5 (Reeves et al., 2013). This is a stochastic modeling 
 105 
 
framework that simulates the within-unit disease spread and generates the herd-level 
durations of disease states. The same swine and household populations were used for the 
within-unit influenza spread simulations. A BetaPERT distribution (which was the best 
fitting probability distribution of clinical infectious duration based on the output of the 
within-herd transmission model) based on the minimum, mode and maximum values of 
100 iterations of the within-unit spread models of swine herd (except for latent period 
for which a fixed value of one day was assumed) or household populations were then 
used for NAADSM models. The durations of immunity period for SH and households 
were assumed to be permanent as is commonly the case in influenza modeling studies. 
3.3.4.2 Contact frequencies 
Daily direct and indirect contact frequencies among SH were extracted from the 
published and unpublished sources (Table 3.4). Data on how frequently pairs of different 
household population types contact each other were not available. Therefore, 
assumptions based on the informed judgement of the co-authors were made. These 
assumptions, along with the average daily individual contact frequency of 13.5, 
extracted from Mossong et al., (2008) and Lee et al., (2009), were used to derive the 
mean daily contact rate between different pairs of the population types (Table 4.4). As 
SWH and RH were in rural communities, only half the individual daily contact 
frequency noted above was used here. Co-authors also discussed and used their best 
judgement to specify the movement distance distributions between source and recipient 
units for all populations. 
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3.3.4.3 Disease transmission probabilities 
In general, it is difficult to measure the transmission probability per contact and 
therefore it is mostly derived from calibrating models to match either the cumulative 
number of cases or R0 (basic reproductive number defined as a number of average 
secondary cases produced by an infectious case during the infectious period in a totally 
susceptible population) of on-going or historical outbreaks (Saenz et al., 2006, 
Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008, Vynnycky and White, 2010). Given an R0, a contact rate 
(C) and an average duration of infectiousness of totally susceptible individuals (D), 
transmission probability per contact (P- is the probability that an infection will be 
transferred between infected and susceptible units given an adequate contact) can be 
derived from the following formula (Saenz et al., 2006, Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008, 
Vynnycky and White, 2010): 
 R0 = C * P * D    
However, neither an estimate of R0 nor historical data on influenza spread between 
farms were available in the literature. Therefore, for simplicity, transmission 
probabilities of 100% and 1% were assumed for direct and indirect contacts, 
respectively. In reality, all other parameters being equal, the transmission probability 
among units will vary depending on the within-unit prevalence and the number of 
animals shipped from infected to susceptible farms. These assumptions may not be 
unreasonable as within-herd spread of influenza in swine is known to be rapid and no 
immunity is anticipated to exist in naïve recipient herds to a novel strain such as pH1N1. 
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For spread amongst households, the transmission probability per contact (P) was 
estimated from individual level data using the formula provided above. Based on the 
minimum, most likely and maximum R0 values of 1.3, 1.5, and 2.2 respectively (Fraser 
et al., 2009, Pourbohloul et al., 2009, Tuite et al., 2010), corresponding daily contact 
frequencies of 6.9, 13.1, and 18.2 (Mossong et al., 2008), and the duration of infectious 
period of 2, 7, and 10 days respectively (Pourbohloul et al., 2009, Yang et al., 2009), the 
mean and 95% confidence interval (CI) of the transmission probability was estimated 
using a Monte Carlo simulation of 1,000 iterations in PopTool version 3.2.5 (Microsoft 
Excel add-in program available at www.poptools.org). The mean of 0.024 (95% CI 
0.012±0.048) of the transmission probability per contact was obtained. This estimate 
was not dissimilar to the median value of 0.043 used by Lee et al. (2009). 
Other general assumptions made within the model were as follows: all swine and 
human populations were totally susceptible to the virus, all populations were closed with 
no addition or losses throughout the simulation period (as the mortality of pigs from 
pH1N1 is negligible [OIE, 2009], and pH1N1 mortality in humans is less than 1%); 
populations were homogeneous with mixing (both direct and indirect contacts) both 
within and between groups based on spatial probability kernel (that is units near the 
infectious unit have a higher probability of contact) and as defined by the contact 
structures. In addition, the disease spread through direct or indirect contacts between our 





The transmission dynamics and the extent of spread of pH1N1 both within and between 
swine and human populations were assessed under the two broad scenarios of the virus 
origin, from a swine herd or from urban households. Within each of these broad 
scenarios the speed, duration and magnitude of the disease spread were investigated at 
three different levels of the transmissibility (low, medium and high) at the swine-human 
interface. Six possible combinations of transmissibility of the virus at the swine-human 
interface were investigated; (i) low animal to human - low human to animal (LL), (ii) 
medium animal to human - low human to animal (ML), and so forth, as summarized in 
Figure 3.1. The values used for low (low animal to human or low human to animal) and 
high (high animal to human or high human to animal) transmissibility were equal to 
those estimated for human to human spread (P = 0.024) and swine to swine spread (P = 
1.0), respectively. A medium transmissibility (medium animal to human or medium 
human to animal) of P = 0.3 was used based on the higher value suggested by Lee et al. 
(2009). 
Each of these scenarios was investigated at four levels of initially immune SHW 
population (0%, 15%, 30%, and 60%). It was assumed that all members of the SHW 
family have been vaccinated and was 100% immune to the infection throughout each 
simulated outbreak. It was based on the assumption that a limited stockpile of effective 
vaccine was available at the very early phase of an outbreak and assessing the benefit of 
targeted vaccination of SWH population. A total of 48 scenarios was investigated in 
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assessing the transmission dynamics at the swine-human interface (Figure 3.1). In the 
case where the virus originated in swine herd the infection was seeded into a single 
randomly selected SH for all iterations. For the scenario of virus originating in human 
population it was seeded in five randomly selected UH for all iterations. Each scenario 
was simulated over 1,000 iterations in time-steps of one-day for 365 days. 
3.3.6 Statistical analyses 
7KHPRGHOV¶RXWFRPHVZHUHDVVHVVHGLQWHUPVRIWKHSDUDPHWHUVWKDWZHUHUHOHYDQWIURP
HSLGHPLRORJLFDODQGUHJXODWRU\SHUVSHFWLYHV7KH\LQFOXGHGLVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶
fraction - proportion of iterations that did not result in an epidemic outbreak; defined as 
<1% of units (total populations combined) becoming infected, (ii) time to peak epidemic 
day - day on which a highest number of infectious units was observed, (iii) epidemic 
size on peak day - number of infectious units observed on the peak epidemic day, (iv) 
outbreak duration - time to-end-of an outbreak, defined as the time until no latent or 
infectious unit was present, or a cut-off value of 365 days if the outbreak persisted 
beyond the simulated time period, and (v) outbreak size - total number of infected units. 
Summary statistics associated with these outcomes (5th, 50th and 95th percentiles of 
1,000 iterations) were generated for all scenarios. The cut-point of <1% of units infected 
ZDVFKRVHQWRGHILQHWKHµVWRFhastic die-RXW¶IUDFWLRQDVWKHSHUFHQWDJHRIXQLWVLQIHFWHG
was >30% in all other iterations. The effects of the three parameters; (i) origin of the 
virus, (ii) transmissibility of the virus at the swine-human interface, and (iii) vaccination 
of SWH on the outbreak duration and proportion of units infected were evaluated by 
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fitting the survival and binomial logistic regression models, respectively. Fitting the 
multivariable models allowed for an assessment of interaction effects between these 
parameters on the outcomes. 
An accelerated failure-time (AFT) survival model (using the generalized linear model 
(glm) function with a gamma distribution) was fitted to the epidemic duration as the 
outcome variable, and the three input parameters as predictor variables. All iterations 
were considered failed event at the end of the outbreak duration. All input parameters 
were coded as categorical variables. The origin of the virus was coded as 1 = swine 
origin (reference category) and 2 = human origin. The transmissibility of the virus at the 
interface was coded as 1 = LL (reference category), 2 = ML, 3 = HL, 4 = MM, 5 = HM, 
and 6 = HH. The vaccination coverage of SWH was coded as 1 = 0% (reference 
category), 2 = 15%, 3 = 30%, and 4 = 60%. All 2-way interactions among the predictors 
were evaluated and retained if significant at P < 0.05 and if the relative difference in the 
predicted duration of epidemic at any levels of the interaction terms was greater than 
one-week duration. This criterion was used since even a small difference between two 
interaction terms tended to exhibit statistical significance due to large sample size (each 
scenario being simulated 1,000 times). Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Cox-
Snell residual plots were used to select the best fitting AFT parametric survival model as 
well as to evaluate the overall fit of the model to the data (Dohoo et al., 2009). Residuals 
were evaluated using deviance residual and plotting the residuals against the fitted 
values or individual predictors. 
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The effect of the predictors on the size of epidemic was assessed using logistic 
regression for binomial data (glm function with binomial family distribution and logit 
link). All predictors were entered into the model as described in the survival model 
above. The number of each population type infected in each scenario was combined 
together into single outcome variable, and a variable of the population type was 
generated. This variable was coded as 1 = SH, 2 = SWH, 3 = RH, and 4 = UH. This 
allowed assessing the effects of the predictors on epidemic size for each of the 
population type using a single model. All two-way interactions among the predictors 
were examined and retained if they were significant at P< 0.05 and, if the relative 
difference in the predicted proportion of units infected at any levels of the interaction 
WHUPVZDV0RGHOGLDJQRVWLFVDQGUHVLGXDOVZHUHHYDOXDWHGEDVHGRQWKHGHYLDQFH
chi-squared test and deviance residuals. Results of the survival and the binomial logistic 
regression models are presented in terms of predicted margins of median epidemic 
duration and proportion of units infected at the representative values of the covariates. 
All analyses were implemented in Stata version 12.1 (StataCorp. 2011. Stata Statistical 
Software: Release 12. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP). 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 6WRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶IUDFWLRQ 
The stochastic nature of the modeling approach used in this study was reflected not only 
in the variability of the predicted measures, but also by the probability of an infection 
dying out without leading to an outbreak, by chance alone. We observed that 5% of the 
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24,000 iterations (equivalent to the number of simulated influenza outbreaks) underwent 
VWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶ZKHQWKHYLUXVRULJLQDWHGLQVZLQH)XUWKHUPRUHWKHPDMRULW\RIWKH
µGLH-RXW¶LWHUDtions (59%) were observed when the transmissibility of the virus at the 
swine-human interface was low (LL scenario); followed by iterations involving 60% 
YDFFLQDWLRQFRYHUDJHRI6:+)LJXUH1RVXFKµGLH-RXW¶ZDVREVHUYHGZKHQ
the infection was seeded into five randomly selected UH (human origin of the virus). 
3.4.2 Peak epidemic day and size 
It took approximately 25 days to infect the first UH in the case of the virus originating in 
swine population, whereas it took approximately 45 days to infect the first SH when the 
virus originated in the human population. The time to reach the peak epidemic day and 
the epidemic size of the peak day were estimated as the median of 1,000 iterations for 
each scenario. In general, the delay to peak epidemic day was shorter and the epidemic 
sizes of the peak days were higher as the transmissibility of the virus at the swine-
human interface increased. In contrast, as the vaccination coverage of SWH increased 
the delay to peak epidemic day was longer and the epidemic sizes of the peak days were 
smaller in both swine herd and household populations. 
As the origin of the virus, was directly correlated with delay to the peak epidemic day 
and the epidemic size of the peak day in the corresponding swine herd or household 
populations, respectively, we focused our attention on the effects of the transmissibility 
of the virus and vaccination parameters on these outcome measures to the UH origin for 
SH population, and SH origin for the household populations. In the case of SH, the 
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higher transmissibility of the virus (MM to HH) significantly shortened the delay to 
peak epidemic day by 3±5 weeks (15±26% reduction) compared with low 
transmissibility (LL to HL) across all levels of vaccination coverage (Figure 3.3). The 
delays to the peak epidemic days among LL to HL or MM to HH were practically small 
(difference of approximately less than one week i.e. <8% reduction). The differences in 
the epidemic sizes of the peak days amongst different scenarios of the transmissibility of 
the virus aWWKHLQWHUIDFHZHUHVPDOODGLIIHUHQFHRI4 infected units) across all levels 
of the vaccination coverage. 
Vaccinating 60% of SWH delayed the peak epidemic day by 2±3 weeks (14±20% 
longer) compared with the scenario with no vaccination, in the SH population across all 
levels of the transmissibility (Figure 3.3). However, the vaccination coverage up to 30% 
had only a small effect (<7% increase in the time to peak epidemic day). The differences 
in the epidemic sizes of peak days amongst various vaccination coverage levels were 
VPDOODGLIIHUHQFHRI4 infected units). 
In the household populations, the delay to peak epidemic day was longer by 
approximately 3±6 weeks (15±31% longer) when the transmissibility of the virus at the 
interface was low (LL) compared with the higher transmissibility (ML to HH) across all 
levels of the vaccination (Figure 3.4). This effect was more apparent in the scenario with 
no vaccination. The epidemic size of peak day was lower by 11±22 infected households 
(a moderate reduction of 7±15%) when the transmissibility of the virus was low (LL) 
than at the higher transmissibility levels (ML to HH). 
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Vaccinating 60% of the SWH delayed the peak epidemic day by 2±5 weeks (13±33% 
longer) and reduced the epidemic size on the peak day by 33±37 infected households (a 
moderate reduction of 20±22%) compared with no vaccination scenario. However, the 
effects of 15% to 30% vaccination coverage on these two outcomes measures were 
small (<12% change on the delay time and the epidemic sizes of the peak days). 
3.4.3 Epidemic duration 
The overall median (5th and 95th percentiles) epidemic duration was 308 (261±365) 
days. The result of the survival model on the epidemic duration indicated that an AFT 
model with gamma distribution fitted the data best. All the predictors (that is input 
parameters from the scenarios) had a significant effect on the epidemic duration. The 
only significant interaction observed was between the transmissibility of the virus and 
the proportion of SWH vaccinated. The predicted median epidemic duration was 6 days 
longer in the case where the virus originated in swine than in humans, at all levels of the 
transmissibility and the vaccination coverage. Though statistically significant, this 
difference was too small to be considered practically meaningful. The interaction effect 
between the transmissibility and vaccination was mainly due to the significant change in 
the slope (shortening of the epidemic duration) between low (LL) versus the higher 
transmissibility (ML to HH) at the low vaccination coverage (0% to 30%) (Figure 3.5). 
This means under low vaccination coverage the increase in the transmissibility of the 
virus (LL vs. ML to HH) will shorten the epidemic duration relatively more (3±6% 
reduction) compared with the vaccination coverage of 60% (1±3% reduction). 
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The deviance residuals did not indicate any particular outlying observation, except 
IRUWKHVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶IUDFWLRQLWHUDWLRQV([FOXGLQJWKHVHLWHUDWLRQV
increased the predicted median epidemic duration up to 7% for the origin of the virus 
and for the interaction term between the transmissibility and vaccination coverage. 
3.4.4 Epidemic size 
The overall median (5th±95th percentiles) of infected units were 83% (67±98%) of SH, 
69% (34±99%) of SWH, 54% (47±58%) of RH, and 35% (34±36%) of UH. The logistic 
regression results showed that the effect of the transmissibility and the targeted 
vaccination of SWH on the epidemic size depended (significant interaction) on the 
population types (Figure 3.6). Furthermore, the interaction effect between the 
transmissibility and the vaccination on the epidemic size was significant. The proportion 
of SH infected was significantly higher when the transmissibility of the virus from 
human to animal was higher (MM to HH) compared to when it was low (LL to ML) 
(Figure 3.6 (a)). However, the magnitude of the difference was relatively larger (by 9±
13%) at vaccination coverage of 60% compared with coverage of 0±30%. While the 
vaccination coverage up to 30% caused a small reduction (1±8%) in the proportion of 
SH infected, 60% coverage had significant reduction (8±21%), particularly at the low 
transmissibility of the virus from human to animal spread (LL to ML) (19±21% 
reduction). 
For the SWH units, a significant difference in the proportion of SWH infected was 
observed between the low (LL) versus higher transmissibility (ML to HH) of the virus 
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(Figure 3.6 (b)). Furthermore, this difference was relatively larger when SWH were 
vaccinated (15% to 60%) compared to no vaccination, a difference of 12±17% vs. 4±5% 
respectively. Similarly vaccination reduced the proportion of SWH infected by 13±68%, 
with relatively larger reduction at the low transmissibility of the virus (LL). While the 
vaccination caused a small reduction in the percentage of RH infected (up to 9% 
reduction), the transmissibility of the virus had negligible effect on the proportion of RH 
and UH infected (Figure 3.6 (c) and (d)). 
The overall goodness-of-fit test of the final model using deviance chi-squared test 
showed a significant lack of fit (P<0.001) with a deviance over-dispersion parameter of 
0RVWREVHUYDWLRQVZLWKH[WUHPHGHYLDQFHUHVLGXDOVZHUHWKHVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶
fraction. Excluding these observations improved the fit of the model substantially (a 
deviance over-dispersion parameter of 4.87). However, 18% of the iterations still had 
deviance residuals greater than or less than ±3. These residuals were spread over all 
covariate patterns and were related to the stochastic variability in the outcome within the 
same covariate pattern. In contrast to statistical modeling of risk factors, the proportion 
of ill-fitting residuals from the predicted outputs actually provides insight into stochastic 
variability in the predicted outcome by chance alone. Since there was no reason to 
exclude thHVHREVHUYDWLRQVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶IUDFWLRQWKHUHVXOWV




Several questions related to the transmission dynamics of zoonotic influenza viruses at 
the swine-human interface have recently been raised by infectious disease control 
authorities around the world, including the potential benefit of targeted vaccination of 
swine workers. To address these questions, in this study we investigated the 
transmission dynamics of pH1N1 2009 virus between swine and human populations by 
modeling its spread amongst and between swine and human populations simultaneously. 
Furthermore, the benefit of vaccinating varying proportions of SWH was assessed. To 
our knowledge (Dorjee et al., 2013) only a single study has modeled the spread of 
zoonotic influenza between swine and human populations simultaneously (Saenz et al., 
2006). Our approach differs from that of Saenz et al., (2006) in a number of ways. Most 
importantly: (a) this is a stochastic, spatially explicit agent-based model with the unit of 
simulation being the farm or household, while the previous study used an aggregate 
deterministic model with homogeneous mixing, (b) we categorized the non-swine 
worker human population into a mix of rural and urban households, (c) we assessed the 
effect of different levels of transmissibility of the virus at the swine-human interface, 
while the previous model investigated the amplifying effect of the influenza spread in 
rural population by swine and swine worker populations. It should be noted that the 
emphasis of our study involved a qualitative investigation of the effects of different 




7KHVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶IUDFWLRQ observed in cases of a single infection seeded 
into the SH population indicates a fraction of outbreaks that can be expected to undergo 
random extinction without causing an outbreak of epidemic proportion, given the 
assumptions inherent in this model. The fact that the majority of this fraction was 
observed in cases that assumed low transmissibility of the virus at the interface (LL) 
and/or where 60% of the SWH were vaccinated, indicates the beneficial effect of 
lowering the transmissibility of the virus or of achieving high coverage of targeted 
vaccination as a means of preventing a proportion of outbreaks. Although, the 
magnitude of this effect will be affected by the location of the index premise and the 
density of the populations surrounding it, we would expect to observe such phenomena 
in real-world situations. The extent to which such location-specific effects might be a 
factor could not be ascertained due to the fact that the current version of the NAADSM 
lacks the ability to randomly seed infections at different locations for each iteration. 
The significant difference between the scenarios of low (LL to ML) versus medium 
to high (MM to HH) transmissibility of the virus from humans to animals in terms of all 
outcome measures in SH population indicated that the spread of the virus from humans 
to animals had a larger impact than the animal to human spread. To a large extent this 
was due to higher contact rate between SH and SWH than between SH units. This result 
suggested that if we are to obtain a significant and positive beneficial effect on the 
outcome measures we should reduce the transmissibility of the virus from humans to 
animals to this low level. Reducing it to the low level would significantly prolong the 
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time to peak epidemic, lower the epidemic size of the peak day, as well as the overall 
outbreak size in the SH population. Similar significant beneficial effects of lowering the 
transmissibility of the virus at the interface would be obtained even in the household 
population. However, the transmissibility of the virus both from animals to humans and 
vice-versa had to be reduced to the low level (LL). The lowering of the transmissibility 
of the virus to the LL level also had the beneficial effect of reducing the overall size of 
the epidemic in SWH population. The positive implication of delaying the time to peak 
epidemic day is that veterinary and public health authorities would be provided with 
more time to mobilize resources and implement appropriate disease response measures, 
such as the delivery of antivirals, vaccination, or other social distancing measures. 
Furthermore, reducing the epidemic size on the peak day should reduce the burden of 
disease control activities (such as movement control and vaccination in animals) 
including the burden on health care facilities. 
An important finding of this study is that it highlights the crucial role the 
transmission dynamics of influenza at the swine-human interface can play in influenza 
spread between swine and human populations. It indicated that opportunities exist to 
prevent or minimize the outbreak of zoonotic influenza by lowering the transmissibility 
of the virus at this interface. Transmissibility of the virus at the swine-human interface 
can be minimized through various mechanisms, including the following: good personal 
hygiene, avoiding direct contacts with sick pigs, using appropriate face masks (e.g. N95 
respirator mask) and gloves, and not smoking while working with pigs (Ramirez et al., 
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2006), instructing swine-workers to stay away from work when suffering from influenza 
like illnesses, and following strict farm biosecurity measures. As significant differences 
in the outcome measures were observed between low and medium to high levels of the 
transmissibility, further sensitivity analysis needs to be carried out between low and 
medium range of values to determine the threshold level at which a significant 
beneficial impact can be achieved. It is recommended that studies are carried out to 
quantify the percentage reduction in infection achieved through these important 
preventive measures at the swine-human interface to improve the parameterization of 
future modeling studies. 
The transmissibility of the virus at the swine±human interface had little or negligible 
impact on the epidemic size in the RH and UH populations. This might suggest that 
once the infection has been introduced in the rural or urban populations it would spread 
in these populations independent of its spread at the swine-human interface, given the 
relatively larger population sizes and higher contact rates. 
Significant beneficial effects on all the outcome measures were observed as the level 
of targeted vaccination of SWH increased, though the most significant changes were 
observed when 60% coverage was reached. These effects were most evident in the SH 
and SWH populations and to a lesser extent in the RH population. Its effect was 
negligible on the proportion of UHs infected, likely for similar reasons to those 
mentioned for the transmissibility above. Within the model, we assumed that an 
effective vaccine was available prior to the influenza outbreak. Questions still remain as 
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to whether such a vaccine would be readily available during the emergent phase of a 
novel virus. However, if a limited amount of such vaccine were to be available early on 
in an outbreak, targeting swine workers in cases where the virus was of swine origin 
should prove beneficial. Future work could investigate the effect of vaccinating similar 
proportions of the rural and/or urban populations. 
3.5.1 Issues and information gaps associated with this modeling approach 
In common with other modeling studies in this domain, a number of simplifying 
assumptions were made. For example, all populations were considered static and closed 
(that is we assumed no addition or removal of farms or households occurs during the 
simulation, and unit sizes are fixed throughout the simulation), and all populations were 
100% susceptible to the influenza virus. Furthermore, contacts between populations of 
the county being modeled and neighbouring counties were ignored, which is not realistic 
as some movements of infected and susceptible populations between counties would be 
expected. Another simplifying assumption made was that once a single individual on a 
farm or in a household become infectious, that farm or household itself was infectious. 
This is an inherent assumption inbuilt into NAADSM Version 3.1.24. In reality all 
animals on a farm or individuals in a household may not become infected, though 
studies have shown that the large majority of animals do become infected during 
influenza outbreaks in farms (Howden et al., 2009, OIE, 2009-2010, Pasma and Joseph, 
2010). Even the household secondary attack rates for pH1N1 were estimated in the 
range of 13% to 50% (Cauchemez et al., 2009, Ghani et al., 2009, Yang et al., 2009, van 
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Gemert et al., 2011). The probability of transmission is likely to be influenced by the 
within-farm or within-household prevalence of disease, but this effect was not 
accounted-for in the current study. Furthermore, the effect of animal shipment size on 
the transmission probability for direct contacts between SH units was not considered. In 
reality we would expect the transmission to be influenced by both within-farm 
prevalence and shipment size. 
For simplicity all swine farms were treated as a homogeneous population; in reality 
epidemic size and length of disease outbreak will likely vary by farm type (farrowing, 
grower, finishing, etc.) as has been observed for classical swine fever (Dürr et al., 2013). 
6LPLODUO\LQKXPDQSRSXODWLRQVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VVXVFHSWLELOLW\WRLQIOXHQ]DYLUXVHV
including pH1N1, will vary by age and family size (Cauchemez et al., 2009, Yang et al., 
2009, van Gemert et al., 2011). Other occupational groups such as veterinarians, abattoir 
workers, and swine transporters, who come into contact with swine, may play an 
important role in influenza spread but these groups were not considered in this study. 
Information on how long a household would remain infectious was not available. 
However, deriving the period of household infectiousness from the individual data using 
the methods within NAADSM seems a reasonable approach. Furthermore, information 
on contact frequencies between SWH, RH and UH were not available with assumptions 
being based on the informed judgement of co-authors, which may have introduced some 
bias in the estimates. Due to time constraints, extensive sensitivity analysis to examine 
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the effects of all these parameters on the modeled spread of the virus was not carried 
out. 
Despite reports of several outbreaks of pH1N1 across the globe in both human and 
swine populations, and the heightened interest in gaining a better understanding of the 
transmission dynamics involved at the swine-human interface, only one study was found 
that reported transmission back from pigs to humans (Howden et al., 2009). Although, it 
can be difficult to determine the direction and quantify the transmission of pH1N1 
spread between humans and swine, it would be useful to carry out some prospective 
studies of transmission to generate key modeling parameters. Furthermore, no study 
could be found that reported the transmission of pH1N1 from one farm to another, either 
through direct shipment of animals or indirect contact (through movement of swine 
workers, veterinarians, and other fomites). More representative studies to estimate 
different stages of pH1N1 or other influenza virus infection at the farm level may 
provide useful information to parameterize models in the future. 
3.5.2 Feasibility of NAADSM for zoonotic disease modeling 
Observations from this study suggest that NAADSM provides a feasible platform for 
modeling directly transmitted contagious zoonotic diseases between animal and human 
populations under simplifying assumptions similar to those adopted in this study. 
NAADSM provides a sophisticated, flexible and user-friendly software platform. It is 
particularly useful to people with a biology background who do not possess strong 
mathematical or computer programming skills (as are typically required to make 
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appropriate use of other modeling software). Building model structures and specifying 
parameters relating to transmission and control strategies can be easily achieved within 
NAADSM as it requires only the specification of parameter values in the form of fixed 
values, probability density functions or relational functions. The software also has 
features to generate graphs, summary statistics, and to compare outcomes across as a 
range of different scenarios. In addition, NAADSM has features to assess all key 
intervention strategies either alone or in combination. These are relevant from a 
regulatory perspective, but are equally applicable to exploring issues relating to the 
public health. 
One of the main constraints of using NAADSM for zoonotic disease modeling in 
animal and human populations simultaneously is that its unit of simulation has to be the 
household level. However, some of the studies mentioned above also emphasized the 
practicality of implementing control measures at the household rather than on an 
individual level in human populations. Nevertheless, good quality information on the 
natural history of influenza infection, its spread, contact rates at the household level are 
required to parameterize a model. For this purpose, a work similar to that reported by 
van Gemert et al., (2011) would be useful. The NAADSM does not have the flexibility to 
incorporate heterogeneity within a unit for parameters such as the contact rates, risk or 
susceptibility to a zoonotic agent that may vary significantly according to social 
demographics such as age or sex. Such heterogeneity is often an important component in 
models of human disease spread. It is also not possible to assign more than a single 
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location for each unit, in contrast to many human disease spread models where 
individuals can be assigned to two or more locations, such as the home, 
school/workplace, community or other places of social gathering. The NAADSM 
simulates the disease spread based not only on the contact rate and transmission 
probabilities, but also as a function of spatial distance between source and recipient 
units. However, households or people even in close geographic proximity may not have 
any contact between one another to facilitate influenza spread. Spatial location becomes 
largely irrelevant unless a disease spreads locally through aerosol transmission. There is 
currently no option in NAADSM to exclude spatial contact distance from being a key 
element of disease spread. This study addressed the issue to some extent by specifying 
larger spatial distances of contact between the units and assuming homogenous mixing 
between units within the specified distance. The NAADSM version used in this study 
lacks the capability to seed the infection in a population randomly for each iteration of 
the scenario. Even though each scenario was simulated for 1,000 iterations it did not 
capture the variability expected due to random seeding of infection in a population at 
different locations. It would be expected that the speed and extent of spread including 
VWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶IUDFWLRQZRuld be influenced to a certain extent by the density of 
population around the index unit. Despite these limitations, the stochastic modeling 
approach which NAADSM supports can be considered relatively superior to simple 
deterministic homogeneous and perfect mixing models. A major limitation of the 
personal computer version of the NAADSM observed is the time taken to simulate 
 126 
 
populations of a significant size. Despite being run on a powerful Windows-based 
machine the 100 iterations of this study population with 30,195 units took around 4 days 
to complete. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this is a unique one-health modeling study which investigated the 
simultaneous spread of pH1N1 both within and between swine and human populations. 
It provided useful insights into how manipulating the transmission dynamics of pH1N1 
at the swine-human interface can alter the spread of an influenza epidemic in swine 
and/or human populations, and illustrated the beneficial effects of targeted vaccination 
of swine workers. Minimizing transmissibility at the swine-human interface through 
appropriate mechanisms including targeted vaccination should form key components of 
all pandemic contingency measures for zoonotic influenza. The effect of preemptive 
targeted vaccination of swine workers seems useful as opposed to reactive 3 km ring 
vaccination of animals and people (Chapter 4). This study also serves as a benchmark 
for future studies to improve the modeling approaches of zoonotic influenza including 
other directly transmitted zoonotic diseases further through enhanced surveillance and 
collection of quality information to parameterize models accurately. This study also 
illustrated that the NAADSM is a feasible and relatively flexible platform for modeling a 
spread of directly transmitted zoonotic influenza between swine and human populations 
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Table 3.1: Description of study populations and probability density functions of the size of units 
used for the simulation of influenza spread between swine and human populations in a country 
of Ontario, Canada. 
Population units Total no. of 
units 
Distribution of size of units  Total no. of 
individuals 
Swine-herds (SH) 488 Uniform(min = 500; max = 2500) 733,107 
Swine-worker-households (SWH) 733 Truncated Poisson(mean = 3, min = 2; max = 7) 2,325 
Rural non-swine-worker-households (RH) 7,879 Truncated Poisson(mean = 3, min=2; max=7) 25,521 
Urban-households(UH) 21,095 Truncated Poisson(mean = 3, min = 2; max = 6) 54,038 
Total 30,195  814,991 
Units refers to swine herds or households and individual means a pig or a person.  
 
 
Table 3.2: Parameters and their probability density functions for swine farms used in the 
simulation of influenza spread between swine and human populations in a county of Ontario, 
Canada. 
Input parameters Individual Herd level References 
Latent period (day) 1a Fixed value of 1b (Lange et al., 2009, Brookes et al., 2010, Vincent 
et al., 2010)a;  
Generated from the individual-level parameters 
using WH 0.9.5 software b; 
(Blaskovic et al., 1970, Desrosiers et al., 2004)c;  
Assumed permanent immunity by using a value 
greater than the duration of the simulation period 
(365 days)d 
Subclinical infectious (day) 0±6a BetaPERT(0, 3, 6)b 
Clinical infectious (day) 1±15a BetaPERT (5; 25;45)b 
Immune period (day) 365±840c Fixed value 366d 
WH 0.9.5 is the software that simulate within-herd disease transmission stochastically and generates 
herd-level durations of disease states (Reeves et al., 2013). 




Table 3.3: Parameters and their probability density functions for households used in the 
simulation of influenza spread between swine and human populations in a county of Ontario, 
Canada. 
Input parameters Individual      Household References 
Latent period (day) 1±3a BetaPERT (1, 2, 3)b (Boëlle et al., 2009, Pourbohloul et al., 2009, Tuite 
et al., 2010)a;  
Generated from the individual-level parameters 
using WH 0.9.5 software b; 
Assumed permanent immunity by using a value 
greater than the duration of the simulation period 
(365 days)c 
Subclinical infectious (day) 0±3a BetaPERT (0, 2,3)b 
Clinical infectious (day) 4±10a BetaPERT (4, 12, 20)b 
Immune period (day) - Fixed value of 366c 
WH 0.9.5 is the software that simulate within-herd disease transmission stochastically and generates 
herd-level durations of disease states (Reeves et al., 2013). 




Table 3.4: Contact structure and influenza transmission parameters used in the simulation of 
influenza spread between swine and human populations in a county of Ontario, Canada. 
Parameters were extracted from the references with the matching superscript letters.  
 
Key: SH = Swine herds, SWH = Swine-worker-households, RH = Rural non-swine-worker-households, 
UH = Urban households. 
  
 Contact type Mean 
contacts/day 
Distance distribution of 






Swine to swine  
SH-SH (Direct contact) 0.06a BetaPERT(0.8, 20, 100)b 1c (Bates et al., 2001, 
Christensen et al., 2008) and 
unpublished data from 
Ontario Veterinary Collegea; 
Assumption based on the 
informed judgement of the 
co-authorsb; Assumed based 
on experimental studies 
(Lange et al., 2009, Brookes 
et al., 2010, Vincent et al., 
2010)c; 
Bases on the assumptions 
explained in the main textd; 
Assumed once/week based 
on the informed judgement 
of the co-authors and 
multiplied by half the 
individual contact rate from 
Lee et al., (2009) and 
Mossong et al., 2008 
(2008)e; Derived from R0 
value of pH1N1 2009 as 
explained the textf. Assumed 
5 times/week based on the 
informed judgment of co-
authors multiplied by half 
the individual contact rate 
from Lee et al., (2009) and 
Mossong et al., 2008 
(2008)g; Assumed once/year 
based on the informed 
judgment of the co-authors 
and multiplied by the 
individual contact rate from 
Lee et al., (2009) and 
Mossong et al., 2008 
(2008)h; Assumed 
twice/year based on the 
informed judgment of co-
authors multiplied by the 
individual contact rate from 
Lee et al., (2009) and 
Mossong et al., 2008 
(2008)i; Based on the 
individual contact rate from 
Lee et al., (2009) and 
Mossong et al., 2008 (2008)j 
SH-SH (Indirect contact) 0.196a BetaPERT (0.8, 20,100)b 0.01b 
Swine to human 
SH-SWH 1d Uniform(0.1, 0.5)b (0.024/0.3/ 1d 
Human to swine 
SWH±SH 1d  Uniform(0.1, 0.5)c (0.024/ 0.3/1)d 
Human to human 
SWH-SWH 0.857e BetaPERT(0.5, 20, 100)b (0.024)f 
SWH-RH 4.286g BetaPERT(0.1, 10, 30)b (0.024)f 
SWH-UH 0.857e BetaPERT(1, 30, 65)b (0.024)f 
RH-SWH 0.857e  BetaPERT(0.1, 10, 30)b (0.024)f 
RH-RH 4.286g  BetaPERT(0.01, 20, 100)b (0.024)f 
RH-UH 0.857e BetaPERT(1, 30, 65)b (0.024)f 
UH-SWH  0.036h BetaPERT(1, 30, 65)b (0.024)f 
UH-RH 0.071i  BetaPERT(1, 30, 65)b (0.024)f 





















Figure 3.1: Graphical description of scenarios used for the simulation of the simultaneous spread 
of pandemic influenza H1N1 2009 virus between swine and human populations in a county of 
Ontario, Canada. Key: AH = animal to human, HA = human to animal, SWH- 0% to 60% refers 
to the percentage of swine worker households vaccinated prior to the disease outbreak with the 




scenarios of the simultaneous spread of the influenza (swine origin) between swine and human 
populations. These scenarios consisted of combinations of the six levels of transmissibility of 
the virus at the swine-human interface and four levels of the vaccination coverage of swine-
worker-household population. Each scenario was simulated for 1,000 iterations. Transmissibility 
abbreviations are outlined in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.3: Epidemic curves illustrating the spread of the influenza in the swine herds (SH) in 
the case of virus originating in the urban households under the different levels of transmissibility 
of the virus at the interface, and at the two levels of the vaccination coverage of the swine-
worker-households (SWH). As the effects of transmissibility at the 15% to 30% vaccination 
coverage levels were similar to the scenario when none was vaccinated, only the epidemic 
curves at 0% and 60% vaccination coverage levels are shown. Transmissibility abbreviations are 
outlined in Figure 3.1. 
  
   
   
Figure 3.4: Epidemic curves illustrating the spread of the influenza in the household population 
in the case of virus originating in a swine herd under the different levels of transmissibility of 
the virus at the interface, and at two levels of the vaccination coverage of the swine-worker-
households (SWH). As the effects of the transmissibility of the virus of the 15% to 30% 
vaccination coverage were similar to that of a scenario when none was vaccinated, only the 
epidemic curves at 0% and 60% vaccination coverage are shown. Transmissibility abbreviations 

























































































































Figure 3.5: The interaction plot for the transmissibility of the virus at the interface and the 
vaccination of the swine-worker household population on the predicted median epidemic 
duration for the influenza outbreaks in the case of the virus originating in a swine herd. The 
effects were similar in the case of virus originating in the urban households. Key: SH = swine 
herds; SWH = swine-worker households; RH = rural non-swine-worker households, UH = urban 
households. Transmissibility abbreviations are outlined in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: The interaction plots for the transmissibility of the virus at the interface and the 
vaccination of the SWH population on the proportion of units infected for the influenza 
outbreaks in the case of the virus originating in swine herd. The effects were similar in the case 
of virus originating in the urban households. Key: SH = swine herds; SWH = swine-worker 
households; RH = rural non-swine-worker households, UH = urban households. Transmissibility 
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One-Health Simulation Modeling: Assessment of Control 
Strategies against the Spread of Influenza between Swine and 




                                                     
* Dorjee, S., C. W. Revie, Z. Poljak, W. B. McNab, J. T. McClure and J. Sanchez, 2013: One-Health 
simulation modeling: Assessment of control strategies against the spread of influenza between swine and 




Simulation models implemented using a range of parameters offer a useful approach to 
identifying effective disease intervention strategies. The objective of this study was to 
evaluate the effects of key control strategies to mitigate the simultaneous spread of 
influenza among and between swine and human populations. We used the pandemic 
H1N1 2009 virus as a case study. The study population included swine herds (488 
herds) and households-of-people (29,707 households) within a county in Ontario, 
Canada. Households were categorized as: (i) rural households with swine workers, (ii) 
rural households without swine workers, and (iii) urban households without swine 
workers. Seventy two scenarios were investigated based on a combination of the control 
parameters: speed of detection, quarantine strategy, effectiveness of movement 
restriction, and ring vaccination strategy, all assessed at three levels of transmissibility 
of the virus at the swine-human interface. Results showed that the speed of detection of 
the infected units combined with the quarantine strategy had the largest impact on the 
size and duration of outbreaks. A combination of fast to moderate speed of the detection 
(where infected units were detected within five to 10 days since first infection) and 
quarantine of the detected units alone contained the outbreak within the swine 
population in most of the simulated outbreaks. Ring vaccination had no added beneficial 
effect. In conclusion our study suggests that the early detection (and therefore effective 
surveillance) and effective quarantine had the largest impact in the control of the 
influenza spread, consistent with earlier studies. To our knowledge no study had 
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previously assessed the impact of the combination of different intervention strategies 
involving the simultaneous spread of influenza between swine and human populations. 
Keywords: One-health, modeling, zoonotic diseases, influenza, pigs, humans, NAADSM 
 
4.2 Introduction 
Pandemics caused by influenza A viruses, including the most recent outbreak involving 
the pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 virus (pH1N1), continue to present a significant 
zoonotic threat to human and animal populations. Constant outbreaks of H5N1 in Asia 
(OIE, 2013), and recent outbreaks of a novel swine-origin H3N2 variant virus in the 
United States (Lindstrom et al., 2012), and bird-origin H7N9 virus in China (Gao et al., 
2013, Uyeki and Cox, 2013) are examples of the current public health concerns. Many 
countries have developed influenza pandemic preparedness plans following the World 
Health Organization guidelines to prevent or mitigate the impact of future influenza 
pandemics (WHO, 2011). The main mitigation measures against influenza pandemics 
are public health measures (also known as non-pharmaceutical) and medical or 
pharmaceutical interventions (WHO, 2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, Halloran et al., 2008, 
Lee et al., 2009). Public health measures include personal hygiene such as hand 
washing, the use of personal protective equipment (face-masks, gloves, etc.), and social 
distancing measures (quarantine and isolation, school closure, restrictions on gathering 
at public events and on travel, etc.). The main medical interventions against influenza 
include anti-viral prophylaxis and treatment, as well as vaccination. 
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Recently, computer simulation and mathematical models have been widely used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of intervention strategies against influenza pandemics. In 
human populations these have included simulations that evaluate individual intervention 
strategies or a combination of such interventions (Lee et al., 2009, Dorjee et al., 2012). 
Relatively few simulation modeling studies have been reported that seek to assess the 
control of influenza outbreaks in animals (Dorjee et al., 2012). Only, one modeling 
study has investigated the simultaneous spread of influenza among and between swine 
and human populations (Saenz et al., 2006). This is despite the fact that swine are 
widely considered to be a potential host for the emergence of novel pandemic influenza 
strains, and frequent reports of the transmission of influenza between swine and people 
(Myers et al., 2006, Myers et al., 2007, Ma et al., 2009, Zimmer and Burke, 2009, 
Lindstrom et al., 2012). Several countries have reported the transmission of pH1N1 
2009 virus from humans to swine (Nelson et al., 2012). Therefore, it is imperative to 
understand the transmission dynamic of influenza and the effectiveness of the mitigation 
strategies at the swine-human interface. 
Models enable the researcher to simulate thousands of virtual influenza outbreaks and 
evaluate the effectiveness of control strategies under a range of scenarios, which cannot 
feasibly be implemented in real-world situations. The outcomes of such studies can 
guide and inform the development of contingency plans and policy for preparedness and 
response to future pandemic threats (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, Germann et al., 2006, Halloran et al., 2008, Basta et al., 2009, 
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Gojovic et al., 2009, Tuite et al., 2010). A systematic review of models evaluating 
effectiveness of combination strategies for pandemic influenza response in human 
populations concluded that the combination of several control measures proved more 
beneficial than the use of only one particular measure (Lee et al., 2009). Most models in 
human populations assessed the intervention strategies that were targeted at the 
individual. Few studies in humans have also investigated the spread and control of 
influenza at the household level (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, Wu et al., 
2006, Fraser, 2007, Shaban et al., 2009). Indeed, these studies noted that targeting 
intervention strategies such as isolation and quarantine, or vaccination and anti-viral 
prophylaxis at the household level was more pragmatic and likely more effective than at 
the individual level. In this case, the approach is similar to the types of disease control 
strategy that are implemented for livestock at the farm level. Targeting intervention 
measures at the household level in human population offers the added advantage of 
ensuring that the granularity of the simulation unit is the same for both animal and 
human populations. This enables the modeling of zoonotic disease spread and control 
between animal and human population simultaneously using readily available modeling 
platform like North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM). The NAADSM 
has built-in features to evaluate the effectiveness of the main disease control strategies 
against contagious diseases of livestock. These include the speed of disease detection 
and reporting, forward contact tracing of infected units, quarantine, vaccination and 
 146 
 
depopulation with or without zoning (disease control area within a specified radius) 
(Harvey et al., 2007). 
While the previous study (Chapter 3) assessed the transmission dynamic of the 
pH1N1 2009 at the swine-human interface, this study was aimed to further use 
NAADSM to evaluate different control strategies against the spread of contagious 
zoonotic pathogens among and between swine and human populations. Specifically it 
evaluated the effectiveness of different intervention strategies such as the speed of 
detection of outbreaks, quarantine and movement control, and ring vaccination against 
the simultaneous spread of pH1N1 2009 between swine and human populations. 
4.3 Materials and Methods 
4.3.1 Study area and populations 
The same study area and populations described in Chapter 3 were used for this study. 
Briefly a county within the province of Ontario, Canada, with relatively high density of 
swine farms along with the existence of a range of rural and urban areas (one city and 
four towns) was selected. Swine herds (SH) and household population data were 
extracted from the official census of 2006 (Statistics Canada, 2007, Statistics Canada, 
2007(b)) to ensure the correct representation of each of these populations within the 
model. Household populations were categorized as: (i) rural households with at least one 
swine worker (SWH), (ii) rural households without swine workers (RH), and (iii) urban 
households without swine workers (UH). The SWH units served as the bridging 
population for pH1N1 2009 virus transmission between swine and human populations. 
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The sizes of swine herds and households were generated as described in Chapter 3. The 
study population consisted of: 488 SH, 733 SWH, 7,879 RH and 21,095 UH. Since the 
specific geographic coordinates of all units were not available in the official census data, 
their geo-coordinate locations were randomly assigned within the agricultural areas (SH, 
SWH, and RH) and urban areas of the county. 
4.3.2 Model structure  
4.3.2.1 North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM)  
The supercomputer version of NAADSM 3.1.24 (NAADSM Development Team, 2008) 
was used for the construction and simulation of the models. NAADSM is a computer 
modeling platform for simulating the spread and control of contagious diseases in 
animal populations, either of the same or different species, or production types. It uses a 
stochastic, spatially explicit, state-transition method. The unit of disease spread is 
simulated at the farm or household level. It has provisions to evaluate the effectiveness 
of a number of different intervention strategies, such as: speed of detection, quarantine 
and movement control, vaccination, and depopulation. The effectiveness of these 
measures can be evaluated with or without a disease control zone of a certain radius, 
along with forward contact tracing. A detailed description of NAADSM has been 
provided by Harvey et al, (2007) as well as by Hill and Reeves (2006). 
4.3.2.2 Disease states and transmission 
The disease spread model structure (susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered (SEIR)) 
and, contact structure among swine herds (SH to SH), between SH and SWH, and 
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among SWH, RH and UH were described in Chapter 3. Susceptible units consisted of 
herds or households that were not infected but were vulnerable to an infection; 
exposed/latent units were those that had been infected but were not shedding organisms; 
infectious units are units shedding organisms; while recovered units were those that had 
recovered and were immune to further infection. Permanent immunity was simulated by 
setting duration of immunity longer than the simulated period (365 days). 
For the influenza spread between SH and SWH, a contact was assumed to have 
occurred when the swine workers came in contact with pigs on farms (SH) during the 
course of their daily work. Similarly, for its spread amongst households, a contact was 
assumed to have occurred implicitly when an individual from an infectious household 
established an adequate contact with individuals from other households at any place, 
such as schools, workplaces or other social congregations. Individuals who become 
newly infected through contact with infectious person outside their home in turn infect 
other members at home and outside their home. The influenza transmissions between 
infectious and susceptible units through direct and indirect (spread between SH units 
through contaminated fomites) contacts were simulated as a function of contact rate, the 
probability of infection per contact and movement distance distribution between the 
units. 
Furthermore, all assumptions of the model, including influenza transmission between 
units in different disease states, their transition from one state to another, and parameters 
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relating to disease states, contact frequencies between pairs of units, and their 
transmission probabilities outlined in Chapter 3 were adopted for this study. 
4.3.2.3 Control strategies 
The scenarios used for the evaluation of the control strategies against the influenza 
spread between swine and human populations are outlined in Figure 4.1. Three control 
strategies were evaluated: (i) quarantine without zoning where only detected units were 
quarantined (No-zone strategy), (ii) quarantine with zoning where all units (both swine 
herd and household populations) within a zone of 3 km radius were quarantined (With-
zone strategy), and (iii) With-zone strategy plus ring vaccination of susceptible units 
(both swine herd and household populations) within a zone of 5 km radius of the 
detected unit. The size and duration of an influenza outbreak will depend on how soon 
an outbreak is detected to implement control measures, the type of control strategies, 
and effectiveness of implementation of these control strategies. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of these control strategies were evaluated at three levels of speed of 
detection (slow, moderate and fast), two levels of the effectiveness of movement control 
of the quarantined units (less-effective and effective), and two levels of the speed of 
commencement of ring vaccination (slow-trigger and fast-trigger). Furthermore, these 
control strategies were evaluated at three levels of transmissibility of the virus at the 
swine-human interface: (i) low animal to human - low human to animal (LL), (ii) 
medium animal to human - low human to animal (ML), and (iii) high animal to human - 
medium human to animal (HM). Seventy two scenarios of various combinations of the 
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control strategies and the transmissibility of the virus at the swine-human interface were 
simulated. 
Detection in NAADSM is defined as the product of two probabilities, (a) the 
probability of observing clinically ill and infectious units over time multiplied by (b) the 
probability of reporting such an observed unit over time (Hill and Reeves, 2006, Harvey 
et al., 2007). Each of these probabilities changes over time and it can be incorporated 
into the model as a linear function (Table 4.1 (a)). The probability of observing clinical 
signs would be expected to increase over time as more pigs in a swine herd or 
individuals in a household exhibit clinical signs. Similarly the probability of reporting 
the detected infected units would be expected to increase over time due to a greater 
awareness following detection of the first few infected units. The fast, moderate and 
slow detections were defined as detection of 98% of infected units in 5, 10 and 20 days, 
respectively (Table 4.1 (a)). Not all infected units would be detected and reported. In 
this model, we assumed 2% of the infected units would never be detected. Furthermore, 
the detection was assumed to be 100% specific. 
In NAADSM once infected units were detected, they were quarantined and no direct 
contact from or to these units was allowed. However, indirect contacts from and to the 
detected units was allowed. In the models the influenza spread was simulated through 
both direct and indirect contacts among SH units, direct contact from SWH to SH units, 
and indirect contact from SH to SWH, and among household populations (SWH, RH 
and UH). To accommodate this in NAADSM an area of five-meter radius zone was 
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imposed around a given detected unit (SHs and households) to restrict even the indirect 
contact to achieve the No-zone quarantine strategy. For the quarantine with zone 
strategy both direct and indirect contacts of all susceptible units within the 3 km radius 
of a detected unit were restricted. Forward contact tracing of all the direct and indirect 
contacts upon the detection of an infected unit was implemented for all population types. 
However, backward tracing was not implemented as the NAADSM version used for this 
study does not support this feature. All the direct and indirect contacts from the detected 
unit within 5 days (approximate maximum incubation period of the influenza infection) 
with a certain percentage of success were conducted (Table 4.1 (a)). All units 
successfully traced in this manner were automatically quarantined. 
Quarantine measures were implemented as a percentage reduction in the baseline 
contact rate (both direct and indirect contacts) associated with the detected infected 
units, or of all units within the disease control zone (with-zone strategy). It is not 
expected that a 100% movement restriction will be achieved in any disease outbreak 
situation. Therefore two scenarios, (a) less-effective and (b) effective reflecting the 
effectiveness of movement restrictions of the quarantined units were evaluated (Table 
4.1 (a)). Both the movement restriction strategies achieved 95% and 80% reduction of 
the baseline direct and indirect contact rates. However, in the effective strategy it was 
achieved in less than 5 days, whereas the same reduction was achieved in less than 10 
days in the less-effective strategy. These assumptions were made based on the expert 
opinion of co-authors as there was no information on these parameters in the literature. 
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For the control strategy incorporating ring vaccination, the speed of initiation of the 
vaccination was evaluated using a slow and fast response (Figure 4.1). In the slow-
trigger scenario, the vaccination of all susceptible units within a radius of 5 km was 
triggered upon detecting 25 or more infected units. The fast-trigger began upon 
detecting 5 or more infected units (Table 4.1 (b)). A seven day delay in the onset of the 
immunity from the time of vaccination was assumed for households (Bresson et al., 
2006, Leroux-Roels et al., 2007, Milne et al., 2009) and SH (Lange et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the vaccine was assumed to be 100% protective with permanent immunity. 
The daily ring vaccination capacity increased from 20 units to a maximum of 300 units 
per day within five days of starting vaccination for all populations. 
For each simulated outbreak, the infection was seeded (index case) into a single 
randomly selected swine herd (latent state). Each scenario was run for 1,000 iterations. 
Each of the iterations ran until no infected units remained in the populations or until 365 
days had been simulated in the case of persistence of the infection. In all scenarios the 
randomly selected index swine herd was kept fixed. This was a choice limited by the 
version of NAADSM 3.1.24 (NAADSM Development Team, 2008) used in this study 
since it had no feature of seeding the infection randomly in a population at each 
iteration. 
4.3.3 Statistical analyses 
7KHPRGHOV¶RXWFRPHVZHUHDVVHVVHGLQWHUPVRIWKHGXUDWLRQRIWKHRXWEUHDNDQGWRWDO
number of infected units. Summary statistics of these outcomes under each scenario of 
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speed of detection, quarantine, movement restriction and ring vaccination strategies 
were generated. Furthermore, the effects of these control strategies at the three levels of 
the transmissibility of the virus at the interface were evaluated by fitting the survival and 
negative binomial regression models, for outbreak duration and number of infected 
units, respectively. Fitting these multivariable models allowed for assessment of 
interaction effects among control strategies on the outcomes. 
An accelerated failure-time (AFT) survival model (using the generalized linear model 
function) was fitted with outbreak duration as the outcome variable, and the input 
parameters as the predictor variables. The predictors were entered into the model as 
categorical variables. The speed of detection was coded as 1 = Slow, 2 = Moderate, and 
3 = Fast, quarantine strategy was coded as 1 = No-zone and 2 = With-zone, movement 
restriction as 1 = Less-effective and 2 = Effective, ring vaccination strategy as 1 = No-
vaccination, 2 = Slow-trigger and 3 = Fast-trigger. All meaningful 2-way interactions 
among the predictors were evaluated and retained in the model if they were significant 
at P < 0.05 and if the difference in the predicted duration of the outbreak between any 
levels of the interaction term was greater than one-week duration. This criterion was 
used because even a small difference between the two interaction terms could be 
statistically significant simply due to large sample size. Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Cox-Snell residual plots were used to select the best fitting AFT parametric 
model and to evaluate the overall fit of the model, as described in Dohoo et al., (2009). 
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Residuals were evaluated using deviance residual and plotting it against the fitted values 
or individual predictors. 
The effect of the predictors on the size of the outbreak was assessed using a negative 
binomial regression model. All predictors were entered into the model as described in 
the survival model above. Instead of building a separate model for each population type, 
the size of outbreak in each population type was combined into a common outcome 
variable, and the population type was entered into the model as a categorical predictor 
(coded as 1 = SH, 2 = SWH, 3 = RH, and 4 = UH). All meaningful two-way interactions 
among the predictors were examined and retained if they were significant at P< 0.05 and 
if the difference in the predicted number of infected units between any levels of the 
interaction term was >10 units. Model diagnostics and residuals were evaluated based 
on the deviance residual. 
The results of the survival and the negative binomial regression models were 
presented in terms of predicted margins of median epidemic duration and number of 
infected units at the specific representative values of the covariates. All analyses were 
implemented in Stata version 12.1 (StataCorp. 2011. Stata Statistical Software: Release 




4.4.1 Epidemic duration 
The summary statistics on the effect of the each control strategy (unconditional 
association) on the duration and size of the outbreak are presented in Table 4.2. The 
overall median (5th±95th percentiles) of the outbreak duration was 40 (21±234) days. The 
speed of the detection had a major impact on the outbreak duration. The median 
duration was approximately two times longer for the slow detection compared with the 
other two detection levels, and with minimal difference between moderate and fast 
detection strategies. The median values of the duration of two the quarantine strategies 
were similar. However, their 95% percentile was relatively longer for the no-zone 
quarantine strategy (only detected units were quarantined). A similar pattern was 
observed for the ring vaccination scenarios, with the duration of outbreak longest for the 
no-vaccination scenario. 
The AFT survival model with log-logistic distribution fitted the data best. All the 
control strategies had statistically significant effects on the outbreak duration. However, 
the difference in the median duration of outbreaks between ring vaccination and without 
ring vaccination strategies (ring vaccination category 2 or 3, versus 1) was 5 days, which 
was practically not meaningful. As such, the ring vaccination strategy variable was 
excluded from the final model. Significant interactions between the effects of speed of 
detection and quarantine strategy, and between speed of detection and movement 
restriction strategy on the outbreak duration were observed. These effects were similar 
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at all the three levels of the transmissibility of the virus at the interface. Therefore, only 
the results at the high transmissibility (HM) are presented. The interaction plot of speed 
of detection and quarantine strategy showed that the effect of these two control 
strategies depended upon each other (Figure 4.2 (a)). The outbreak duration was 208 
days (4 times) longer in the case of no-zone quarantine strategy than with-zone strategy 
at the slow speed of the detection. However, this difference was small (<4 days) 
between the two quarantine strategies either at the moderate or fast speed of detection. 
These effects showed the similar pattern but of lesser magnitude when the movement 
restriction was more effective than when it was less effective (a difference of 35 days). 
The interaction plot at the less effective movement restriction strategy only is presented 
in Figure 4.2 (a). Similarly, the outbreak duration was 238±239 days (6±8 times) longer 
when the speed of detection was slow than when it was moderate to fast at the no-zone 
quarantine strategy. However, this difference was relatively smaller (34±40 days longer) 
under the with-zone quarantine strategy. Similar interaction effects between the speed of 
detection and the movement restriction strategies on the duration of outbreak were 
observed (Figure 4.2 (b)) at both levels of the quarantine strategies. However, the 
magnitude of the difference was much smaller in the no-zone strategy than with-zone 
strategy. 
4.4.2 Epidemic size 
The overall percentages of units infected was <1% (median values) for all the 
population types. The overall 95th percentile of units infected was: SH 10%, SWH 11%, 
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RH 3% and UH 1%. The summary statistics of the effect of each control strategy 
(unconditional association) on the size of the outbreak in SH and household populations 
are presented in Table 4.2. The size of the outbreak (median value) was relatively larger 
when the detection was slow than moderate or fast, with minimal difference between the 
latter two detection levels. Although, the median values of the size of outbreak were 
same between quarantine or movement restriction strategies, or among ring vaccination 
strategies, the 95% percentiles were considerably larger in the no-zone quarantine than 
with-zone strategy, and without the ring vaccination than with ring vaccination 
strategies. 
The multivariable negative binomial regression results showed that all the control 
strategies, except the vaccination strategy (P = 0.172) had a statistically significant 
effect on the size of the outbreak in all the population types. All two-way interactions 
between the control strategies and population type on the size of outbreak were 
significant. Furthermore, the interactions between the speed of detection and quarantine 
strategy or movement restriction strategy were significant. These effects were again 
similar at all three levels of the transmissibility of the virus at the interface. Therefore, 
only results at the high transmissibility of the virus (HM) are presented. The interaction 
effect between the speed of detection and quarantine strategy on the size of outbreak 
suggested that imposing quarantine zone around the detected units was beneficial only at 
the slow detection level (Figure 4.3). No difference in the size of the outbreak was 
observed between the two quarantine strategies at the moderate or fast detection levels. 
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These effects were similar in all the population types at both the levels of movement 
restriction strategies. However, the magnitude of difference between the two quarantine 
strategies on the size of the outbreak at slow detection was smaller at the effective than 
less effective movement strategies; less by 33 and 174 units in SH and UH populations, 
respectively. 
Similarly, the size of outbreak between the two movement restriction strategies was 
significantly different at the slow detection level, with no difference observed in 
moderate or high detection levels (Figure 4.4). Furthermore, the difference in the effect 
was observed only at the no-zone quarantine strategy. No difference between the two 
movement restriction strategies was observed at all levels of the detection at the with-
zone quarantine strategy (Figure not shown). 
4.4.3 Model and residual diagnostics 
The smallest and largest deviance residuals of the AFT survival model were -3.43 and 
5.10 respectively. However, less than 1% of the iteration had the deviance residuals 
above or below r3. The deviance chi-squared goodness-of-fit test of the negative 
binomial model did not indicate any lack of fit (P = 0.999). The smallest and largest 
deviance residuals of negative binomial regression were -4.14 and 9.62 respectively. 
However, less than 1% of the iterations had the deviance residuals above or below r3. 
Therefore the numbers of outlying residuals were as within the acceptable range. 
Excluding these iterations with outlying residuals had negligible impact on the estimates 
of both the models. No patterns in the distribution of these outlying residuals were 
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observed in terms of the covariate patterns. Therefore these residuals might explain the 
extent of the stochastic variation over and above those explained by the predictors in the 
models. 
4.5 Discussion 
This study evaluated the effectiveness of key control strategies against the simultaneous 
spread of the influenza between swine and human populations using the NAADSM 
modeling platform. We used pH1N1 2009 virus as a case study because it is easily 
transmissible between human and swine populations (Howden et al., 2009, Nelson et al., 
2012). Simulations of thousands of virtual disease outbreak events under a defined set of 
input parameters in the model offer a useful tool to identify effective intervention 
strategies. Results from such studies can provide guidance for making policy decisions 
and developing disease contingency plans and preparedness for future pandemic threats. 
To our knowledge (Dorjee et al., 2012) no study has investigated the combination of 
intervention strategies in situations involving influenza spread between swine and 
human populations simultaneously. 
The results of this study showed that under the assumptions given in the models, 
differences in speed of detection had the largest effect on the size and duration of the 
outbreaks. They suggested that a fast to moderate speed of detection (98% detection 
within 5 to 10 day period) combined with quarantine of detected units along (No-zone 
quarantine strategy) would control the outbreak in 30±40 days with only a single SH 
unit and no household unit infected in most instances (Figure 4.2 (a) and Figure 4.3). If 
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the detection of the majority of infected units (41±98% of the units) was delayed by 11±
20 days (Table 4.1), the implementation of the zone-based quarantine strategy (in which 
both the infected and susceptible units within a 3 km radius of the detected infected 
units are quarantined) was a better alternative strategy. It could be argued that even the 
slow detection defined in this study was relatively effective because in reality it might 
take weeks to a few months to recognize a novel influenza virus originating in swine to 
be of potential pandemic threat. Its effective transmission from person to person would 
have to be known before serious public health intervention measures are initiated. 
However, if control measures were implemented in a manner defined in this study for 
any serious influenza outbreak in swine, irrespective of knowing its potential pandemic 
threat to people, the outbreak can be contained within the swine population alone. This 
would mitigate the likelihood of occurrence of future influenza pandemics. The 
transmission of the influenza from swine to swine workers can be prevented following 
strict personal hygiene and protective equipment, including anti-viral prophylaxis in the 
case of influenza outbreaks, preventing serious threat to human health. 
A similar time-frame for speed of detection and implementation of control measures 
was used for pandemic influenza spread in humans by Longini et al (2005), where delay 
times of 7, 14, or 21 days after the detection of the first case were evacuated. However, 
Ferguson et al (2005) used the threshold of 20 or more cases (individuals rather than 
households) to initiate the implementation of the control strategies, as opposed to a 
delay measured in days. The finding that speed of detection has the largest impact on the 
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modeled outcomes in this study was consistent with these other studies that evaluated 
the similar control strategies targeted at the household level and used zones of a certain 
radius around infected cases (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, Shaban et al., 
2009). 
The results also suggested that ring vaccination did not offer additional beneficial 
effect when combined with the detection and the movement restriction level defined in 
this study. It will likely be challenging to achieve the vaccination capacity of 300 units 
per day, or early onset of vaccination immunity, and 100% protective level that were 
assumed in this study. However, even considering this best case scenario, it had no 
added beneficial effect. Therefore decreasing the ring vaccination capacity or protective 
level, or delaying onset of the ring vaccination capacity will not make any differences, 
given the other assumptions in the models. Additional sensitivity analysis to assess the 
effects of further delaying the speed of detection, reducing effectiveness of movement 
restriction (that is the compliance rate of quarantine measure) and various ring 
vaccination options at a wide range of reproductive numbers or varying rates of 
transmissibility of the virus could be explored in future studies using the present model. 
For this study we have evaluated the effect of control strategies under the scenario of the 
pH1N1 seeded (index case) in a swine farm only, due to time constraint and due to the 
fact that a novel influenza virus may most likely originate in animal than human 
populations. However, it would be worthwhile for future studies to evaluate the effects 
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of similar control strategies under scenario where the virus was seeded in a human 
population.  
In this study the control strategies were targeted at the farm or household levels, in 
contrast to most studies in human populations where control strategies are targeted at the 
individual (Germann et al., 2006, Nuno et al., 2007, Yasuda and Suzuki, 2009, Tsai et 
al., 2010, Tuite et al., 2010). However, other studies have highlighted the importance of 
evaluating the spread and control strategies targeted at the household level together with 
zones of certain radius (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, Wu et al., 2006, 
Fraser, 2007). These studies justify such approaches on the basis that most influenza 
transmission occurs within households and that cases tend to be clustered within 
localities. Furthermore, they highlight the fact that anti-viral treatment and prophylaxes, 
as well as quarantine measures, are more practical and effective if targeted at the whole 
household and/or a zone of a certain radius, rather than at the individual. For these 
reasons the need to estimate influenza spread parameters, such as the reproduction 
number at household level, had been emphasized (Cauchemez et al., 2004, Ferguson et 
al., 2005, Fraser, 2007). Therefore, a choice as to the granularity of simulation unit and 
approach to control strategy evaluation adopted in this study, were consistent with the 
approaches highlighted as being important by a number of other authors. 
The results of this study suggest that NAADSM is a feasible platform on which to 
model the simultaneous spread and control of contagious zoonotic diseases between 
swine and human populations. The main limitation of this study was the lack of 
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empirical data on pH1N1 outbreaks in a usable form at the swine herd or household 
levels to calibrate a model for the evaluation of different intervention strategies. 
However, this study provides useful insights into the effect of strategic combinations of 
intervention measures, with findings that were similar to those arising from studies that 
modeled influenza spread in only human populations. It should be noted that this study 
was not intended to generate quantitative predictions; rather it attempted to provide a 
better qualitative assessment of the combination of control strategies. 
A number of 1$$'60¶Vgeneral limitations were outlined in Chapter 3. In addition, 
when modeling control strategies some of the limitations include: it assumes the 
detection is 100% specific (no false positives), no capability for tracing the contacts of 
detected units backward, units are quarantined permanently till the end of the simulation 
period, and there is no capability to assess the effects of school or workplace closure 
along with the quarantine of households. Imposing permanent quarantine measures for 
swine herds may be realistic but this is not the case for households, particularly when 
the duration of the outbreak is prolonged. In human studies the members of infected 
households have typically been quarantined for 7±21 days (Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, Wu et al., 2006). The NAADSM version used in this study does 
not have a specific feature to evaluate the effectiveness of the anti-viral treatment or 
prophylaxis measures. The feature evaluating the ring vaccination can be used to mimic 
anti-viral prophylaxis by setting the delay time to immunity to one day following ring 
vaccination. However, this approach would mean that it would not be possible to assess 
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the effectiveness of the anti-viral and vaccination strategies simultaneously. In addition, 
ring vaccination or anti-viral treatment would be assumed to be 100% protective, which 
is not likely realistic. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This study demonstrated that effective quarantine based on the early detection of 
infected units alone would have the largest impact in limiting influenza outbreaks in 
swine populations with negligible spread to humans, given the assumptions in the 
model. Chapter 3 concluded the pre-emptive vaccination of swine workers was useful. 
In contrast, the models developed in this chapter suggest that reactive ring vaccination 
(up to 5 km radius), did not provide significant benefit. The modeling approach and 
evaluation of the effectiveness of a combination of key control strategies assessed in this 
study is suitable for modeling contagious zoonotic pathogens as they spread among and 
between animal and human populations. Furthermore, this study demonstrated that 
NAADSM offers a feasible and readily useable platform for such an undertaking. It is 
recommended that concerted efforts should be made to collect relevant information on 
influenza outbreaks in swine and human populations to better parameterize such models 
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Table 4.1(a): Parameters of control strategies used for simulation models of the simultaneous 
spread of pandemic influenza H1N1 2009 virus between swine and human populations in a 
county in Ontario, Canada. 
*These cumulative probability distributions were converted to a daily probability distribution using spreadsheet 
provided by Neil Harvey of the University of Guelph and entered into the models. § This applies to the direct contacts 
of undetected units of swine herds (SH) and swine worker households (SWH) in with-zone strategy as the direct 
contacts of all the detected units were automatically quarantined with 100% effectiveness as a default setting in 
NAADSM. The contacts between pairs of households were simulated by indirect contact. 
  
Parameters  Parameter values 
Swine herd Household 
1. Speed of detection Day Slow Moderate Fast Slow Moderate Fast 
(a) Probability of observing clinical signs 
given the number of days that a unit is 
clinically infectious*  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.8 
3 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.95 
5 0.25 0.8 0.99 0.5 0.9 0.99 
10 0.5 0.99 - 0.8 0.99 - 
15 0.9 - - 0.9 - - 
20 0.99 - - 0.99 - - 
(b) Probability of reporting an observed 
clinical unit given the number of days 
since any unit was first detected * 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0.1 0.25 0.7 0.1 0.25 0.7 
3 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.9 
5 0.7 0.9 0.99 0.7 0.9 0.99 
10 0.8 0.99 - 0.8 0.99 - 
15 0.9 - - 0.9 - - 
20 0.99 - - 0.99 - - 
(c) Probability of the overall detection 
[(a)*(b)] 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1 0.01 0.1 0.49 0.01 0.1 0.56 
 3 0.1 0.36 0.81 0.15 0.42 0.86 
 5 0.18 0.72 0.98 0.35 0.81 0.98 
 10 0.4 0.98 - 0.64 0.98 - 
 15 0.81 - - 0.81 - - 
 20 0.98 - - 0.98 - - 
2. Quarantine strategy Radius Radius 
(a) No-zone strategy - quarantine of detected units 
only (however a zone of this radius was imposed 
to control the indirect contacts between SH to SH, 
and SH to SWH, and among household units) 
0.005 km  0.005 km  
(b) With-zone strategy ± quarantined all units within 
a zone of this radius around the detected units.  
3 km 3 km 
3. Effectiveness of movement control  









(a) Movement restriction of direct contacts of 
undetected units within the disease 
control zone (With-zone strategy only) 
0 1.0 1.0 1.0§ 1.0§  
1 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 
3 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.1 
5 0.3 0.05 0.3 0.05 
10 0.05 - 0.2 - 
(b) Movement restriction for indirect 
contacts upon detection for both No-zone 
and With-zone strategy)  
0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 
3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 
5 0.3 0.05 0.3 0.05 
10 0.2 - 0.2 - 
4. Forward contact tracing Trace success (%) Trace success (%) 
(a) Probability of trace success for the movement that 
occurred within five days of detection for direct 
contacts 
0.95 1.0 
(b) Probability of trace success given days before the 




Table 4.1(b): Parameters of vaccination strategies used for simulation models of the 
simultaneous spread of pandemic influenza H1N1 2009 virus between swine and human 
populations in a county in Ontario, Canada 
Parameters Parameter value for both swine herds & Households 
5. Vaccination  No-vaccination Slow-trigger Fast-trigger 
(a) Threshold level to start vaccination - XQLWVGHWHFWHG XQLWVGHWHFWHG 
(b) Whether to vaccinate all unit types - Yes Yes 
(c) Delay to immunity following 
vaccination of units (all units) 
- 7 days 7 days 
(d) Vaccine immune period - Permanent Permanent 
(e) Radius of the ring vaccination - 5 km  5 km 
(f) Number of units vaccinated per day 
(all units) 











Table 4.2: Summaries of the outcomes generated from the simulation of 1,000 stochastic iterations of 
each scenario of the simultaneous influenza spread between swine and human populations in a county in 
Ontario, Canada. The figures presented are median and 5th±95th percentiles of the distributions. 
Scenarios  Outbreak duration (days) 
No. of units infected  
Swine herds Households 
i. Speed of the detection 
  
 
Slow 74 (28±324) 6 (1±236) 9 (0±426) 
Moderate 38 (22±66) 2 (1±7) 0 (0±7) 
Fast 32 (20±46) 1 (1±3) 0 (0±3) 
ii. Quarantine strategy 
   
No-zone (detected infected units only) 40 (21±343) 2 (1±253) 1 (0±459) 
With-]RQHDOOXQLWVZLWKLQDUDGLXVRINP 39 (21±97) 2 (1±14) 1 (0±21) 
iii. Movement restriction 
   
Less-effective 41 (22±235) 2 (1±49) 1 (0±165) 
Effective 39 (21±233) 2 (1±48) 1 (0±160) 
LY5LQJYDFFLQDWLRQDOOXQLWVZLWKLQ km radius) 
   
No ring vaccination 40 (21±296) 2 (1±190) 1 (0±377) 
Slow-trigger (over 25 infected units detected) 39 (21±97) 2 (1±14) 1 (0±20) 





















Figure 4.1: The description of scenarios used for assessing the control strategies against the 
simultaneous spread of pandemic influenza H1N1 2009 virus between swine and human 
populations in a county of Ontario, Canada. The infection was seeded in a single randomly 
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2. Mod. = 6-10 
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95% reduction  
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Figure 4.2: The interaction effects of control strategies on the duration of the outbreaks: (a) 
speed of detection and quarantine strategy, and (b) speed of detection and movement restriction 
strategy. The error bar shows the predicted 95% confidence intervals of the duration of the 
outbreak. Only the results of high animal to human ± medium human to animal (HM) 
transmissibility of the virus are shown. Key: No-zone = quarantined the detected infected units 
only; With-zone = quarantined all units around the 3 km radius of the detected infected units. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The interaction effects of speed of detection and quarantine strategy on the size of 
the outbreaks. The error bars show the predicted 95% confidence intervals of the size of the 
outbreaks. Only the results of high animal to human ± medium human to animal (HM) 
transmissibility of the virus at the Less-effective movement restriction strategy are shown. Key: 
No-zone = quarantined detected infected units only, With-zone = quarantined all units within 3 
km radius of the detected infected units; SH = swine herds; SWH = swine worker households; 



























































































































Figure 4.4: The interaction effects of speed of detection and movement restriction strategy on 
the size of the outbreaks. The error bars show the predicted 95% confidence intervals of the size 
of the outbreaks. Only the results of high animal to human ± medium human to animal (HM) 
transmissibility of the virus at No-Zone quarantine strategy are shown. Key: (a) SH = swine 
herds, (b) SWH = swine worker households, (c) RH = rural non-swine worker households, (d) 
































































Network Analyses of Swine Shipments in Ontario, Canada, to 






                                                     
 Dorjee, S., C. W. Revie, Z. Poljak, W. B. McNab and J. Sanchez, 2013: Network analysis of swine 
shipments in Ontario, Canada, to support disease spread modeling and risk-based disease management. 




Understanding contact networks is important for modeling and managing the spread and 
control of communicable diseases in populations. This study characterizes the swine 
shipment network of a multi-site production system in southwestern Ontario, Canada. 
'DWDZHUHH[WUDFWHGIURPDFRPSDQ\¶VGDWDEDVHOLVWLQJVZLQHVKLSPHQWVDPRQJ
swine farms, including 20 sow, 69 nursery and 162 finishing farms (Network A), and 
farms to 91 processing units (PUs - Network B) for the two-year period of 2006 to 2007. 
Several network metrics were generated. Network A and B were analyzed using one-
mode and two-mode network methods respectively. The number of shipments per week 
between pairs of farms and farms to PUs ranged from 1±6 and 1±4, respectively. In 
network A, the medians (and ranges) of out-degree were: sow 6 (1±21), nursery 8 (0±
25), and finishing 0 (0±4), over the entire two-year study period. Corresponding 
estimates for in-degree of nursery and finishing farms were 3 (0±9) and 3 (0±12) 
respectively. Outgoing and incoming infection chains (OIC and IIC), were also 
measured. The medians (ranges) of the monthly OIC and IIC were 0 (0±8) and 0 (0±6) 
respectively, with very similar measures observed for intervals of two-weeks. Nursery 
farms exhibited high measures of centrality. This indicates that they pose greater risks of 
disease spread in the network. Therefore, they should be given a high priority for disease 
prevention and control measures affecting all age groups alike. The Network A also 
demonstrated scale-free and small-world topologies as observed in other livestock 
shipment studies. This heterogeneity in contacts among farm types and network 
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topologies should be incorporated in simulation models to improve their validity. 
Limited results based on two-mode analysis using Network B are presented to illustrate 
the potential of extending the network analysis. In conclusion, this study provided useful 
epidemiological information and parameters for the control and modeling of disease 
spread among swine farms, for the first time from Ontario, Canada. 
Keywords: Network analysis; swine; pigs; shipments/movement; modeling parameters 
 
5.2 Introduction 
The shipment of animals between farms is one of the main mechanisms of spread of 
infectious disease among livestock (Gibbens et al., 2001, Mansley et al., 2003, Kiss et 
al., 2006a, Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006, Poljak et al., 2008). Recently, network analyses 
have been applied to describe and quantify animal shipments between farms, and to 
study their implications for disease spread and control (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2006, Kiss 
et al., 2006b, Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006, Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007, Dubé et al., 2008, Kiss 
et al., 2008, Martinez-Lopez et al., 2009a, Vernon and Keeling, 2009, Lockhart et al., 
2010, Volkova et al., 2010, Nöremark et al., 2011). Analyses of animal shipment 
networks help identify heterogeneity in contact frequency and the connectedness of the 
network. They also identify whether these contacts are permanent (for example, through 
trade agreements between farmers) or differ over time or distance. Knowledge of these 
network characteristics is useful to assess disease spread in a population (Kiss et al., 
2006a, Martinez-Lopez et al., 2009b, Dubé et al., 2011, Nöremark et al., 2011). 
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Furthermore, it can provide guidance for targeted tracing, surveillance and disease 
control measures. Farms with high out-degree (number of off-farm links) can act as a 
key source of disease spread, whereas farms with high in-degree (number of onto-farm 
links) are at relatively greater risk of disease introduction since they receive shipments 
from many farms. Farms with both high out-degree and in-degree can act as hubs for 
disease spread in a network. For example, once a disease infects so called hub farms, it 
can spread rapidly in a scale-free network (Shirley and Rushton, 2005b, Ortiz-Pelaez et 
al., 2006). Strategically applying control measures at such hubs (including quarantine, 
vaccination or stamping out) will be more effective than similar control measures 
applied randomly. For risk-based surveillance, farms with low in-degree but high out-
degree (low probability but high consequences) can be targeted to mitigate high impact 
of exotic disease introduction (Cameron, 2012). Whereas farms with high in-degree 
(high probability of infection) can be targeted for high surveillance sensitivity and 
demonstration of freedom from disease (Cameron, 2012, Frossling et al., 2012). Disease 
spread may be relatively slower in a small-world network, but it can spread to 
topologically more distant clusters and facilitate more persistent infection in the 
population, than in random or scale-free networks (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008, 
Rahmandad et al., 2011). 
Network component analyses (where components are more highly connected sub-
regions of a network), have been used to estimate the likely lower and upper limits of 
epidemic-sizes (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2006, Kao et al., 2006, Kiss et al., 2006b, Robinson 
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et al., 2007). However, Dubé et al. (2008) DUJXHGWKDW³LQIHFWLRQFKDLQ´PHDVXUHVZKLFK
take into consideration the temporal sequence of livestock shipments between farms) 
may provide better estimates of a potential epidemic size. Furthermore, understanding 
animal movement networks can support regionalization and compartmentalization 
approaches to disease control, as encouraged by the World Organization for Animal 
Health (OIE). This would allow the identification of groups of regions or farms that 
behave as a single epidemiological unit (referred to as a compartment) in terms of risk 
for disease transmission, as well as risk-free groups with no links to infected groups. 
This can facilitate resumption or continuation of trade from disease-free regions, or even 
from risk-free herds within an infected region (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007, Martinez-
Lopez et al., 2009b). 
Knowledge of contact networks facilitates more realism in simulation modeling of 
the spread and control of disease in human (Eubank et al., 2004, Longini et al., 2005, 
Aparicio and Pascual, 2007, Hsu and Shih, 2010, Rahmandad et al., 2011), and animal 
populations (Green et al., 2006, Kiss et al., 2006a, Kiss et al., 2008, Sharkey et al., 2008, 
Vernon and Keeling, 2009, Dubé et al., 2011). Examples of input parameters required 
for such models include: the number of contacts each farm has, topologies of contact 
networks, frequency and size of shipments, as well as movement distances between 
farms (Morris et al., 2001, Garner and Beckett, 2005, Harvey et al., 2007). 
Pork production is a major industry in Canada. Accordingly, an outbreak of a highly 
contagious disease among Canadian swine would have a significant negative 
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socioeconomic impact. Analyses of swine shipment networks have been reported from 
several jurisdictions, but not yet from Canada to date (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007, 
Martinez-Lopez et al., 2009a, Nöremark et al., 2011, Rautureau et al., 2012, Buttner et 
al., 2013). Therefore, the objectives of this study were to generate farm and network 
level contact measures, from the swine industry of the Province of Ontario, Canada, that 
are important for the development of simulation models and to support disease 
management strategies. 
5.3 Materials and Methods 
5.3.1 Study populations 
Data used in this study described shipments of pigs among 251 farms (20 sow, 69 
nursery and 162 finishing farms), and farms to 91 PUs (abattoirs and small-scale 
processing units) from January 2006 to December 2007. The study data were provided 
by a large swine health and management company, which serviced the above described 
farms, located across 15 counties in southwestern Ontario, Canada. Sow farms 
comprised a mixture of farrow-to-wean and farrow-to-finish operations. Nursery farms 
consisted of a mixture of farms rearing pigs of approximately 3±10 weeks of age 
(nursery) and approximately 3 weeks to market age (wean-to-finish). Finishing farms 
housed pigs at approximately 10 weeks to market age. Information recorded in the 
database included unique identity numbers (IDs) of the premises, owners, managers, and 
of batches of swine managed and moved as groups. In addition, shipment dates, IDs of 
source and destination premises, farm type, number of animals on the farms, the number 
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of animals in shipments, and types of animals shipped were also recorded in the 
database. The management company did not own any of the farms but provided health 
and management services, including the maintenance of swine shipment data for the 
swine producers. The farms were owned by 33 different owners with some owners 
owning multiple farms. Each farm was located on a unique land parcel and was 
managed by a different farm manager. Shipments of pigs from one farm to another were 
not limited to farms belonging to a same owner. Not all farms located in the area were 
serviced by this one company. Therefore, the data did not include all swine shipments 
during the study period, among all farms in the 15 counties. However, the data were 
considered to be representative of the Ontario swine industry because the vast majority 
of the swine farms in the province employ intensive multi-site production systems, 
similar to the farms managed by this company. The emphasis of this study was the 
network of swine movements influencing spread of disease between farms. Accordingly, 
a detailed analysis of the network of swine shipments from farms to abattoirs was not 
included. 
5.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Statistics were estimated describing the number of swine-shipments per week between 
different farm types, and farms to PUs, for the two-year period of 2006 and 2007. Also, 
distributions of the sizes of farms and shipments were generated. Farm size represented 
the number of sows (excluding piglets), nursery or finishing pigs that a farm can 
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accommodate. The median value for shipment size was used in cases of multiple 
shipments between any specific pair of study premises. 
5.3.3 Network analysis 
Patterns of swine shipments among farms, and farms to PUs were characterized using 
network analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, Newman, 2003). A network consists of 
collections of nodes or vertices (the unit of interest) which may or may not be connected 
to others by links (also known as edges or arcs). In this study, nodes represented 
premises (farms or PUs) and links represented shipments of pigs between source and 
destination premises. Links can be treated as weighted or binary depending on whether 
or not multiple shipments between pairs of premises are taken into consideration. Each 
shipment event included a batch of one or more pigs from a source to a destination 
premises. All links were treated as directed (arcs), involving directional shipments of 
pigs between premises. Since swine shipments from farms to PUs present little risk of 
disease spread (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007, Nöremark et al., 2011, Rautureau et al., 2012) 
in comparison to farm to farm shipments, the two networks were analyzed separately. 
Networks can be represented as one-mode or two-mode matrix. In this study, swine 
shipment network among farms (Network A) was analyzed as one-mode, whereas the 
shipment from farms to PUs (Network B) was analyzed as two-mode network. A one-
mode represent links between a same set of nodes (e.g. farm to farm contacts where 
rows x column matrix represents a same set of farms), and two-mode network represent 
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links between two different sets nodes or nodes by events (where rows and columns 
matrix represent two sets of entities).  
5.3.3.1 One-mode network of swine shipments (Network A)  
Contacts (shipments) between the 20 sow, 68 nursery and 157 finishing farms were 
analyzed using a one-mode directed binary network matrix. One nursery and five 
finishing farms that received shipments before January 2006 but shipped pigs to 
abattoirs only during the study period were excluded from this network. A one-mode 
network represents the links between the same set of entities (the row and column 
elements in the matrix relate to the same set of farms). In the binary network links were 
assigned a value of one or zero based on whether or not there was at least one shipment 
of pigs between a pair of farms. The intensity of off-farm (out-degree) and onto-farm 
(in-degree) shipments between pairs of farms were assessed by treating links as 
weighted, taking into consideration the number of shipments of animals between pairs 
of farms. 
The network was characterized in terms of: (i) Network size: number of nodes, 
number of directed links; (ii) Farm-level centrality measures: out-degree, in-degree, 
betweenness, eigenvector, including normalized indices of these measures; (iii) 
Network-level measures: density, centralization indices of out-degree, in-degree, and 
betweenness, diameter, geodesic distance, clustering coefficient and fragmentation index 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Descriptions of the network terminology used in this 
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paper are outlined in Table 5.1, and were based on the definitions adopted by Dubé et 
al., (2009), Martinez-Lopez et al., (2009b) and Newman, (2003). 
5.3.3.1.1 Infection chain analysis 
It has been proposed that measures referred to as the outgoing infection chain (OIC) and 
the incoming infection chain (IIC) are particularly relevant when considering the 
epidemiology of disease spread and control measures (Dubé et al., 2008; Nöremark et 
al., 2011). Therefore these measures were assessed in this study. OIC and IIC count all 
direct and indirect (contacts through other farms) off-farm and onto-farm contacts, 
respectively, accounting for the time sequence of shipments. These measures were 
generated for intervals of two-week and monthly durations, along with corresponding 
in-degree and out-degree measures for the same time intervals. These intervals were 
chosen based on the plausible range of infectious periods of most common infectious 
GLVHDVHVDQGSODXVLEOHOHQJWKVRID³VLOHQWSKDVH´DIWHUDQRXWEUHDNKDVVWDUWHGEXW
before official detection occurs. For instance, an outbreak detection delay up to three 
weeks for foot-and-mouth disease has been reported in the literature (Keeling et al., 
2001). These measures were generated using the EpiContactTrace package (version 
0.6.9, http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/EpiContactTrace) of R software version 
2.15.1 (R Foundation; http://www.r-project.org). 
5.3.3.1.2 Scale-free and small-world topologies  
Since many networks of livestock shipments have been observed to exhibit scale-free or 
µVPDOO-ZRUOG¶WRSRORJLHV(Christley and French, 2003, Webb, 2005, Bigras-Poulin et al., 
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2006, Kiss et al., 2006b, Webb, 2006, Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007, Lockhart et al., 2010), 
the network in this study was also examined for these properties. A scale-free network is 
characterized by a right skewed, long-tailed, power-law distribution of the number of 
links (degrees) to nodes, where a large number of nodes have a few links, but a few 
nodes have relatively large numbers of links. Such networks are hypothesized to evolve 
through preferential attachment (Barabasi and Albert, 1999, Barabasi and Bonabeau, 
2003). Accordingly, power-law (P(k) ~ k-J) distributions were fitted to out-degree, in-
degree and total degree data, using statistical approaches described by Clauset et al., 
(2009). Specifically, J and k were estimated by fitting the power law distributions to the 
data using maximum likelihood methods and goodness-of-fit tests based on the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistics, where k was based on a kmin recommended by 
Clauset et al. (2009). The power-law distribution fitting and hypothesis testing were 
conducted using R software, including the routines: plfit.R, ConfidenceIntervals.R and 
GoodnessOfFit.R (available at: 
https://sites.google.com/site/beyondmicrofoundationscoderepo/home/r-code-
repository/power-laws). 
Small-world networks are characterized by clusters of nodes that are connected to 
each other through a few long range links. They tend to have a relatively high clustering 
coefficient and shorter geodesic distance than an equivalent size random network. As 
there is no formal statistical test for detecting small-world characteristics in a network, 
the clustering coefficient and geodesic distance of the observed network were compared 
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with a set of randomly generated networks using the equivalent number of nodes and 
links (Newman, 2003, Opsahl and Panzarasa, 2009). The observed network was 
compared with 500 Erdös-Renyi random graphs generated using the same numbers of 
farms and links. In the literature, a network demonstrating at least a 6-fold increase in 
the clustering coefficient, in comparison to the analogous random network, has been 
classified as small-world (Watts and Strogatz, 1998, Lockhart et al., 2010). 
5.3.3.2 Two-mode network of swine shipments (Network B) 
This network consisted of 209 farms (12 sow, 54 nursery and 145 finishing farms) and 
91 PUs. The objectives of this analysis were to describe the number of PUs to which a 
farm was supplying pigs for slaughter (degree of a farm) and number of farms that a PU 
was receiving pigs from (degree of a PU), together with the connectedness among these 
farms and PUs. Furthermore, this analysis supported an assessment of differences in 
attributes between farms supplying pigs to large and small PUs. This two-mode 
undirected binary network was analyzed by converting the matrix of farms (rows) to 
PUs (columns) into two one-mode bipartite graphs; a farm by farm matrix with strength 
of links between farms representing the number of abattoirs to which farms co-supplied 
pigs, and a PUs by PUs matrix with strength of links between PUs representing the 
number of common farms from which they received pigs. On this basis, network 




5.3.4 Statistical analyses 
Differences in the sizes of farms and shipments among three farm types were compared 
using a Kruskal-Wallis (KW test) with Bonferroni post hoc adjustment for multiple 
comparisons. A critical value of the post hoc adjustment was calculated as Į/(k*(k í
ZKHUHĮ DQGk is the number of groups compared. For Network-A, associations 
between means of various network measures, including out-degree, in-degree, 
betweenness, and eigenvector with farm type, farm or shipment sizes, were compared 
using a network adapted ANOVA and t-test (for pairwise comparisons), that are based 
on bootstrapping and permutation approaches (Hanneman and M, 2005). These methods 
were used because the network measures violate the random sampling and independence 
assumptions, and are robust to violation of assumptions of normality and equal variance 
of residuals. For comparisons, farm sizes were categorized into four groups (A = 250±
999; B = 1,000±1299; C = 1,300±2,099; and D = 2,100±4,000) based on 25th, 50th, and 
75th percentile distribution. The records of farm sizes were missing for three sow farms 
and two each of the nursery and finishing farms. They were estimated for these farms 
using a multivariate normal regression imputation method based on their respective 
median shipment size, out-degree, in-degree, and betweenness values. The median of 
100 imputed values was used for each of these seven farms. Similarly, sizes of 
shipments were categorized into four groups as: A = 1±54; B = 55±100; C = 101±208; 
and D = 209±2,598. The numbers of relevant links identified through infection chain 
analysis, as compared to the number of links identified by simple degree counts, were 
assessed using the same two-week and monthly time intervals applied to the infection 
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chain analysis. Differences in two-week and monthly OIC vs. out-degree and IIC vs. in-
degree measures were compared among the three farm types as well as the four groups 
of farm size or shipment size, using the KW test with Bonferroni post hoc adjustment 
described above. In addition, the distributions of both OIC and out-degree, and IIC and 
in-degree, were compared (for each of the two-week and monthly time intervals), using 
the KS goodness-of-fit test, because this test takes into consideration the whole 
distribution. 
For Network B, a power-law distribution was fitted to degree distributions of farms 
and PUs, while scaling parameters were estimated as described for Network A. The 
associations between the degree and farm types, or farm size groups were examined 
using a network adapted ANOVA test. The difference in the proportion of farm size 
JURXSVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHILYHODUJHVW38VZLWKGHJUHHth percentile) and other PUs 
ZHUHFRPSDUHGXVLQJ3HDUVRQ¶V&KL-square test. 
5.3.5 Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis was used to examine whether there were distinct groups of farms based 
on the farm and shipment sizes, together with key network measures (out-degree, in-
degree, betweenness and eigenvector measures). Agglomerative hierarchical cluster 
analysis using the weighted average linkage method with a stopping rule based on the 
Duda and Hart index as described by Everitt et al., (2011) was used for this analysis. A 




All network and statistical analyses, unless specified previously, were carried out 
using UCInet v6.360 for Windows (Borgatti et al., 2002) and Stata version 11.2 
(StataCorp. 2009. Stata Statistical Software: Release 11. College Station, TX: StataCorp 
LP), respectively. For multiple comparisons using Kruskal-Wallis test, a kwallis2 
package in Stata (http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/bocode/k) was used. The significance of 
all statistical tests was assessed at the 5% significance level. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of swine shipments between premises are summarized in Table 5.2. 
Shipments from finishing to PUs accounted for 49% (6493/13177). This was followed 
by sow to nursery farms 28% (3690/13177), nursery to finishing farms 12% 
(1527/13177) while shipments from nursery to finishing farms accounted for 27% 
(1527/5760) of movements. Each farm shipped pigs to 1±4 other individual farms or 1±9 
PUs per week. The frequency of shipments per week between pairs of farms ranged 
from 1±6, and from farms to PUs ranged from 1±4. Limited number of shipments 
between farms of the same type (nursery or finishing) were also observed. Considerable 
variations in the frequency of weekly and monthly shipments amongs farms were noted 
within each year and between the two years (Figure 5.1). The medians (ranges) of farm 
sizes by farm type were: sow 1200 (500±2700), nursery 2100 (450±4000) and finishing 
1060 (250±2760). The farm sizes varied significantly by farm types (P<0.001; Figure 
5.2). The distribution of shipment size also varied widely with an overall median (range) 
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of 101 (1±2930) pigs per shipment (Table 5.3). A significant difference in the size of 
shipments among the three farm types was observed with larger size shipments from 
nursery to finishing farms (excluding shipments from farm to PUs) (P <  0.001). 
Furthermore, a positive association between farm size groups and shipment size groups 
ZDVHYLGHQW3HDUVRQ¶VFKL-squared test P value of <0.001). 
5.4.2 Network A  
The network consisted of 245 farms (nodes) with 810 links. A total of 5760 shipments 
was observed from 147 individual sources to 211 individual destination farms. Detailed 
farm and network level measures are presented in Table 5.4. The overall difference in 
the out-degree among the three farm types was significant (P < 0.001). Sow and nursery 
farms shipped pigs to a median of six nursery and eight finishing farms, respectively 
(with the exception of limited shipments to other nursery farms) (Table 5.4). The 
difference in out-degrees between these two farm types was not statistically significant 
(when assessed against a post hoc WHVW¶VFULWLFDOYDOXH([FHSWIRUWKHILQLVKLQJIDUPV
that shipped pigs to 1±4 other finishing farms, most finishing farms (94) shipped pigs 
only to PUs. Since those shipments to PUs were excluded from the analysis, most 
finishing farms had out-degrees of zero in this network of farm-to-farm animal 
shipments. Similarly, three nursery farms were wean-to-finish farms (sent shipments off-
farms only to abattoirs) and therefore had out-degrees of zero for this network. 
Significant positive associations between out-degree and farm size groups and shipment 
size groups were evident (P<0.001; Figure 5.3). 
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The difference of in-degree distributions between nursery and finishing farms was 
not significant (when assessed against a post hoc WHVW¶VFULWLFDOYDOXH. In-degree values 
presented a borderline signficant association with farm size groups (P = 0.055), but they 
had a significant association with the shipment size groups (P <0.001; Figure 5.4). None 
of the sow, eight nursery and six finishing farms in this data received any shipments (in-
degress of zero). Most of these farms sourced replacements from within their own 
farms, but some may have had other sources who were not clients of the swine 
management company involved in this study and were therefore not included in the 
study data. 
Yearly network measures were also estimated (but not provided in Table 5.4). The 
overall median (range) of out-degree values for both the yearly networks was 0 (0±15), 
and the in-degree values were 2 (0±7) and 2 (0±8) for 2006 and 2007, respectively. Sow 
and nursery farms had similar values of out-degree with an overall median (range) of 4 
(0±15) for the yearly networks (not including shipments from finishing farms to 
abattoirs). The in-degree values for the nursery and finishing farms were similar, with an 
overall median (range) of 2 (0±8). The medians (ranges) of the overall total-degree of 
2006 and 2007 yearly networks were 4 (1±17) and 4 (1±18), respectively. 
Only nursery and finishing farms had betweenness centrality scores greater than zero. 
In particular, four nursery farms had the highest betweenness score of 93 (farm K), 102 
(farm J), 104 (farm D), and 106 (farm G) (Figure 5.5 (b)). These farms also had 
relatively high out-degree, in-degree and eigenvector scores (Figure 5.5 (a) and (b)). The 
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betweenness scores of nursery farms were significantly higher than for finishing farms 
(P < 0.001). Betweenness scores were significantly associated with farm size and 
shipment size groups (P < 0.001; Figure 5.6). 
No significant differences in eigenvector scores among farm types or farm size 
groups were observed (P value of 0.121 and 0.163, respectively; Figure 5.7 (a)). 
However, eigenvector scores differed significantly among shipment size groups (P < 
0.001; Figure 5.7 (b)). A plot of eigenvector and betweenness scores shown in Figure 5.5 
(b) identified key farms with high scores of these measures, indicating their influential 
role in the flow of swine shipments among the farms. 
5.4.2.1 Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis identified five clusters (Table 5.5). Cluster #1 included a range of farm 
characteristics. Cluster #2 consisted primarily of finishing farms with high in-degree, 
small farm and shipment sizes, and the lowest out-degree, betweenness, and eigenvector 
scores. Cluster #3 consisted of an equal proportion of sow and nursery farms with large 
farm size, intermediate values of shipment size, out-degree, betweenness and 
eigenvector scores, and lowest in-degree. Cluster #4 consisted of only nursery farms 
with the highest out-degree, betweenness and eigenvector scores and largest farm and 
shipment sizes, and relatively high in-degree (see Figure 5.5 (a) and (b)). Cluster #5 
consisted of a single nursery farm with the largest shipment size and larger farm sizes, 
but with lowest network measures.  
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5.4.2.2 Infection chain analysis 
The medians for each of the OIC, IIC, out-degree and in-degree measures, were not 
significantly different within each measure-type, based on two-week vs. one-month time 
intervals. However, the maximum values of out-degree, IIC and OIC, were higher for 
monthly vs. two-week intervals. Accordingly, for brevity, only results for the monthly 
network measures are presented here. The overall medians (ranges) of monthly 
measures were: out-degree 0 (0±7), OIC 0 (0±8), in-degree 0 (0±5), and IIC 0 (0±6). 
These measures differed significantly among farm types (P < 0.001). Sow farms had 
relatively higher out-degree and OIC with median (range) values of 2 (0±7) and 3 (0±8) 
respectively, and zero in-degree and IIC. The median values of all these measures were 
zero for both nursery and finishing farms. However, the nursery farms had relatively 
higher ranges of out-degree (0±5) and the OIC (0±6) than the finishing farms (out-
degree of 0±2; OIC of 0±3). While the nurseries had higher in-degree range (0±5) than 
finishing farms (0±3), IIC range was lower for nursery (0±5) than finishing farms (0±6). 
The percentages of three farm types likely to have ranges of monthly OIC and IIC are 
shown in Figure 5.8 (a) and (b), respectively. It shows that 88% of the sow farms, 36% 
of the nursery and 4% of the finishing farms shipped pigs to at least one farm in a month 
(Figure 5.8 (a)). Similarly, 39% of the nursery and 21% of the finishing farms received 
pigs from at least one farm in a month (Figure 5.8 (b)). No differences in these measures 
were observed between 2006 and 2007 years (P >  0.05). Significant positive 
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associations between monthly OICs or IICs measures with farm size groups or shipment 
size groups were evident (all P < 0.0001). 
5.4.2.3 Scale-free topology  
The out-degree and in-degree distributions had power law scaling parameters (J) of 1.97 
(95% CI 1.82±2.14) and 4.34 (95% CI 3.65±5.15) for farms with the out- and in-degree 
>2 and >6, respectively. There were 147 and 79 farms above these threshold limits, 
respectively. The total degree distribution had a power law scaling exponent (J) of 2.69 
(95% CI 2.40±3.02) for farms with the degree >6 (consisted of 116 farms). The KS test 
failed to reject the power law model as a plausible model for out-degree and total degree 
(P>0.05). However, this test was significant for the in-degree distribution (P < 0.001). 
5.4.2.4 Network-level measures 
In general, the network density and clustering coefficient were low. The high 
fragmentation index indicated that the proportion of unreachable pairs of farms was high 
LQWKHQHWZRUN7KHQHWZRUN¶VRXW-degree, in-degree and betweenness centralization 
indices were also low, illustrating a relatively low reliance or concentration of off- and 
onto-farms shipments from/to a few nodal farms at the macro-level of the entire 
network. A median geodesic distance of two indicates the presence of only one farm on 
the most efficient pathway between any two farms in general. 
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5.4.2.5 Small-world topology  
The overall median geodesic distance of 500 simulated random graphs of equivalent 
network size of the observed network was 5 with the overall median (5th and 95th 
percentiles) of clustering coefficient of 0.013 (0.011±0.012). The relatively shorter 
geodesic distance (two) and larger clustering coefficient (0.09) of the observed network 
compared with random graphs of equivalent size demonstrated small-world topology of 
the swine shipment network. A network graph showing farms, where the size of the 
nodes was made proportional to the total degree is shown in Figure 5.9. 
5.4.3 Network B  
The descriptive metrics of Network B are presented in Table 5.6. There was high 
heterogeniety in the degree distributions of both farms and PUs. The degree 
distributions for both farms and PUs followed a power-law distribution with scaling 
exponent (J) of 3.63 (95% CI 3.23±4.07) and 1.98 (95% CI 1.74±2.27) at minimum 
degree thresholds over three and two respectively. There were 160 farms and 55 PUs 
with a degree value above these threshold limits. The KS test failed to reject the power 
law as a plausible model in both the cases with P >0.05. Three PUs (main abattoirs) had 
the highest degree of 129, 134, and 144 respectively, which was evident from the two-
mode network graph shown in Figure 5.10. No significant differences in the degree 
amongst the three farm types or farm size groups were evident (P value of 0.202 and 
0.1046 respectively). A significant positive association between the size of the farms 
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supplying pigs to PUs with the 5 highest degree values compared with farms supplying 
to other PUs was evident (P<0.001). 
5.5 Discussion 
This study described the network characteristics of swine shipments among 245 farms, 
in 15 counties, in the province of Ontario, Canada. As a non-random sample, the study 
data were not fully representative of all swine farms in Ontario (Statistics Canada, 
2007). However, it did include swine shipment events over a two-year period, from 13% 
(251/1950) of swine farms in 15 of 47 swine rearing counties, or 6.2% (251/4070) of all 
swine farms in Ontario (Statistics Canada, 2007). The majority of Ontario swine farms 
participate in multi-site production systems, where individual farms specialize in a 
specific production type (breeder, farrow-to-wean, nursery, or finishing). As in most 
developed countries, Canadian and Ontario swine production chains follow pyramidal 
structures, where a few farms higher up in the production chain supply pigs to a larger 
number of farms down the chain (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007, Clauset et al., 2009, 
Nöremark et al., 2011, Buttner et al., 2013). Most of these farms also operate under a 
single integrator or on the basis of fairly permanent trade partnerships, where a 
farrowing farm supplies a specific, relatively fixed set of nursery farms, etc. Thus data 
obtained for this study described a sub-network, within the overall network of swine 
shipments in Ontario. Considering this farming structure, we can assume that estimates 
of farm-level centrality measures of this network represent reasonable estimates of the 
typical commercial multi-site production systems in Ontario. Furthermore, since these 
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data captured all swine shipments of participating farms, including those shipments to 
and from farms outside the enrolment of this company (except for the supply of 
replacement sows), the magnitude of bias in the farm-level measures are likely small. 
However, network level measures observed in this study, such as density and 
fragmentation indices will be subject to some degree of bias, because such measures 
depend on the total number of farms present in the network. In addition, given that 
number of farms and animals in these 15 counties remained stable between 2006 (farms 
= 1950 and animals = 3.4 million) and 2011 (farms = 1703 and animals = 2.7 million) 
these estimates may not have been affected much even though data was about 5±6 years 
old (Statistics Canada, 2007, Statistics Canada, 2012). 
This study provided useful preliminary information on the characteristics of multi-
site commercial swine shipment networks in Ontario. It illustrated the types of farms 
that tend to be more centrally connected and could thus guide the prioritization of 
control measures, and provide some indication of the potential size of epidemics in such 
networks. It also provided preliminary parameters required for modeling disease spread 
among swine farms, such as contact frequencies, the number of links between farms, 
and the structure of network topologies. As a caution, the network statistics observed 
during normal trading may change once quarantines or movement controls are 
implemented during the outbreak response phase (Shirley and Rushton, 2005a). 
The frequency of off-farm shipments per week (ranging from 1±6, Table 5.2), can be 
used as input parameter for the contact rate in simulation models. However, such simple 
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statistics are much more informative when combined with the network information such 
as: the number of links over which those shipments occur, which types of nodes are 
involved, or the contact structure of the network. 
The high and similar out-degree distributions observed for sow and nursery farms 
compared with finishing farms illustrated the similar risk these two farm-types present 
as disease sources, once they become infected. However, when one also considers the 
higher in-degree of nursery farms (relative to sow farms), it is clear that nursery farms 
present a greater overall risk through their ability to act as hubs in the spread of disease. 
The out-degree of finishing farms (links to other finishing farms) was very low in this 
particular dataset. However, some finishing farms also ship gilts to sow farms in 
Ontario, was also reported in other countries (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2006, Buttner et al., 
2013). In general, finishing farms may present a lower risk to the spread of disease from 
farm-to-farm by animal shipments. The similar in-degree distributions of nursery and 
finishing farms implied similar vulnerability to, or risk of, introduction (receipt) of 
diseased animals. However once again, considering the higher out-degree of nursery 
farms, they will likely be more influential in the spread of disease in the network. The 
out-degree measures of sow and finishing farms, and in-degree measure of finishing 
farms in this study were similar to those observed by Buttner et al. (2013). This re-
enforces the fact that these data, despite being based on a relatively small network, can 
provide useful information when estimating farm-level measures of centrality. 
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Their higher betweenness scores means that targeting nursery farms for disease 
control measures can be more effective and efficient at the network population level 
(although this may be infection-specific and nursery-specific) than similar controls 
applied to sow or finishing farms. The eigenvector scores for individual farms provided 
additional insights into their respective centrality, because this score is weighted by the 
centrality scores of farms connected to the farm being assessed. Farms with both high 
betweennesss and high eigenvector scores are certainly hubs that will likely act as 
µVXSHU-VSUHDGHUV¶LILQIHFWHG,QWKLVVWXG\DOOVXFKIDUPVZHUHREVHUYHGWR be nursery 
farms (Figure 5.5 (b)) and belonged to a single Cluster#4. Farms with high betweenness 
and low eigenvector scores act as central bridges connecting farms to the core of a 
network, which would otherwise be isolated. Removing these farms from the network 
increases the fragmentation index of a network. Farms with low betweenness scores but 
high eigenvector are well-connected and lie at the core of the network, but they have 
very few connections outside the core region. Identifying such farms can be useful for 
disease surveillance and disease outbreak management. 
The positive associations observed for farm-size and shipment-size, with out-degree, 
and measures of centrality indicated that, in addition to large farms receiving and 
making more shipments to more farms, the probability of at least one infected animal 
being included in any of those shipments is greater for any given prevalence of disease 
within the source herd at the time. Some of the disease spread modeling tools explicitly 
model the disease transmission probability per shipment as a function of farm size, 
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within-farm prevalence of an infection, and shipment size (Morris et al., 2001, Aparicio 
and Pascual, 2007, NAADSM Development Team, 2011). It should be cautioned that 
other factors such as the biology of the disease agent, biosecurity and management 
practices of farms and other factors governing between-farm linkages should also be 
considered in estimating the overall risk of disease transmission. 
Cluster analysis provided a useful holistic picture of important aspects of the 
network. Most notably, it identified a group of specific nursery farms (cluster #4) with 
combined characteristics of large farm and shipment sizes and high measures of 
centrality. Given that individual farm characteristics may change over time (e.g. farm 
size, shipment size, frequency or degrees); if contemporary farm-specific data of such 
characteristics are not available at the time of an outbreak, then a reasonable 
precautionary policy would be to give higher priority to nursery farms in general, as 
targets for control measures. 
Normally infection chains analyses (OIC and IIC) are used for contact tracing during 
response to an outbreak of an emerging disease. However, knowledge of the 
characteristics of infection chains in a given network, before an outbreak, is also useful. 
Such knowledge can be used to prepare for and mitigate an outbreak, as well as estimate 
its likely magnitude, before an outbreak even starts. This is because infection chain 
analyses take into account direct and series contacts (through other farms), and the 
temporal sequence of these contacts (Dubé et al., 2008, Nöremark et al., 2011). 
Estimates of the OIC and IIC of two-week and monthly interval networks were similar 
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to out-degree and in-degree estimates in this study. This suggested that estimates based 
simply on out-degree and in-degree provide an equivalent estimate of the likely 
magnitude of disease spread for a duration of up to one month. Since sow farms had 
significantly higher OIC than other farm types, the consequence component of the risk 
of disease spread from sow farms was higher than for other farm types. Similarly, since 
finishing farms had significantly higher IIC, the risk of them becoming infected was 
greater than for other farm types. Thus, farms with high IIC can be targeted for 
surveillance to increase the probability of detecting the infection, relative to random 
surveillance sampling of the population (Nöremark et al., 2011, Frossling et al., 2012, 
Rautureau et al., 2012, Buttner et al., 2013). 
The scale-free topology of the network observed here was consistent with the 
findings of other studies of livestock shipments (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007, Dubé et al., 
2008, Lockhart et al., 2010, Nöremark et al., 2011, Rautureau et al., 2012, Buttner et al., 
2013). This scale-free topology indicated that the degree distributions of farms were 
heterogeneous and that hubs (highly connected farms) were present. Knowledge of the 
scale-free topology and highly connected farms is useful for prioritizing risk-based 
surveillance, tracing and control measures (Martinez-Lopez et al., 2009b, Dubé et al., 
2011). It is particularly important because the speed of disease spread is faster in scale-
free than in non-scale-IUHHQHWZRUNVGXHWRWKHSUHVHQFHRIµVXSHU-VSUHDGHUV¶(Shirley 
and Rushton, 2005b, Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008). Also, the speed of detection and 
control is faster if one takes into account the scale-free nature of the network by 
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targeting hubs, than if only random surveillance and routine contact tracing is used to 
control an outbreak in a scale-free network (Shirley and Rushton, 2005b, Kiss et al., 
2006a, Dube et al., 2011). The power-law scaling exponent for the total degree in this 
study was similar to other studies (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007, Rautureau et al., 2012, 
Buttner et al., 2013). The out-degree and the scaling exponent are important parameters 
required for constructing a realistic scale-free network structure for network-based 
disease spread simulation models. For example, a median number of 4 off-farm links per 
farm (based on the yearly networks) along with the scaling exponent of 1.97 (95% CI 
1.82±2.14) could be used to construct a scale-free network for simulating disease spread 
over a one-year duration. 
Low density and low clustering coefficient, and high fragmentation index of swine 
shipments networks in general indicate that the likelihood of a disease spreading to 
every farm may be relatively low, assuming swine shipments between farms alone 
drives a disease spread. The small-world properties observed in this network indicated 
the presence of localized clusters that were connected to topologically distant clusters 
through a few long range connections. This kind of topology makes it possible for a 
disease to spread between distant clusters in the network. Small-world properties 
observed in this network were consistent with those reported in swine (Nöremark et al., 
2011, Rautureau et al., 2012) and other livestock species (Leon et al., 2006, Dubé et al., 
2008, Lockhart et al., 2010). 
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Although, swine shipment from farms to PUs presents little risk of disease 
transmission to other farms (Nöremark et al., 2011, Rautureau et al., 2012), analysis of 
such networks can provide useful information. As many surveillance protocols for 
animal diseases, including zoonotic diseases, are implemented at abattoir level, analysis 
of such information elucidates the extent to which various farms that may be involved in 
the case of detection of a disease at an abattoir. Subsequently, differences in farm-level 
risk factors such as biosecurity measures and other management factors can be 
compared between groups of farms supplying pigs to case abattoirs (an abattoir where a 
particular disease has been detected) and non-case abattoirs. This may also facilitate 
traceability of a disease to source farms. Wide ranges in the degree of farms and PUs 
were observed in this study since PUs included sales to small-scale butcher shops as 
well as to the large PUs. 
5.5.1 General comments 
These results should be extrapolated cautiously. Nevertheless, this study provided 
epidemiologically relevant and reasonable estimates of farm-level measures, particularly 
for southwestern counties of Ontario. Future studies should consider incorporating 
indirect contacts and shipment distances between farms as these are important 
parameters to consider in spatially-explicit diseases spread models (Morris et al., 2001, 




This study provided insights into a large swine shipment contact network in 
southwestern Ontario in Canada. Nursery farms are the high-risk farms in terms of risk 
of disease introduction as well as a potential source of spread to other farms (for 
infectious diseases that affect all age groups alike), and should be accorded high priority 
for disease prevention and control measures. The study found heterogeneity in the 
frequency of contacts among farm types. Also the network demonstrated small-world 
and scale-free topologies, consistent with livestock shipment networks reported in 
several other countries. Any attempt to incorporate disease transmission dynamics 
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Betweenness  The number of times that a node falls on the shortest path between other pairs of nodes 
in the network. 
Betweenness 
centralization index 
The sum of differences between largest betweenness of most central node with all other 
nodes divided by the maximum possible values, and expressed in percentage terms. 
Clustering coefficient The proportion of closed triplets out of the total number of triplets (both open and 
closed) present in the network. A triplet is formed when three nodes are connected by 
either two (open triplets) or three (closed triplets) undirected links (Opsahl and 
Panzarasa, 2009). 
Density  Density is the proportion of links (L) present out of all possible links in the network. 
For a directed network density is equal to L/(N(N-1)), where N is the number of nodes 
present.  
Diameter The longest geodesic distance between any pair of nodes of a network. 
Eigenvector  A relative centrality score of a node assigned as an increasing function of the sum of all 
the centralities of all the nodes to which it is connected. A node connected to other 
nodes with high centrality scores will have higher Eigenvector score than another node 
with equal connections, but connected to nodes with low centrality scores. Therefore 
WKLVPHDVXUHQRWRQO\DFFRXQWVIRUDQRGH¶VGHJUHHEXWDOVRIRUWKHGHJUHHRIWKHRWKHU
nodes to which it is connected.  
Fragmentation The proportion of pairs of nodes in a network that are unreachable either through direct 
RULQGLUHFWSDWKZD\VDQGSURYLGHPHDVXUHRIQHWZRUN¶VGLVFRQQHFWHGQHVV 
Geodesic distance  The shortest possible path between two nodes and is the most efficient connection 
between them. 
In-degree  In the directed network, in-degree is the number of nodes from which a particular node 
received shipments of animals. For weighted directed network, in-degree represents 




The sum of the differences between largest in-degree of most central node with all 
other nodes divided by the maximum possible values and expressed in percentage. 
Links  The connection between pairs of nodes established through shipments of animals. 
Network size  The total number of possible unique pairs of nodes. If N is equal to the number of 
nodes, then network size is equal to N (N-1). 
Normalized betweenness  The proportion of betweenness of a node to a maximum possible betweenness of the 
network and expressed in percentage. 
Normalized in-degree It is the in-degree of a node divided by the maximum possible degree of the network 
and expressed in percentage. 
Normalized out-degree It is the out-degree of a node divided by the maximum possible degree of the network 
and expressed in percentage. 
Nodes/vertices Premises such as farms and PUs in the network. 
Out-degree In the directed network, out-degree of a node is the number of out-going links to other 
nodes (number of premises to which a farm sent its swine shipments). In a weighted 




The sum of the differences between largest out-degree of most central node with other 
nodes divided by the maximum possible values, and expressed in percentage. 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of swine shipments among farms, and farms to processing units 
(PUs) for 2006 and 2007 in southwestern Ontario, Canada. 
Farm type 
 





Total no. of 
links  










Source  Destination  2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 
Sow  Nursery 19 20 47 47 121 113 1787 1903 1 (1±3)  2 (1±6) 
Sow PUs 12 8 5 3 23 8 112 86 1 (1) 1 (1±2) 
Nursery  Nursery 21 39 20 36 23 51 26 82 1 (1) 1 (1) 
Nursery  Finishing 46 46 107 110 295 294 696 831 1 (1±4) 1 (1±3) 
Nursery PUs 46 44 37 17 143 101 325 401 1 (1±3) 1 (1±3) 
Finishing  Finishing  49 57 48 61 61 89 232 203 1 (1±2) 1 (1±6) 








Table 5.3: Distribution of the number of pigs shipped by premises types for the period 2006 to 
2007 in southwestern Ontario, Canada. 
Premises type Median shipment size 
(5th & 95th percentiles)  
Shipment size  
(minima ± maxima) Source  Destination  
Sow  Nursery 203 (64±590) 9±1190 
Sow  PUs  608 (21±1285) 1±1685 
Nursery  Nursery 28 (1±218)  1±1580 
Nursery  Finishing 243 (30±1943)  1±2355 
Nursery  PUs 52 (9±318)  1±2930 
Finishing  Finishing  15 (1±274)  1±2598 





Table 5.4: Descriptive network metrics of swine shipments among three farm types estimated for 
the two-year period (2006±2007) in southwestern Ontario, Canada. 
 
Table 5.5: Clusters identified by hierarchical cluster analysis using weighted-average linkage 
method based on farm-level variables and measures of centrality of the swine shipments 
network analysis in southwestern Ontario, Canada. Values with superscript letter µD¶ are reported 
in median and interquartile range. 
Network metrics Overall Sow Nursery Finishing 
A. Network size 
i) Number of nodes (farms) 245 20 68 157 
ii) Number of directed links 810 - - - 
iii) Total number of shipments  5760 - - - 
iv) Network size (all possible pair-
wise links) 
59780 - - - 
B. Node level centrality measures - values reported are median ( minimum and maximum range) 
i) Out-degree 1 (0±25) 6 (1±21) 8 (0±25) 0 (0±4) 
ii) Normalized out-degree 0.41 (0.00±10.25) 2.46 (0.41±8.61) 3.28 (0.00±10.25) 0.00 (0.00±1.64) 
iii) Frequency of off-farm shipments  1 (0±409) 203 (9±409) 16 (0±279)  0 (0±260)  
iv) In-degree 3 (0±12) - 3 (0±9) 3 (0±12) 
v) Normalized median in-degree 1.23 (0.00±4.92) - 1.03 (0.00±3.69) 1.23 (0.00±4.92) 
vi) Frequency of onto-farm shipments  8 (0±363) - 48 (0±215) 7 (0±363)  
vii) Total degree 5 (1±29) 6 (1±21) 9 (1±29) 4 (1±13) 
viii) Betweenness score 0 (0±106) - 8 (0±106) 0 (0±52) 
ix) Normalized betweenness score 0.00(0.00±0.18) - 0.01 (0.00±0.18) 0.00 (0.00±0.09) 
x) Eigenvector score 0.01 (0.00±0.23) 0.03 (0.00±0.18) 0.02 (0.00±0.23) 0.01 (0.00±0.14) 
xi) Normalized Eigenvector score 1.72 (0.00±32.39) 3.94 (0.00±24.68) 2.74 (0.00±32.39) 1.13 (0.00±20.01) 
C. Network level measures 
i) Density 0.014 - - - 
ii) Out-degree centralisation index 8.9% - - - 
iii) In-degree centralisation index 3.6% - - - 
iv) Betweenness centralization index 0.17% - - - 
v) Diameter  5.0 - - - 
vi) Median geodesic distance (mode) 2.0 (2.0) - - - 
vii) Clustering coefficient 0.09 - - - 
viii) Fragmentation  0.96 - - - 
Variable Cluster#1 









Farm sizea  1,406 (250±2,700) 1,060 (360±2,760) 1,965 (1,000±4,000) 2,000(1,235± 2,540) 1,950 
Shipment sizea  39 (0±1,166)  0 (0±145)  346 (124±232)  467 (232±600)  2,352 
Out-degreea  1 (0±15 )  0 (0±3)  15 (12±21)  17 (13±25) 1 
In-degreea  2 (0±6)  7 (4±12)  1 (0±3)  6 (4±9) 1 
Betweennessa  0 (0±36)  0 (0±52)  4 (0±21)  58 (34±106)  0 
Eigenvectora 0 (0±0.09) 0.01 (0± 0.14)  0.15 (0.10± 0.18) 0.16 (0.13±0.22) 0 
Sow (%) 9.4 0 50.0 0 0 
Nursery (%)  30.2 1.6 50.0 100 100 




Table 5.6: Descriptive metrics of swine shipment network from farms to PUs (Network B) for 
the period 2006 to 2007 in southwestern Ontario, Canada. 
Network metrics Overall farms Sow Nursery Finishing PUs 
A. Network size  
i) Number of nodes 
(premises) 
300 12 54 143 91 
ii) Number of links 740 - - - - 
iii) Total number of 
shipments 
7,417 - - - - 
iv) Network size (all 
possible pair-wise links) 
19,019 - - - - 
B. Node level centrality measures - values reported are median ( minimum and maximum range)  
i) Degree 3 (1±24) 3 (1±4) 3 (1±11) 3 (1±24) 2 (1±144) 










C. Network level measures  
i) Density (directed) 0.04 - - - - 
ii) Diameter  7.00 - - - - 
iii) Median geodesic 
distance 3.00 






Figure 5.1: Frequency of weekly shipments of swine for 2006 and 2007 in southwestern Ontario, 
Canada. A lowess smoothing line was generated using locally weighted regression of frequency 





Figure 5.2: Distribution of the number of farms according to the total number of animals 




































   
 
Figure 5.3: Out-degree distributions by: (a) farm size groups and (b) shipment size groups of a 






Figure 5.4: In-degree distributions by: (a) farm size groups and (b) shipment size groups of a 






























































Figure 5.5: Scatter plot distributions of: (a) in-degree versus out-degree of nursery (red circle) 
and finishing (blue triangle) farms where size of marker is proportional to the betweenness 
centrality scores (sow farms are not shown as they have zero in-degree and betweenness score); 
and (b) Eigenvector versus betweenness scores of sow (green diamond), nursery (red circle) and 
finishing (blue triangle) farms involved in the swine shipment network in southwestern Ontario. 
Labeled farms belonged to cluster 4 groups that may play a central role in terms of vulnerability 
to disease introduction and spread to other farms as they have high key network measures; 





Figure 5.6: Betweenness centrality score distributions by: (a) farm size groups and (b) shipment 
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Figure 5.7: Eigenvector centrality distributions by: (a) farm size groups and (b) shipment size 





Figure 5.8: Percentage of farms with a given number of monthly: (a) outgoing infection chain 
and (b) incoming infection chain values for each of the three farm types described in the network 
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Figure 5.9: Network of swine shipment among three farm types in southwestern Ontario, 
Canada. Node sizes and width of links are proportional to the total degree and three categories 




Figure 5.10: Two-mode network of swine shipment from farms to processing units in 
southwestern Ontario, Canada. Node sizes and width of links are proportional to the total degree 
and three categories of frequency of shipments (1, 2±10 and 11±117). Key: sow herd (pink); 






Assessing the Effects of Network Structures on the Spread and 
Control of Diseases using Agent-based Modeling: A Case of 








Recently network-based modeling studies have demonstrated that the spread and control 
of infectious diseases in human and animal populations are significantly affected by the 
structure of contact networks. We evaluated whether the generic findings of these 
studies are valid in a setting of a specialized multi-site all-in all-out swine production 
system. We constructed an agent-based model comparing three theoretical networks: 
random (RN), scale-free (SFN) or small-world (SWN). We used the pandemic influenza 
H1N1 2009 virus as a case study in a study population of 500 swine farms, equivalent to 
the population of a county in Ontario, Canada. The results indicated a faster spread, with 
higher peak prevalence and larger epidemic size in the SWN models compared with the 
SFN and the RN models, contrary to the findings in other species of animal and human 
populations. The spread of influenza tended to be faster with higher peak prevalence and 
higher overall epidemic size in the SFN compared with the RN models consistent with 
the previous studies. However, these differences were not statistically significant. A 
strategy that quarantined all farms with a nXPEHURIOLQNVth percentile distribution 
had the maximum benefit in containing the disease outbreaks (with relatively lower peak 
prevalence and overall size of the outbreaks) compared with a strategy targeting farms 
ZLWKDQXPEHURIOLQNVth percentile distribution. In conclusion, future infectious 
disease modeling work in similar swine production system should consider 
LQFRUSRUDWLQJDSSURSULDWHQHWZRUNVWUXFWXUHVWRLPSURYHWKHYDOLGLW\RIWKHPRGHO¶V
predictions, and to support better policy decisions. 
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Keyword: Influenza, H1N1 virus, swine, pigs, agent-based models, network modeling 
 
6.2 Introduction 
Simulation models are being used to predict the extent of spread, to evaluate 
intervention strategies, and to both develop and assess contingency plans for infectious 
diseases in human (Lipsitch et al., 2003, Lloyd-Smith et al., 2003, Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Longini et al., 2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, Germann et al., 2006, Halloran et al., 2008, 
Gojovic et al., 2009, Tuite et al., 2010) and animal populations (Morris et al., 2001, Kao, 
2002, Garner and Beckett, 2005, Shirley and Rushton, 2005a, Kiss et al., 2006b, 
Sharkey et al., 2008, Dürr et al., 2013). While the majority of early disease spread 
models used aggregate or compartmental models, an increasing trend towards the use of 
more complex stochastic agent-based models has been reported (Keeling and Eames, 
2005, Lloyd-Smith et al., 2009, Woolhouse, 2011, Dorjee et al., 2013a). In an agent-
based model (ABM), each µagent¶ is represented explicitly and the model tracks its 
infection status or other attribute over time (for this reason these are also referred to as 
³LQGLYLGXDO-EDVHG´PRGHOV7KLVLVLQFRQWUDVWWRWKHDJJUHJDWHRUFRPSDUWPHQWDOPRGHO
where individuals are followed collectively as a group over time. Agent-based models 
offer the advantages of greater flexibility to incorporate individual-level heterogeneities 
such as age, sex, risk of susceptibility to an infection, historical health information (for 
example vaccination status, waning immunity, in-utero exposure to infectious agent, 
etc.), as well as spatial location. In addition, contact tracing of exposed individuals to an 
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infection and targeted intervention measures can be more easily implemented in this 
type of model. 
Recently, a growing number of modeling studies have extended the agent-based 
approach further by explicitly incorporating either empirical or theoretical contact 
networks of disease spread and intervention measures, in human (Moore and Newman, 
2000, Eames and Keeling, 2002, Riley et al., 2003, Eubank et al., 2004, Hufnagel et al., 
2004, Shirley and Rushton, 2005b, Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008, Rahmandad et al., 
2011) and animal populations (Green et al., 2006, Kao et al., 2006, Kiss et al., 2006b, 
Kiss et al., 2006a, Kiss et al., 2008, Sharkey et al., 2008, Vernon and Keeling, 2009, 
Dürr et al., 2013, Fournié et al., 2013). In a real-world situation a given individual has 
contact with only a limited number of other individuals in a population, and this may 
vary significantly from one individual to another. Frequency and patterns of linkages 
between individuals result in the formation of networks with different contact 
topologies. Many real-world structures of social, technological and biological 
interactions are characterized by scale-free network (SFN) and/or small-world network 
(SWN) topologies (Newman, 2002, Newman, 2003, Keeling and Eames, 2005, Danon et 
al., 2012), including those associated with livestock movements between farms 
(Christley and French, 2003, Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007, Clauset et al., 2009, Dubé et al., 
2009, Martinez-Lopez et al., 2009, Lockhart et al., 2010). In a SFN, a large number of 
nodes/vertices (representing a person, farm or other entities of interest) have few links, 
while a limited number of nodes have a relatively large number of links, following a 
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power-law distribution (Barabasi and Albert, 1999, Barabasi and Bonabeau, 2003). Such 
networks are hypothesized to evolve through preferential attachment of new nodes to the 
existing nodes that are highly connected. Small-world networks are characterized by 
clusters of nodes that are connected to each other through a few long-range links. 
Therefore, a SWN will have a relatively high clustering coefficient and shorter geodesic 
distance than a random network (RN) of equivalent size (Newman, 2003, Shirley and 
Rushton, 2005b, Dubé et al., 2009). Although many complex empirical networks are 
possible in the real-world, the effects of network topologies on the spread of diseases 
and on the effectiveness of intervention strategies have been studied using four 
theoretical networks. These are RN, ring-lattice, SWN and SFN (Keeling and Eames, 
2005, Shirley and Rushton, 2005b, Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008). These studies have 
shown that the speed and extent of disease spread, as well as the effectiveness of control 
strategies, are significantly affected by network topology. This being the case, even a 
complex and stochastic agent-based model which assumes random-mixing rather than 
adopting a suitable contact network structure, will be unrealistic in many situations. 
Therefore, it is recommended that an appropriate network structure be explicitly 
incorporated to increase the validity of such models (Keeling and Eames, 2005). 
Currently, network modeling studies that have assessed the effects of network 
structures (theoretical and empirical) on the spread and control of diseases in livestock 
have mostly focused on a limited set diseases; including foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) 
(Green et al., 2006, Kao et al., 2006, Kiss et al., 2006b, Kiss et al., 2006a, Kiss et al., 
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2008, Vernon and Keeling, 2009), highly pathogenic influenza viruses in poultry 
(Sharkey et al., 2008, Fournié et al., 2013) and classical swine fever (CSF) in 
Switzerland (Dürr et al., 2013). Live swine shipments among farms/premises have been 
shown to exhibit SFN and SWN topologies (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007, Nöremark et al., 
2011, Rautureau et al., 2012, Buttner et al., 2013, Dorjee et al., 2013b). To our 
knowledge, no study has yet evaluated the effects of making different network topology 
assumptions on the spread and control of influenza in swine populations. Therefore, the 
main objective of this study was to evaluate the effects of network topology and 
heterogeneities in contacts among different farm types on the spread and control of 
influenza. Specifically, this study investigated the effects of three common network 
topologies (RN, SFN and SWN) on the speed and extent of influenza spread among 
farms, in conjunction with various control strategies, assuming a multi-site all-in all-out 
(AIAO) production system. For this study, the pandemic influenza A H1N1 2009 
(pH1N1) virus has been used as the case example. The results of this study should also 
provide guidance as to how important it is to incorporate a complex network structures 
into future disease spread modeling research which targets similar production systems. 
Furthermore, this modeling exercise could be adapted and applied to other infectious 
diseases of swine, such as FMD, porcine respiratory and reproductive syndrome 
(PRRS), or CSF. 
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6.3 Materials and Methods 
6.3.1 Study populations 
A synthetic study population of 500 swine farms, approximately equal to the number of 
swine farms of Perth County (a county with the highest swine farm density) in Ontario, 
Canada was generated. A total of 488 swine farms with 664,508 pigs were recorded in 
the 2006 census year for this county (Statistics Canada, 2007). The majority of the swine 
farms in Ontario consist of specialized multi-site production systems; such as breeder, 
farrow-to-wean, farrow-to-finish, nursery, wean-to-finish or finishing farms. These 
farms are operated either as continuous-flow or AIAO systems of management. 
Furthermore, AIAO production systems are operated as either AIAO by barn or by site 
(McEwan and Marchand, 2007, Varela et al., 2007, Owsley et al., 2013). For simplicity, 
swine premises were categorized into three types, namely sow (50), nursery (150) and 
finishing (300) farms, and AIAO by site was assumed for nursery and finishing farms, 
but not for sow farms. In the AIAO by site production system, all barns are filled or 
emptied of pigs at the same time. Barns are then cleaned, disinfected and kept empty for 
7±GD\VUHIHUUHGWRDVµGRZQ-WLPH¶(Scheidt et al., 1995, Owsley et al., 2013). The 
number of farms assigned to each category was based on the approximate proportion of 
the three farm types (8% of sow, 28% of nursery, and 64% of finishing farms) observed 
in the swine population data used in a previous network analysis study (Dorjee et al., 
2013b). Sow farms consisted of breeder farms, farrow-to-wean or farrow-to-finish 
operations, nursery farms housed pigs of 3-10 weeks of age, and finishing farms housed 
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pigs of approximately 11 weeks to market age. It was assumed that live pigs were 
shipped in a directed flow from sow to sow, sow to nursery, sow to finishing, nursery to 
finishing, and finishing to sow (gilt replacement) farms. Accordingly, the influenza 
spread among farms was modeled by direct contact through the shipment of live pigs. 
The potential spread by indirect contact, through the movement of people, contaminated 
fomites, etc. was ignored due to lack of information and for simplicity of model 
construction. 
6.3.2 Structure of models 
The effect of three commonly reported network topologies, namely RN, SFN and SWN 
on the spread and control of influenza among swine farms were compared using an 
agent-based network models (ABNM). A simple deterministic system dynamic or 
aggregate compartmental model (SDM), that treated farms as a single type, was also 
constructed for comparison with the ABNMs. A basic unit of simulation was 
implemented at the farm level. All units within each category of farm type were 
considered identical in terms of size, breeds, management practices, using the approach 
similar to that adopted by Vernon and Keeling (2009). Therefore, any effects of these 
variables on the transmission dynamics of influenza could not be assessed. Although a 
crude assumption, this approach allows for an evaluation of the effect of network 
topologies in isolation from other heterogeneities (Vernon and Keeling, 2009). All 





transmission per contact *E) +  (contact frequency between infectious and 
susceptible farms * probability of transmission per contact * I)) * (S/N); 
 e =  flow rate from exposed to infectious compartment per unit time = 1/average 
duration of exposed period * E; 
 r =  flow rate from infectious to recovered compartment per unit time = 
1/average duration of infectious period * I. 
The major assumptions of the SDM were: all farms were totally susceptible to the 
influenza virus; individual farms within each compartment were homogeneous and 
perfectly mixed (i.e. same contact probability among farms); probabilities of farms 
moving from the exposed to infectious, and to the recovered compartments were 
independent of how long a farm had been in the exposed or infectious states; there was 
no addition or loss of farms during the simulated period (closed population). 
Furthermore, exposed farms were assumed infectious as the shipment of live pigs from 
exposed farms (farms with infected animals in the incubation stage) would result in 
infection of susceptible farms.  
 
6.3.2.2 Agent-based network model (ABNM) 
The same SEIR model structure was assumed for sow farms, whereas SEIRS was used 
for nursery and finishing farms for all the ABNMs (Figure 6.1). This was because the 
nursery and finishing farms were no longer susceptible to infection during the down-
time of 14 days in the AIAO system of management (as no pigs were housed on a farm). 
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The nursery and finishing farms returned to a susceptible state once they were restocked 
with a new batch of pigs at the end of each period of down-time. 
Although the model structure of the SDM and ABNMs are similar, the disease states 
of each individual farm were explicitly represented in the ABNMs. That is each 
individual farm j %?«1H[LVWHGLQRQHRIWKHIRXUPXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYHGLVHDVHVWDWHV
at any given time step (i.e. day) of the simulation. Disease state transitions f (j), e (j), and 
r (j) of each farm represent one instant of infection, transition from the exposed to 
infectious states (e = emergent), or from the infectious to recovered states (r = recovery), 
respectively, and zero otherwise (that is it remained in the same disease state). In the 
case of nursery and finishing farms, s (j) represents one moment of transition from a 
recovered to a susceptible state, occurring at the end of recovered period (equivalent to 
the duration of down-time period). In the agent-based approach, the model keeps track 
of each individual farm and sums up the individual transitions to estimate the total 
population in each of the disease states at the end of each time-step of the simulation 
(Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008, Vynnycky and White, 2010). Agent-based models relax 
the assumptions of homogeneity and perfect mixing and capture individual 
heterogeneities in terms of number of links and other attributes associated with the 
disease transmission process. At each iteration, a sow farm was initially infected using 
one of the two approaches: (i) a premises with a maximum number of links in the 
networks being evaluated; or (ii) by random selection. At each iteration, the links were 
assigned randomly among farms depending on the network structure described below. 
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The probability of a farm being infected depended on the disease states of all farm 
linked to it. Every day, every exposed or infectious farms contacted other farms 
connected to it randomly with certain contact frequency (as defined in Table 6.1), and 
with a probability equal to a transmission probability sent the message ³,QIHFW´ to these 
farms,IDIDUPUHFHLYLQJWKHPHVVDJH³,QIHFW´ZDVDVXVFHSWLEOHIDUPWKHQLWJRW
infected and transited to the exposed state. Once exposed/infected every farm transited 
from exposed to infectious state (e = emergent) based on the rate 1/exposed duration, 
and then from infectious to recovered state (r = recovery) based on the rate 1/infectious 
duration. Subsequently, nursery and finishing farms transited from a recovered or from 
quarantined to susceptible state DWWKHHQGRIµGRZQ-WLPH¶. In the case of sow farms that 
were quarantined, they transited to susceptible state at the completion of one-month 
quarantine duration. All of these transitions were modeled by stochastic processes. 
  
6.3.2.3 Network topology 
The theoretical RN, SFN and SWN topologies used in this study were constructed using 
random (Erdös and Rényi, 1960), small-world (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), scale-free 
(Barabasi and Albert, 1999) algorithms that are inbuilt in AnyLogic®. The SFN was 
constructed based on the preferential attachment process where the probabilities of new 
farms linking to the existing farms were proportional to the number of links the existing 
farms already have. The network construction started by M0 initial number of farms 
connected to each other. Then at every time step a new farm was added to the network 
 231 
 
so that a new farm was connected to M (M0) already existing farms with a probability 
that was proportional to the number of links that the existing farms already have. This 
process was repeated until a network size of 500 farms was reached. AnyLogic® 
requires that only a value of M be specified, and we used M0 = M = k = 4, where k was 
the average number of links per farm (XJ Technologies, 2007, Rahmandad and Sterman, 
2008). An average of four links per farm (k = 4) was assumed based on the result of the 
previous network analysis study (Dorjee et al., 2013b). The distribution of links among 
farms in SFN follows a power-law function, where the probability that a farm has k links 
(probability (k)) ן k ±ȖZKHUHȖLVWKHVFDOLQJH[SRQHQW 
Three types of SWNs were constructed from a ring-lattice network by re-connecting 
a proportion of the links to long-range links according to the following probabilities: 
0.05 (SWN-0.05), 0.10 (SWN-0.10) and 0.30 (SWN-0.30). A probability of 0.05 with 
average of 4 links/farm among 500 farms resulted in a clustering coefficient of 
approximately 0.42 and an average path length of 10, which are higher than those 
observed in a previous study (Dorjee et al., 2013b); while a probability of 0.30 resulted 
in a clustering coefficient of 0.22 and an average path length of 6, values that are 
approximately similar to those in the study noted above. The average path length did not 
decrease below 5 despite increasing the probability of long-range links to 0.50 to 0.60, 
while the clustering coefficient decreased to 0.059 for the 0.50 probability of a long-
range links. Therefore, the impact of SWN was assessed at three levels noted above in 
terms of long-range links in the sensitivity analysis. 
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The default features regarding network construction in AnyLogic® establish links 
among all possible pairs of farm types. Our study required no connection between 
nursery to nursery or between finishing to finishing farms. As such, customized Java 
code was built into AnyLogic® to disconnect the links between nursery-to-nursery and 
finishing-to-finishing farms, these disconnected links were then re-wired among pairs of 
farms randomly in consistent with the contact structures outlined above. In addition, 
directional links were used so the infection was transmitted between pairs of farms in 
RQHGLUHFWLRQRQO\7KLVZDVDFKLHYHGE\WKHZD\LQZKLFKWKHµLQIHFWLRQPHVVDJH¶ZDV
passed and received between by each pair of linked farms. For example, a sow farm 
FRXOGUHFHLYHWKHµLQIHFWLRQPHVVDJH¶IURPRWKHUVRZRUILQLVKLng farms but not from 
any of the nursery farms. 
6.3.3 Quarantine strategies 
The behavior of each model was investigated in response to three quarantine strategies: 
(i) general quarantine implemented through a reduction in the contact rate between all 
farms (irrespective of their disease states in all the three types of network models); (ii) 
random quarantine of individual farms (irrespective of their disease states); and (iii) 
targeted quarantine of highly connected farms (irrespective of their disease states). The 
latter two strategies were assessed only in the SFN models. The general quarantine 
measure was modeled as a reduction in the contact frequency (Cjs) between infectious 
farms, , M׫^(,` and susceptible farms, V׫^6` where the contact frequency decreased 
linearly from the initial value Cjs to the minimum rates achieved under contact 
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reduction (Cqjs), as the cumulative number of cases increased as defined by the equation 
below (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008): 
Cs =  (1-q)Cjs +  qCqjs    «HTXDWLRQ 
q =Min[1, Max(0, (P-P0)/(Pq ± P0))]   «equation 3 
Where the proportion of contact reduction (q) increased linearly from zero to one over 
time as the number of cases (cumulative prevalence (P) = infectious + recovered) 
increased from a threshold (P0) to the level at which a maximum reduction was achieved 
(Pq). We used P0 = 10 farms and Pq = 50 farms. As the quarantine measure cannot be 
implemented perfectly, the minimum contact frequency achieved (Cqjs) was set to 
0.05Cjs (that is the reduction of 95% from the normal contact rates). The contact 
reduction for general quarantine strategy was assumed to have been achieved through 
policy responses (mandatory isolation and movement restriction) as well as voluntary 
isolation (that is farms on receiving the disease outbreak notification voluntarily stopped 
receiving and sending animal shipments to other farms). 
The random and targeted quarantine strategies were evaluated only in SFN models 
because it was not logical to assess the targeted quarantine strategy in RN and SWN 
models as all farms would have similar number of links. In a random quarantine 
strategy, two farms from each production type, irrespective of their disease states were 
quarantined randomly on a daily basis. Although a random quarantine strategy is rarely 
implemented in practice (perhaps only in cases when authorities do not have any 




Two scenarios of targeted quarantine strategies were evaluated; targeting only those 
IDUPVZLWKQXPEHURIOLQNVLth SHUFHQWLOHRULLth percentiles of the overall 
link distribution. Transition of farms either from the susceptible, exposed or infectious 
VWDWHWRTXDUDQWLQHGVWDWH)LJXUHZHUHWULJJHUHGE\DµPHVVDJH¶ZKHQDWKUHVKROGRI
P0 = 10 farms was reached. Farms remained in the quarantined state permanently for the 
duration of the simulation. 
6.3.4 Model parameters 
The parameters used for the SDMs and ABNMs are presented in Table 6.1, and were 
derived from the literature or otherwise assumed. No information on the exposed or 
infectious duration of influenza infections at the farm level was available. Therefore, it 
was assumed that the farm-level duration of the exposed state was equal to individual 
pig level value. In effect this means that farms were considered exposed from the time a 
single pig became infected up until the time when the first pig becomes infectious. The 
farm-level duration of infectious state varies with a farm size. Accordingly, infectious 
duration of sow farms was generated from an individual-level parameters using the 
WithinHerd software version 0.9.5 (Reeves et al., 2013). This is a stochastic modeling 
framework that simulates the within-unit disease spread and generates herd-level 
durations of disease states. A farm size distribution of BetaPert(500, 1200, 3000), 
equivalent to that observed in a previous study (Dorjee et al., 2013b) was used for this 
exercise. Infectious periods of 32 and 120 days were assumed for nursery and finishing 
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farms, respectively, after subtracting the exposure time. These values represent the 
duration that pigs remained in nursery and finishing farms. No information on the 
probability of influenza transmission per contact between swine farms was available. 
Therefore the transmission probability (infectivity) of 0.1 and 0.9 was assumed for 
exposed and infectious farms, respectively.  
6.3.5 Statistical analyses  
A total of 28 scenarios were evaluated. The outcomes of SDM and five ABNMs (RN, 
SFN, and three SWN models with different probabilities of long-range links) for the 
spread and general quarantine strategy were evaluated (2 SDMs + 5 ABNMs x 2 = 12 
scenarios). In addition, five ABNMs were evaluated under the two initial infection 
settings (5 x 2 = 10 scenarios). Furthermore, three quarantine strategies (of random and 
two targeted quarantine options) using SFN models under the two settings of the 
infection seeding were compared (3 x 2 = 6 scenarios). A total of 500 iterations were 
simulated to capture the stochastic variability of each scenario. Models outcomes are 
reported in terms of parameters relevant from an epidemiological or regulatory 
SHUVSHFWLYHVXFKDVVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶IUDFWLRn (a fraction of simulations that do not 
lead to an outbreak; defined as no farms infected), time-to-peak epidemic day (day on 
which the highest number of infectious farms was observed), peak prevalence (highest 
number of infectious farms observed at the peak epidemic day), overall epidemic size 
(total number of farms infected), and duration of outbreak (time-to-end of outbreak, 
defined as the time until no exposed and infectious farms were present, or a cut-off 
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value of 365 days in cases when it extended beyond that day). Descriptive statistics were 
calculated in terms of the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles. Differences in the outputs 
between different models were compared using Kruskal-Wallis test with Bonferroni post 




in a sow farm randomly and when the general quarantine strategy was implemented 
)LJXUH+RZHYHUWKHVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶IUDFtions were similar among different 
network-based models within the same type of infection seeding and with or without the 
implementation of the general quarantine strategy, except in scenarios where the 
infection was seeded in a maximally connected sow farms. 
6.4.2 Epidemic size and duration 
The results from 22 simulated scenarios (the spread and the general quarantine strategy 
scenarios) are summarized in Table 6.2. For the models assessing transmission dynamics 
(section A - influenza spread models without imposing any quarantine measures), the 
medians of time-to-peak epidemic day were relatively shorter in SWN-0.05 and SWN-
0.10 compared with other models in both the settings of infection seeding. In addition, 
this measure was similar for the RN, SFN and SWN-0.30 models, and comparable to 
that predicted by the SDM model, under the setting when infection was seeded 
randomly. However, the magnitude of this difference was larger between RN, SFN and 
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SWN-0.30 when the infection was seeded in a maximally connected sow farm (index 
case). The predicted peak prevalence and the overall epidemic size when using SDM 
were both significantly higher than was the case for any of the ABNMs. The outbreak 
duration of the SDM subsided in 296 days, whereas it typically continued beyond the 
one-year simulation period in all the ABNMs. The 5th percentiles of the overall duration 
were relatively shorter for RN, SFN and SWN-0.05 compared with SWN-0.10 or SWN-
0.30 models (results not shown). Given the assumptions of the models, the results 
indicated that the influenza spread among farms was faster with higher peak prevalence 
and the overall epidemic size in the SWNs than in RN or SFN models, under both the 
settings of the infection seeding. Both the medians of peak prevalence and the overall 
size of the epidemics of the SWNs models were approximately twice the values 
observed from either RN or SFN models under the setting of random seeding of the 
infection (Table 6.2 A.1 and Figure 6.3). However, these differences were of lesser 
magnitude for the setting where infection was seeded in a maximally connected sow 
farm. No significant differences were observed in all the outcome metrics between RN 
and SFN in both the settings of infection seeding. However, the influenza spread trended 
to be relatively faster with higher peak prevalence and overall epidemic size, in the SFN 
than RN models. 
The median time-to-peak epidemic day was longer by approximately 2±4 weeks in 
both the maximally seeded RN and SFN than randomly seeded same models. The 
medians of peak prevalence and the sizes of epidemics of RN and SFN models with the 
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infection seeded in a maximally connected sow farm was 1.5 to two times higher than 
that of the same models where the infection was seeded into a single randomly selected 
sow farm (Table 6.2 A.2). However, no significant difference was observed between the 
two seeding approaches across all types of SWNs. 
6.4.3 Control strategies  
Amongst the models assessing the effect of the general quarantine strategy (Table 6.2, 
section B), the outcomes related to the SDM were similar to those of the RN and SFN 
models, except that the time taken to the peak epidemic day and the duration of the 
outbreak were shorter in the case of the SDM. The similar trend was observed amongst 
the different ABNMs in the peak prevalence and the overall epidemic size as in the 
disease spread scenarios, except the time-to-peak epidemic days were similar among all 
the models. 
The results indicated that the general quarantine strategy implemented as a reduction 
in the contact rate among farms was not effective at the level specified in the models as 
peak prevalence, the overall epidemic size and duration of outbreaks were similar to 
those scenarios without the implementation of the quarantine measure (Table 6.2 B). 
However, imposing general quarantine measure significantly delayed the time to the 
peak epidemic day by 14±34 days for RN, SFN and SWN-0.30. These differences were 
relatively smaller in the case of SWN-0.05 and SWN-0.10. In contrast, the quarantine 





of the overall link distribution was the most effective (Table 6.3, Figure 6.4 (b)). The 
time taken to reach the peak epidemic day was shorter and the overall epidemic size was 
lower (by half the length and number) in the case of quarantine strategy targeting farms 
with numbeURIOLQNVth percentile of the overall link distribution than the strategy 
that targeted farms with OLQNV95th percentile of the link distribution or simply did so 
randomly. In addition, under this quarantine strategy the approximately twice difference 
in the number of units infected in a maximally seeded SFN model compared with 
randomly seeded SFN models observed was no longer true. All the outcome measures 
were similar between the two types of seeding of infection across the three models 
assessing alternative targeted quarantine strategies. The number of farms quarantined 
was also relatively more in the random strategy than the targeted quarantine strategies 
(Table 6.3 and Figure 6.5). 
6.5 Discussion 
In this study we evaluated the effects of network topologies on the spread and control 
strategies for pH1N1 among swine farms using ABNMs. These models explicitly 
incorporated realistic contact structures (contacts between sow farms, sow to nursery 
farms, etc.) and different contact rates between pairs of farm types. The results from this 
study can be used to gauge the value of explicitly incorporating network structure into 
the models of this type. Alternatively, they help inform the question as to whether 
 240 
 
relatively simpler ABMs with random mixing, are adequate for modeling influenza and 
other infectious diseases in the similar swine production system. 
The results indicated that a simple SDM overestimated the peak prevalence and the 
overall epidemic size, while underestimating the duration of the outbreak when 
compared to all the ABNMs in the absence of quarantine measures. This is due to the 
homogenous and the perfect mixing assumption of SDM whereby the probability of 
infectious farms contacting susceptible farms is much greater (perfect mixing) in 
comparison to network-based models. This result suggests that SDM may not provide 
valid estimates of the key outcome metrics. However, the outcome measures from the 
SDM and RN or SFN models were similar when the general quarantine strategy was 
implemented. Strictly speaking it is not reasonable to compare model outputs from the 
SDM with the network-based models as the SDM considered all farms as a single type, 
whereas the contact rate, the duration of the infectious and recovered periods of different 
farm types were assumed different in the ABNMs. The crude comparison here provides 
a general understanding of the differences between an over simplified representation 
(SDM that treated all farms as homogenous) versus relatively realistic approaches to the 
modeling (RN, SFN and SWN models). Nevertheless these finding are consistent with a 
theoretical study that compared the outcome metrics of SDM and ABNMs (Rahmandad 
and Sterman, 2008). There are additional disadvantages of using SDMs, such as their 
inability to implement targeted quarantine measures or the difficulty in incorporating 
other agent-level heterogeneities which are often necessary within modeling studies 
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(Keeling and Eames, 2005, Shirley and Rushton, 2005a, Rahmandad and Sterman, 
2008). 
No significant differences in the epidemiologic metrics evaluated were observed 
between the RN and SFN models that assessed the spread of the virus without 
quarantine or under a general quarantine strategy. This would suggest a relatively 
simpler agent-based approach assuming random mixing can be used for modeling 
influenza spread in a similar swine production system, given the assumptions outlined in 
these models. This is because the RN model can be treated as the equivalent of an agent-
based model with a random mixing (Keeling and Eames, 2005, Shirley and Rushton, 
2005b, Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008). Although not significantly different, the speed 
of the influenza spread (time-to-peak epidemic day), peak prevalence, and overall 
epidemic size were all relatively higher in the SFN models than in the RN models, 
consistent with findings from other studies (Shirley and Rushton, 2005a, Kiss et al., 
2006a, Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008). Network-based models may still provide the 
preferred option in cases where targeted quarantine strategies are being assessed, as 
discussed below. The lack of significant differences between the RN and SFN models 
observed in this study, as opposed to findings of other studies (Shirley and Rushton, 
2005a, Kiss et al., 2006a, Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008) may be due to the relatively 
small network size combined with fewer farms having a limited number of contacts 
(links). A fewer average number of links per farm results in the scale-free networks of 
relatively narrower range of the distribution of links among agents (higher value of 
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scaling exponent of the power-law distribution), which in turn results in the similar 
estimates of the outcome metrics with that of RN models. This is apparent from the 
differences in results amongst the similar studies conducted by Rahmandad and Sterman 
(2008) that used an average of 10 links per agent in a network of 200 people, Shirley 
and Rushton (2005a) that used an average of 8 links per agent in a network size of 500 
people, and Keeling and Eames (2005) that used an average of 4 links per agent (as was 
the case in this study) but with a network size of 10,000 individuals. 
The significantly faster spread of influenza among farms with higher peak prevalence 
and the overall epidemic size, observed for the SWN models compared with the SFN or 
RN models indicates the strong effect of the long-range links on the spread of influenza, 
overriding even the effects of the scale-free network. These long-range links facilitate 
the rapid spread of the disease across wider regions of the network, resulting in higher 
overall number of farms infected (Keeling and Eames, 2005). The higher number of 
infection results because more susceptible farms are available at any given time for 
contact with the infectious farms. Even with only a few long-range links (5% of farms), 
significant changes in the metrics of influenza spread were evident, demonstrating the 
importance of this small-world effect. It is interesting to note the influenza spread was 
relatively slower with higher peak prevalence and the overall epidemic size in the SWN-
0.30 model than SWN-0.05 or SWN-0.10. This is because the speed of spread of the 
influenza among the population was positively associated with the degree of local 
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and SWN-0.10 models than with other models (RN, SFN, and SWN-0.30). Contrary to 
our findings, other studies have found that the speed of the disease spread tended to be 
faster, with higher peak prevalence, in SFN models than in SWN models (Keeling and 
Eames, 2005, Shirley and Rushton, 2005b, Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008). This might 
be due to the combination of small network size and the relatively low value for the 
average number of links per farm used in our study. It results in a relatively lower 
magnitude of the scale-free effect than the long-range effect of the small-world on the 
spread of influenza as explained above.  
The higher peak prevalence and the overall epidemic sizes observed in the models 
when the infection was seeded in a maximally connected, rather than a randomly 
selected sow farm was due to the fact that an infection seeded in a maximally connected 
farm is more likely to generate a well-established outbreak in a population. This was 
DOVRHYLGHQWIURPWKHUHVXOWVUHODWLQJWRWKHVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶IUDFWLRQ)LJXUH, 
particularly in the absence of quarantine strategy measure. It is important to investigate 
such scenarios in modeling research as highly connected farms are at greater risk of both 
receiving and spreading infection to other farms, and their early infection probably 
represents a worst case scenario in many disease outbreak situations. It also suggests 
that a general policy of requiring better routine biosecurity on all highly connected 
farms may be justified due to the negative impact they can have on the entire industry if 
they are the initial or an early case in a new disease outbreak. 
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It was evident that the targeted or random quarantine strategy had a significant 
beneficial effect than the general quarantine strategies. Given the assumptions in the 
models, the targeted strategy that quarantined all farms with a number of links th 
percentile of the overall link distribution offered a maximum benefits than other 
strategies assessed in this study. However, a cost benefit trade-off in terms of disease 
control process versus impact on quarantining more number of harmless farms should be 
taken into consideration. For this knowledge to be practically useful it would be 
necessary to know the distribution of links among farms in advance for any disease 
outbreak situations, through contact network analysis. Even in the absence of contact 
tracing, quarantining highly connected farms may prove useful. However, targeted 
quarantine used in combination with the contact tracing may be a better and most 
effective strategy (Kiss et al., 2006a). Since the models investigated in this study were 
not spatially explicit we did not model local area or air-borne spread, nor did we model 
quarantine applied spatially relative to known infected farms (e.g. 3 km ring quarantine). 
These aspects may be studied in future work. 
Some of the main limitations of this study include: a lack of information on the 
natural farm-level history of influenza infection (exposed, infectious, recovered 
duration) and farm-to-farm transmission probabilities to calibrate the models. Further 
sensitivity analysis needs to be conducted to evaluate whether these findings are 
consistent across all the plausible range of the transmission probabilities per contact and 
unit pairing. The default feature for SFN models in AnyLogic® does not allow for the 
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construction of customized SFNs based on average links per farm and a scaling 
exponent parameter, nor does it allow different sets of parameters to be specified 
between specific production types. It is not clear what value of the scaling exponent in 
the power-law distribution would be equivalent to the value of the M parameter used in 
this study. We also treated our links as binary and static; but previous studies found 
some important differences when treating the network as static as opposed to dynamic 
(Vernon and Keeling, 2009), and binary rather than weighted (Rahmandad and Sterman, 
2008) in terms of the epidemic behavior of disease spread. In addition, we did not 
consider the indirect mechanisms of influenza transmission through the movement of 
people and other fomites which can also be important. Contact network structure as well 
as transmission dynamic and the persistence of the influenza virus could vary by 
production type and/or system of management (such as all-in-one versus multi-site 
production, continuous flow versus all-in-all-out operations, AIAO by barn or site, farm 
biosecurity levels, etc.). Therefore, future studies should investigate the findings 
presented here further in the context of alternative settings. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, our study supported the findings of previous studies in that it 
demonstrated the presence of significant differences on the spread and control of 
infectious disease among different network structures in the specialized multi-site AIAO 




effect than topologies of RN or SFN on the speed of influenza spread and the overall 
outbreak size in the production system considered in this study. A targeted quarantine 
VWUDWHJ\LQYROYLQJDOOIDUPVZLWKth percentile distribution of links (upper inter-
quartile range) provided the better benefit. Future modeling work on swine populations 
should attempt to incorporate appropriate network structures to improve the validity of 
the modeled outputs and ultimately to support better policy decisions. All of these 
findings are driven by the mathematics of the parameters used to describe any given 
network. Thus they will differ between networks with different characteristics (as in 
other studies). This in turn highlights the importance of understanding the characteristics 
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Table 6.1: Parameters used for system dynamic (SDM) and agent-based network (ABNM) 
modeling of influenza spread among swine farms. 
 
:+LVWKHVRIWZDUHWKDWVLPXODWHZLWKLQ-herd disease transmission stochastically and generates 
herd-level durations of disease states (Reeves et al., 2013). 
  
Parameter Value  Reference 
1. Natural history of influenza infection of a farm (day) 
(a) Exposed- all farm types 3 days - SDM Assumption 
  Pert(1, 3, 5) - ABNMs (Lange et al., 2009, Brookes et 
al., 2010, Vincent et al., 2010) 
(b) Infectious period  25 days for all farm types in SDM Assumption 
(i) Sow Pert (22, 25,30) in ABNMs Generated from the individual-
level parameters using WH 
VRIWZDUH 
 
(ii) Nursery  31 - exposed period in ABNMs Assumption 
(iii) Finisher  120 - exposed period in ABNMs Assumption 
(c) Recovered Permanent for all farm types in SDM   
 Permanent for sow farms in ABNMs  
 14 days for nursery and finisher in 
ABNMs 
 
2. Contact frequency    
(a) SDM 0.143/day (once a week) (Dorjee et al., 2013b) 
(b) ABNMs   
(i) Sow to sow 0.143/day (once a week) Assumption 
(ii) Sow to nursery 0.286/day (twice a week) (Dorjee et al., 2013b) 
(iii) Sow to finisher 0.143/day (once a week) Assumption 
(iv) Nursery to finisher 0.143/day (once a week) (Dorjee et al., 2013b) 
(v) Finisher to sow 0.033/day (once a month) (Torremorell et al., 2009) 
3. Infectivity per contact (both SDM/ABNMs)     
(a) Infectivity by exposed- all farm types 0.1 Assumption 
(b) Infectivity by infectious- all farms types 0.9 Derived as explained in the text 
4. Number of links/farm  4 (Dorjee et al., 2013b) 
5. Small-world network- probability of random re-
wiring of long-range links  
0.05; 0.1; 0.3 (Rahmandad and Sterman, 
2008) 
6. M parameter of the scale-free network 4 (Dorjee et al., 2013b) 
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Table 6.2: Summary results from the 22 simulated scenarios evaluating the effects of network 
structure on the spread and control of influenza among swine farms. The results of each scenario 
are summarized as median values (5th±95th percentiles) based on 500 iterations. 
Models Peak day Peak day prevalence*  Epidemic size¥  
A. Spread - without quarantine 
   1. Infection seeded in a single randomly selected sow farm  
SDM 100 149 477 
Random network 107 (6±359)a 18 (2±78)a 36 (2±196)a 
Scale-free network 98 (7±357)a,c 22 (2±89)a 46 (2±203)a 
Small-world network (0.05) 78 (8±213)b 43 (2±106)b 84 (3±228)b 
Small-world network (0.1) 79 (9±245)b 40 (2±112)b 81 (3±244)b 
Small-world network (0.3) 103 (10±322)c 49 (3±116)b 114 (3±257)b 
2. Infection seeded in a maximally connected sow farm 
Random network 136 (8±353)a 29.5 (2±81)a 83 (3±209)a 
Scale-free network 113 (8±361)a,c 34 (3±91)a 83 (4±224)a, b 
Small-world network (0.05) 75 (10±222)b 49 (3±106)b 94 (4±237)a, b 
Small-world network (0.1) 77 (11±257)b 45 (3±114)b 97 (3±245)b 
Small-world network (0.3) 102 (8±302)c 59 (2±120)b 142 (2±259)c 
B. Spread ± assuming general quarantine 
   1. Infection seeded in a single randomly selected sow farm  
SDM 61 20 49 
Random network 89 (6±337)a, b 17 (2±56)a 36 (2±138)a 
Scale-free network 85 (8±345)b 20 (2±58)a 42 (3±130)a 
Small-world network (0.05) 70 (10±198)c 40 (3±66)b 79 (3±165)b 
Small-world network (0.1) 72 (11±192)a, c 41 (2±67)b 82 (3±168)b 
Small-world network (0.3) 80 (9±246)a, b, c 43 (2±74)b 96 (3±174)b 
2. Infection seeded in a maximally connected sow farm 
Random network 102 (8±345)a 29 (2±60)a 73 (2±147)a 
Scale-free network 82 (13±325)a, d 29 (3±61)a 66 (4±142)b 
Small-world network (0.05) 68 (8±185)b 41 (3±68)b 80 (3±164)a, c 
Small-world network (0.1) 66 (8±213)b, c 45 (2±71)b ,c 98 (2±172)d 
Small-world network (0.3) 76 (10±268)c, d 48 (2±76)c 108 (2±179)c 
*Peak day prevalence is the number of infectious farms on the peak day.  
¥
 Epidemic size is the total number of farms infected during the outbreak. 
$OOPRGHOUHVXOWVVXPPDUL]HGLQWKHWDEOHH[FOXGHGVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶iterations (zero farm infected) of 
500 runs.  
Metrics with the same superscript letters amongst different ABNM within two settings of infection 
seeding are statistically not significant from one another.  
SDM model could not be compared because it was of its deterministic nature with only one iteration. 
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Table 6.3: Summary results evaluating the effectiveness of targeted quarantine measures on the 
spread of the influenza among swine farms in a scale-free network. The results of each model 
are summarized as median values (5th±95th percentiles) values based on 500 iterations. 
*Peak day prevalence is the number of infectious farms on the peak day.  
¥ Epidemic size is the total number of farms infected during the outbreak 
All model results summari]HGLQWKHWDEOHH[FOXGHGVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶iterations (zero farm infected) of 
500 runs; 
 Metrics with the different superscript letters amongst different ABNM within two settings of infection 
seeding are statistically significant from one another. 






No. of farms 
quarantined 
1. Infection seeded in a single randomly selected sow farm 
Random quarantined 41 (7±145)a 12 (2±25)a 21 (2±43)a 260 (32±352)a 157 (0±290)a 
7DUJHWIDUPth percentile of 
links 22 (3±115)b 8 (2±13)b 12 (2±25)b 231 (39±353)a 109 (0±123)b 
7DUJHWIDUPth percentile of 
links 67 (6±323)c 14 (2±53)c 28 (3±135)c 228 (13±356)a 21 (0±24)c 
2. Infection seeded in a maximally connected sow farm 
Random quarantined 38 (9-111)a 15 (3±31)a 26 (3±54)a 275 (29±356)a 191 (0±308)a 
7DUJHWIDUPth percentile of 
links 18 (5-102)b 8 (3±14)b 13 (3±27)b 234 (40±344)b 110 (0±123)b 
7DUJHWIDUPth percentile of 




Figure 6.1: Influenza infection transition chart for all farms present in the agent-based network 
models. Key: f, e, r and s represent instances of exposure, or of transitions from exposed to 
infectious, from infectious to recovered, and from recovered to susceptible states. 
 
 
Figure 6.23HUFHQWDJHRILWHUDWLRQVZLWKVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-outs¶]HURXQLWVLQIHFWHGin each of the 
five agent-based network models of influenza spread and general quarantine measures 
(quarantine implemented as reduction in contact rate between farms) under two settings of 
infection seeding into a sow farm. For each iteration of the simulation an infection was seeded 
into either a single randomly selected sow farm or into the sow farm with the maximum number 
of links. Each model was simulated for 500 iterations. Key: RN = random network model; SFN 
= scale-free network model; SWN-0.05 to SWN-0.30 = small-world network models with the 
probabilities of long-range links equal to 5%, 10% and 30%, respectively; Rand = seeding the 
infection in a randomly selected sow farms; Max = seeding in a sow farm with the maximum 
number of links; Q-ve = spread scenario (without quarantine measure); Q+ve = with quarantine 
measure. 
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Figure 6.3: Epidemic curves of influenza spread in different network models when the infection 
seeded in a maximally connected sow farm. Key: RN = random network model; SFN = scale-
free network model; SWN-0.05 to SWN-0.30 = small-world network models with the 
probabilities of long-range links equal to 5%, 10% and 30%, respectively. 
 
   
Figure 6.4: Epidemic curves of influenza spread: (a) in different network models under a general 
quarantine strategy when infection was seeded in a maximally connected sow farm, and (b) SFN 
network models under a targeted quarantine strategy under both types of infection seeding. Note 
difference in y-axis scales between (a) and (b). Key: RN = random network model; SFN = scale-
free network model; SWN-0.05 to SWN-0.30 = small-world network models with the 
probabilities of long-range links equal to 5%, 10% and 30%, respectively; MaxSFN and 
RandSFN = infection seeded in a maximally connected and randomly selected sow farm 
respectively; RQ= farms quarantined randomly; TQ75 and TQ95 = targeted quarantine of all 
























































































Figure 6.5: Cumulative number of farms quarantined under different quarantined strategies. 
Key: Max and Rand = infection seeded in a maximally connected and randomly selected sow 
farm respectively; SFN = scale-free network model; RQ= farms quarantined randomly; TQ75 















































In this thesis a systematic review of modeling methods and approaches including 
existing gaps in the knowledge of transmission dynamics of zoonotic influenza in 
animals and humans, particularly at the animal-to-human interface, was conducted. 
Building on this review, the effect of the transmissibility of the pH1N1 virus at the 
swine-human interface and the effectiveness of control strategies against its spread in 
swine and human populations, were evaluated as a case study of zoonotic disease 
modeling. Unlike many other zoonotic modeling studies, in which the study of 
transmission dynamics and control measures are restricted to either reservoir animal or 
human hosts, this study adopted a one-health approach by simultaneously modeling the 
spread of pH1N1 among and between swine and human populations using NAADSM 
software. Furthermore, network analyses of swine shipments among farms, and between 
farms and processing units, and an assessment of the effects of network structures on the 
spread and control of the pH1N1 virus in swine populations were carried out to inform 
some of the knowledge gaps identified by the systematic review. The main findings of 
these studies, their relevance to supporting policy decisions, the associated limitations, 
and future directions in research that is required to address some of the critical issues 
identified are presented in the following sections. 
7.1 Chapter 2 
A synopsis of modeling methods and approaches, together with software used for 
modeling the spread of zoonotic influenza viruses in animals and humans, particularly 
those related to the animal-human interface, was presented in this chapter. A significant 
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increase in the application of modeling research to assess patterns of influenza spread 
and the effectiveness of a single or a combination of intervention strategies in human 
populations was observed. The modeling approaches and methods have also advanced 
significantly in terms of complexity, from simple deterministic to more stochastic and 
individual-EDVHGPRGHOVLQDQDWWHPSWWRLPSURYHWKHYDOLGLW\RIWKHPRGHOV¶
predictions. In contrast, the application of modeling research to influenza in animals 
(including birds) and particularly at the animal-human interface was limited. These 
findings appear to be consistent across all zoonotic diseases, where most studies being 
restricted to exploring the dynamics of zoonoses in a single host species, either in the 
reservoir animal species or human populations (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2009). Significant 
gaps in knowledge around the frequency at which novel strains of virus evolve in pigs, 
the farm-level natural history of influenza infection, incidences of influenza 
transmission between farms and between swine and humans were clearly evident. This 
is disconcerting given the fact that swine have been recognized as a potential host for 
the generation of novel influenza viruses, and because influenza viruses, such as the 
pH1N1 virus, are easily transmissible between swine and humans. This review 
contributed to the existing literature by providing both a source of references for a wide-
range of modeling approaches and a summary of important disease spread and 
intervention parameters extracted from primary research. 
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7.2 Chapter 3 
The research in this chapter evaluated the effects of the transmissibility of the pH1N1 
virus at the swine-human interface on its spread in the swine and human populations in 
general, while accounting for the different percentages of SWH units initially immune 
through vaccination. This study undertook a unique approach by simulating the spread 
of pH1N1 at the swine herd and household levels, instead of at the individual pig or 
person level. In addition, the SWH units served as a bridging population for the spread 
of the virus between swine herd and human household populations.  
Given the assumptions specified in the models, the results showed that minimizing 
the influenza transmissibility at the swine-human interface and targeted vaccination of 
swine workers had significant beneficial effects for all the outcome measures. However, 
to achieve these beneficial effects the transmissibility of the virus from humans to 
animals or both humans to animals and animals to humans had to be reduced to the low 
level for SH (that is at the LL, ML and HL level) and household units (at the LL), 
respectively. As it was expected, reducing the transmissibility of the virus significantly 
prolonged the time to peak epidemic day, decreased peak prevalence and increased the 
OLNHOLKRRGRIVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXWV¶)XUWKHUPRUHWKHVL]HRIWKHHSLGHPLFVGHFUHDVHGLQ
SH and SWH populations. Another notable result was that decreasing the 
transmissibility of the virus at the swine±human interface to LL had little or negligible 
impact on the size of the epidemic in the RH and UH populations. This is because the 
disease once introduced would spread in these household populations independent of its 
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transmission dynamics in SH and SWH units given the relatively larger numbers of RH 
and UH units, and the higher contact rates among those units. Although the results 
observed in this study may vary by the population structure, we would expect a similar 
trend as the household sizes and contact rates between RH, UH, and RH and UH would 
be relatively higher than SH or SWH in general. Therefore, other appropriate control 
strategies to prevent or minimize the spread from SWH to RH and UH needs to be 
implemented in combination with the lowering of the transmissibility of the virus at the 
interface.  
The epidemiological implication of delaying the time to peak epidemic day is that 
this provides more time for the concerned authorities to mobilize resources and 
implement appropriate response measures, such as the delivery of antivirals, 
vaccination, or other social distancing measures. Furthermore, reducing the peak 
prevalence should reduce the extent of disease control activities (such as movement 
control and vaccination in animals) required, including the burden on health care 
facilities.  
This study emphasised the importance of lowering the transmissibility of the virus at 
the swine-human interface to a low level. This can be achieved through several 
mechanisms, including: following good personal hygiene, avoiding direct contacts with 
sick pigs, using gloves and not smoking while working with pigs (Ramirez et al., 2006), 
abstaining from work or avoiding contact with pigs when suffering from influenza like 
illnesses, and implementing strict farm biosecurity practices. As significant differences 
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in the outcome measures were observed between low (0.024) and medium (0.3) to high 
(1.0) levels of the transmissibility of the virus at the interface, further sensitivity analysis 
needs to be carried out between the low and medium range of values to determine the 
threshold level below which significant beneficial impacts can be expected to occur. 
The targeted vaccination of SWH had a significant beneficial effect on all the 
outcome metrics. However, significant positive effects were only consistently observed 
once 60% coverage had been reached. The effects of vaccination were largest in SWH 
followed by SH and to a lesser extent in the RH populations. However, the effect was 
negligible for UH population, likely for similar reasons to those mentioned for the 
transmissibility of the virus above. We assumed that vaccine that would confer 100% 
protection was available prior to the influenza outbreak. Questions remain as to whether 
such a vaccine would be readily available during the emergent phase of a novel virus. If 
a limited amount of such vaccine were to be available early on in an outbreak, targeting 
swine workers in cases where the virus was of swine origin would prove beneficial. 
However, once the virus had been introduced into RH and UH populations, the results 
suggested that targeting SWH alone would not be effective in containing the spread of 
the disease. 
7.3 Chapter 4 
This chapter of the thesis evaluated the effectiveness of various combinations of speed 
of detection of an outbreak, quarantine, movement control and ring vaccination 
strategies. Three levels of the speed of detection of an outbreak (slow, moderate or fast; 
 265 
 
meaning that 98% of infected units were detected within 5, 10 or 20 days, respectively), 
two types of quarantine strategies (no-zone strategy where only the detected units were 
quarantined, or with-zone strategy where all units around 3 km radius of a detected unit 
were quarantined), two levels of effectiveness of movement control (less effective or 
effective where both movement restriction strategies achieved reduction of 95% of 
direct and 80% of indirect contact rates in less than 10 or 5 days, respectively), and three 
vaccination strategies (no-ring vaccination, ring vaccination with slow or fast triggers, 
where the vaccination of all susceptible units within a radius of 5 km was triggered upon 
detecting 25 RULQIHFWHG units, respectively). In all cases the effectiveness of 
combinations of these strategies against the simultaneous spread of pH1N1 virus within 
and between swine and human populations was evaluated.  
Results indicated that a combination of moderate to fast speed of the detection, 
combined with the effective quarantine of detected units alone, would contain the 
outbreak within the swine population in most of the simulated outbreaks. However, 
zone-based quarantine was a better strategy when the speed of detection was delayed by 
approximately 2±3 weeks (slow detection). These findings were consistent with other 
studies that evaluated similar control strategies (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 
2005, Shaban et al., 2009). The use of ring vaccination had no added beneficial impact. 
Therefore, these findings underscore the necessity of having effective surveillance in 
place to detect the disease as early as possible. Having effective surveillance and 
quarantine strategies in place will avoid the necessity of resorting to more expensive 
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ring vaccination measures. It could be argued that even the slow detection level defined 
in this study was relatively effective because in reality it may take from several weeks to 
months before a novel influenza virus is recognized as a potential pandemic threat. Its 
effective transmission from person to person would have to be known before serious 
public health intervention measures are initiated. 
7.4 Modeling assumptions, limitations and the feasibility of NAADSM 
Several simplifying assumptions were made as in other modeling studies of this domain. 
The detailed discussions on the assumptions and limitations including those attributed to 
using NAADSM were discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, and only the important ones are 
highlighted in this section. 
One of the main limitations, rather a debatable one is using farms and households as 
the unit of simulation based on the design of NAADSM. While it is the most common 
approach to model livestock diseases at a farm level, most modeling studies in human 
populations are simulated at the individual level. However, some studies have suggested 
modeling a disease spread at the household level as a better alternative for diseases like 
pandemic influenza (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, Wu et al., 2006, Fraser, 
2007). This approach has been justified on the basis that most influenza transmission 
occurs within a household and cases tend to cluster locally. In addition, it is more 
practical and effective to target implementation of both public health and 
pharmaceutical intervention measures at the household level or all households within a 
zone of a certain radius than at the individual level. Therefore, a choice as to the 
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granularity of simulation unit and evaluation of spread and control strategies adopted in 
our studies are consistent with the approaches highlighted by these studies. This 
approach is one of the fundamental assumptions required for NAADSM to be used for 
modeling directly transmitted zoonotic diseases.  
The studies of Chapters 3 and 4 also made an assumption that a farm or household 
was infectious from the time a single pig or individual on a farm or household became 
infectious, an inherent assumption inbuilt into the NAADSM version 3.1.24. In reality all 
animals on a farm or individuals in a household may not become infected, though some 
studies have shown that the large majority of animals do become infected during pH1N1 
outbreaks on farms (Howden et al., 2009, OIE, 2009-2010, Pasma and Joseph, 2010). 
The household secondary attack rates for pH1N1 estimated ranged from 4±50 % 
(Cauchemez et al., 2009, Ghani et al., 2009, Yang et al., 2009, van Gemert et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, this assumption might have led to an overestimation of the spread of the 
disease in the SH and household populations. Given a contact, the probability of 
transmission will likely be influenced by the within-farm or within-household 
prevalence including size of animal shipments for direct contacts between SH units, 
which were not considered because of limitation of the NAADSM version used in these 
studies. In addition, a 100% probability of transmission per contact was assumed among 
SH. Therefore the transmission rate may have been overestimated. 
Contrary to the previous situation, the contact rates among households were assumed 
equal to the average daily contact rate of an individual person for UH units, or half this 
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rate for SWH and RH units. This might have underestimated the spread of the disease 
because each household has, on average three members, and therefore the actual contact 
rate between households would have been higher. However, the references (Mossong et 
al., 2008, Lee et al., 2010) from which these contact rates were extracted did not specify 
what proportion of a daily average contact rate is between the members of the same 
household, or among and between different occupational groups (e.g. swine workers, 
rural non-swine workers or urban households). Therefore, the magnitude and direction 
of bias in the estimates of the spread of the disease in these populations could not be 
predicted.   
For simplicity all swine farms were treated as a homogeneous population with 
random mixing, but in reality the susceptibility and contacts will likely vary by farm 
types (sow, nursery or finishing types), as observed for classical swine fever (Dürr et al., 
2013) and in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 6LPLODUO\WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VVXVFHSWLELOLW\WR
influenza may vary by age and family size (Cauchemez et al., 2009, Yang et al., 2009, 
van Gemert et al., 2011), and the contact structure which were not considered. The 
assumptions of homogeneous population of swine herds or households and a random 
mixing might have overestimated the size of outbreaks in general. While different swine 
production types could be explicitly modeled in NAADSM, it does not have the 
flexibility to incorporate individual level heterogeneity within a household for 
parameters such as the contact rates, risk or susceptibility to a zoonotic agent, which 
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may vary significantly according to social demographics such as age, gender, race and 
occupation. 
In addition, NAADSM lacks the feature to explicitly represent different contact 
network structures such as scale-free or small-world topologies observed in real-world 
which influences the speed and control of a disease spread in a population. It is also not 
possible to assign more than a single location to each unit in NAADSM, in contrast to 
many human disease spread models where individuals are assigned to two or more 
locations, such as at home, school/workplace, other places of social gathering. 
Furthermore, in NAADSM a disease transmission is simulated not only based on the 
contact rate and transmission probabilities, but also as a function of spatial distance 
between source and recipient units. However, households or people even in close 
geographic proximity may not have any contact between one another to facilitate the 
influenza spread. Spatial location becomes largely irrelevant unless a disease spreads 
locally through aerosol transmission. The NAADSM version used in these studies also 
lacks the capability to seed the infection randomly in a population for each iteration of 
the scenario. This feature is important as the speed and extent of spread of a disease 
LQFOXGLQJVWRFKDVWLFµGLH-RXW¶IUDFWLRQZLOOEHDIIHFWHGWRDFHUWDLQGHJUHHE\WKHGHQVLW\
of population around the index unit. It is possible to select a unit randomly for seeding 
the infection for each iteration but was not done due to practical difficulties when 
running thousands of iterations. In addition, we cannot seed the infection repeatedly 
from the external source into the study population which is important for diseases like 
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influenza particularly in household populations. Future version of NAADSM may 
explore incorporating these features. Another major limitation of the personal computer 
version of NAADSM observed in this study is the time taken to simulate populations of a 
significant size. Despite being run on a powerful Windows-based personal computer 
machine the simulation of this study population with 30,195 units took 4 days to 
complete around 100 iterations and did not progress further and crashed. Therefore, we 
resorted to the super-computer version for running our simulations. 
The role of other occupational groups such as veterinarians, abattoir workers, and 
swine transporters who come into contact with swine, and who may play an important 
role in influenza spread were not considered. Similarly the role of live swine markets 
was not considered. Therefore, these assumptions might have underestimated the spread 
of the influenza in the study populations to a certain extent. 
Regardless of these limitations, we found that NAADSM can be used to model the 
spread and control of contagious zoonotic diseases like influenza under similar 
simplifying assumptions to those adopted in this study. This is not surprising given that 
NAADSM was originally built to model spread of FMD between groups of different 
susceptible mammalian species (e.g. bovine, porcine, ovine) and production types (e.g. 
beef, cow calf versus dairy cattle, etc.). Therefore, if one considers UH and RH as just 
other types of groups of mammals, then NAADSM is as well of better suited to model 
the human-animal interface of zoonotic disease spread. However, its feasibility needs to 
be further validated using models calibrated with more accurate farm and household 
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level parameters and influenza outbreak data. For this a good quality information on the 
natural history of influenza infection at the farm and household levels, its spread or 
reproductive numbers of both within and between farms and households, and contact 
rates between household types are required, which are lacking currently. The NAADSM 
is a sophisticated, flexible and user-friendly framework for modeling. It is particularly 
user friendly to people with a biology background who do not possess strong 
mathematical or computer programming skills (as are typically required to make 
appropriate use of other modeling software). 
In our studies, the feasibility of using NAADSM for modeling zoonotic diseases was 
investigated in the context of directly transmitted pathogens where a pathogen spreads 
easily both within and between species simultaneously, and in cases where simulating 
the disease spread at aggregate level such as farm or a household level is reasonable. It 
is not suitable for modeling vector-born, foodborne and other zoonotic diseases where 
the unit of simulation had to be at the individual animal or person level. For this major 
structural changes in NAADSM would be required. Other more flexible and powerful 
modeling software like AnyLogic® used for the study described in Chapter 6 provide a 
better alternative for modeling all types of zoonoses and for all purposes. AnyLogic® is 
powerful multi-methods modeling software that can be used to build discrete event, 
system dynamic, agent-based/individual-based, or hybrid of any of these models 
including spatially explicit and network-based models. However, AnyLogic® is not 
easily accessible and user friendly to field epidemiologists as it requires a high-level of 
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training and support of information technology professionals besides being relatively 
expensive software. Therefore, it seems imperative to invest in upgrading software like 
NAADSM to incorporate flexibility to overcome the deficiencies highlighted above to 
develop it into generic zoonotic diseases modeling framework. 
7.5 Chapter 5 
This chapter of this thesis, a network analysis of the swine shipments among farms was 
conducted. The result showed the heterogeneity in the contact frequency among and 
between swine farm types. The network also demonstrated scale-free and small-world 
topologies. Furthermore, this study also included network analysis of swine shipments 
from farms to processing units using the directed two-mode network approach. The 
epidemiological implications of the network metrics were presented in detail in the 
Chapter 5, including potential use of two-mode network analysis between farms and 
slaughterhouses. Although not a comprehensive study in terms of province or country 
wide coverage, the estimates of the network and farm level metrics were found similar 
to other studies. This study provides a number of useful epidemiological information for 
understanding the patterns of disease spread, parameters required for modeling and 
supporting risk-based disease management in swine first time in Ontario, Canada. 
7.6 Chapter 6 
In this chapter, the effects of network structures (RN, SFN and SWN) on the spread and 
control of pH1N1 virus in a specialized multi-site AIAO swine production system using 
the agent-based network modeling approach was evaluated. The results showed the 
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speed and the size of the influenza outbreaks in the RN and SFN models were similar. In 
addition, long-range links present in SWN models allowed the disease to spread faster 
and with greater outbreak size than in either SFN or RN models. This is contrary to the 
previous findings in both animal and human populations (Keeling and Eames, 2005, 
Shirley and Rushton, 2005, Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008), where diseases spread 
faster in SFN followed by RN and SWN models. This difference might be due to the 
combination of small network size and relatively lower value of the average number of 
links per farm used in our study, resulting in a relatively smaller magnitude of the SFN 
effect than a SWN effect on the spread of influenza in this study population. Therefore, 
future models should incorporate an appropriate network structure to improve the 
validity of the disease spread models. The quarantine strategy that quarantined all farms 
ZLWKWKHQXPEHURIOLQNVWKSHUFHQWLOHGLVWULEXWLRQKDGWKHPD[LPXPEHQHILW
followed by randomly targeted quarantine strategy and the quarantine strategy targeting 
RQO\IDUPVZLWKWKHQXPEHURIOLQNVWKSHUFHQWLOHGLVWULEXWLRQ+RZHYHUWKHFRVW
benefit of quarantining more number of farms vis-à-vis cost saved through minimizing 
losses from a disease outbreak should be assessed to decide on appropriate control 
strategies. To our best knowledge this is the first study conducted for assessing the 
effect of network structure on influenza spread in a swine population. 
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7.7 Future directions 
The future directions proposed in this section are based on gaps in knowledge and 
information identified through the systematic review as well as from results in the 
modeling studies outlined above. 
 It is apparent that modeling research on influenza transmission dynamics in 
animals (including birds) and at the animal-human interface has been grossly 
neglected. As such, more modeling research needs to be conducted. This is 
imperative given the continued threat posed by the repeated emergence of 
pandemic influenza viruses and the potential role animals (particularly swine) 
can play in generating novel influenza viruses.  
 One of the main limitations of zoonotic modeling studies described in Chapters 
3, 4, and 6 has been the lack of information on the farm-level natural history of 
influenza infection and farm-to-farm spread parameters through direct contact 
(shipment of animals between farms) and indirect contact (through movement of 
swine workers, veterinarians, and other fomites) to calibrate the models. 
Therefore some studies need to be conducted to estimate these parameters. It is 
possible that some of the information are available but have not been reported in 
a form usable for modeling work. More representative studies to estimate 
different stages of pH1N1 or infection with other influenza viruses at the farm 
level may provide useful information to parameterize of models in the future. 
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 Some prospective studies also need to be conducted to quantify the transmissions 
of pH1N1 from swine to human and human to swine as it is one of the main 
transmission parameters required for modeling. 
 Some surveys may also be conducted to estimate the contact frequency among 
different occupations of people similar to those reported by Mossong et al. 
(2008)  
 Future studies need to investigate whether the findings of Chapters 3 and 4 are 
consistent across all plausible ranges of the infectious duration of the virus, 
transmission probabilities of the diseases in swine and humans, the effect of 
further delaying the speed the detection, and reducing the effectiveness of 
movement restrictions through adequate sensitivity analyses.  
 Future modeling research could also investigate the effect of vaccinating similar 
proportions of the rural and/or urban populations in addition to swine workers 
for controlling influenza pandemic. 
 It is recommended that a more extensive and representative swine shipments 
network analysis study covering a larger area and incorporating both direct and 
indirect contacts related to swine industry be initiated to validate the estimates 
presented in this thesis. 
  In the agent-based network models study in Chapter 6, all the links were treated 
as binary and static, and the transmission through indirect contacts such as 
movement of people and other fomites including their effect in other settings of 
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swine production systems were not considered. Therefore, future studies may 
investigate these findings further using weighted and dynamic network similar to 
study conducted by Vernon and Keeling (2009), and in other swine management 
systems. This is also one of the limitations of the NAADSM models explained 
earlier. 
 It is worthwhile to invest in upgrading the user friendly software like NAADSM 
to incorporate more flexibility and features to overcome the deficiencies 
highlighted above to develop it into a generic zoonotic diseases modeling 
framework. 
7.8 Concluding remarks 
The work presented in this thesis contributes to the literature by providing an overview 
of modeling approaches, methods and software used for influenza modeling in animal 
and human populations. In addition, key disease spread and intervention parameters 
used for modeling influenza viruses are consolidated for ready reference in future 
works. It also highlighted the huge lacunae existing in the modeling research in animals 
and animal-human interface. Priority needs to be accorded to address some of these 
deficiencies given the rising incidence of zoonotic diseases throughout the world. The 
importance of reducing the transmissibility of the influenza at the animal-human 
interface, early detection through effective surveillance mechanisms, and effective 
quarantine measures for controlling the outbreaks were highlighted. Furthermore, the 
feasibility of using a user friendly modeling framework designed for field 
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epidemiologists (NAADSM) was investigated, and suggestions to further upgrade it into 
a generic zoonotic modeling framework were provided. Other contributions of this 
thesis include estimation of useful network metrics and parameters required for 
understanding the patterns of disease spread, and for supporting modeling research and 
risk-based disease management decisions in swine populations. We have also developed 
different network structures based on multiple production types for the first time in 
AnyLogic (the default network feature is limited to single agent type). This study 
demonstrated the importance of incorporating appropriate network structure explicitly to 
LPSURYHWKHYDOLGLW\RIDPRGHO¶VSUHGLFWLRQV, and the benefits of the targeted control 
strategies.  
Lastly, although, simulation models are useful tools and are increasingly being used 
to support policy decisions in the disease prevention and management, a cautionary 
reminder by Kao (2002) WKDWµall theoretical models are only one aspect to providing 
good scientific advice, augmenting experimental investigation and the good collection 
and analysis of epidemiological data¶ must be noted. Thus, research priority needs to be 
given to the collection, analysis and reporting of epidemiological data in formats that 
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Table S1: List of articles that used different methods for modeling the spread of zoonotic influenza viruses in human and animal populations to 
address various research questions. 
 
Key: I = evaluate different types of intervention measures; M = describe new modeling methods, techniques and approaches; P = parameter estimation; S = evaluate spread of 
influenza; T = development of modeling platforms or tools (T). Combination of these letters indicates more than one research questions of interest. Where there are more than one 
set of combination of question of interests for application of a particular model, superscripts on question of interests correspond to superscripts of respective articles. 
  
Species and spread type Model type Questions of 
interests 
Article  




(Kitching et al., 2006)1; 
(Hartvigsen et al., 2007)2 
 
 






(Gani et al., 2005, Duerr et al., 2007b, Tennenbaum, 2008, An der Heiden et al., 2009, 
Medlock and Meyers, 2009, Tuite et al., 2009, Tsai et al., 2010, Tuite et al., 2010a)1; 
(Larson, 2007, Nigmatulina and Larson, 2009)2; (Roberts et al., 2007, Wein and 
Atkinson, 2009)3; (Fraser et al., 2009, Tuite et al., 2010b)4 
3. Deterministic heterogeneous mixing & 
spatially explicit compartmental model 
IMS (Lunelli et al., 2009) 










(Sattenspiel and Herring, 2003, Hollingsworth et al., 2006, Gardam et al., 2007, Nuño et 
al., 2007a, Nuño et al., 2007b, Arinaminpathy and McLean, 2008a, Arino et al., 2008, 
Gumel et al., 2008, Nuño et al., 2008)1; 
(Vardavas et al., 2007)2; (Chowell et al., 2006b, Flahault et al., 2006)3; 
(Brauer, 2008)4; (Mills et al., 2004, Chowell et al., 2006a, Sertsou et al., 2006, Chowell 
et al., 2007a, Chowell et al., 2007b, Chowell et al., 2008b)5; 
(Massad et al., 2007)6; (Flahault et al., 1994, Grais et al., 2003, Grais et al., 2004, 
Lavenu et al., 2004, Rios-Doria and Chowell, 2009)7; 
(Eichner et al., 2007)8 
5. Deterministic network model M (Aparicio and Pascual, 2007) 











(Ferguson et al., 2006, Wu et al., 2006, van den Dool et al., 2008, Basta et al., 2009, Lee 
et al., 2009a, Sypsa et al., 2009, Milne et al., 2010)1; (Das et al., 2008)2; (Yang et al., 
2009, Yasuda and Suzuki, 2009)3; (Germann et al., 2006, Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2007, 
Ciofi degli Atti et al., 2008, Sypsa and Hatzakis, 2009)4; (Fraser, 2007, Tsai et al., 
2010)5; (Carpenter and Sattenspiel, 2009)6; (Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2009)7; 
(Hanley, 2006, Feighner et al., 2009)8; 






(Davey and Glass, 2008, Perlroth et al., 2010)1; 
(Carrat et al., 2006b, Duerr et al., 2007c)2; 
(Chao et al., 2010)3; 
(Ajelli and Merler, 2008)4 
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Table S1: (continued) 
Species and spread type Model type Questions of 
interests 
Article  
 8. Stochastic agent-based/individual-based spatially explicit 
model 
I1; (Ferguson et al., 2005, Halloran et al., 2008)1; 





(Halloran et al., 2002, Weycker et al., 2005, Glass and Barnes, 2007, 
Haber et al., 2007)1; (Shaban et al., 2009)2; 
(Gojovic et al., 2009)3; (Longini et al., 2004, Rizzo et al., 2008)4; 
(Addy et al., 1991)5; 
  10. Stochastic heterogeneous mixing gravity model  S  (Boni et al., 2009) 
 11. Stochastic homogeneous mixing compartmental model I1; 
P2; 
(Epstein et al., 2007, Wood et al., 2007, Xu et al., 2007)1; 
(Lessler et al., 2007)2 
 12. Stochastic metapopulation model I1; 
IS2; 
MS3 
(Cooper et al., 2006)1; 
(Colizza et al., 2007, Flahault et al., 2009)2; 
(Balcan et al., 2009)3 
 13. Stochastic network model I1; 
IS2 
(Glass et al., 2006)1; 
(Hsu and Shih, 2010)2 
 14. Stochastic spatially explicit metapopulation model PS  (Colizza et al., 2009b) 
 
15. Stochastic spatially explicit network model I (Longini et al., 2005) 




(Elbakidze, 2008)1; (Iwami et al., 2009)2; 
(Ward et al., 2009)3;  
(Bos et al., 2007, Guberti et al., 2007)4 
 2. Stochastic agent-based/individual-based model IS (Savill et al., 2006) 
3. Stochastic heterogeneous mixing compartmental model S (Bavinck et al., 2009) 
4. Stochastic homogeneous mixing compartmental model P1; 
IP2 
(van der Goot et al., 2003)1; 
(van der Goot et al., 2005)2 
5. Stochastic spatially explicit agent-based/individual-based 
model 
I (Le Menach et al., 2006) 
6. Stochastic spatially explicit network model IS  (Sharkey et al., 2008) 
C. Bird-bird and bird-human 1. Stochastic agent-based/individual-based spatially explicit 
model 
 MT  (Rao et al., 2009) 
 
2. Deterministic homogeneous mixing metapopulation model  IM  (Arino et al., 2007) 
D. Bird-bird, bird-human and 
human-human 
1. Deterministic homogeneous mixing compartmental model  M  (Iwami et al., 2007, Kim et al., 2010) 
E. Animal-animal, animal-
human, human-human and 
human-animal 
1. Deterministic multi-host compartmental model  IMS  (Saenz et al., 2006) 
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Table S2: List of articles that used different modeling methods for assessing various intervention strategies against zoonotic influenza in human 
and animal populations 
Species and spread type Model type Interventions Articles 
A. Human-human 1. Deterministic agent-based/individual-based model V (Kitching et al., 2006, Hartvigsen et al., 2007) 








(Gani et al., 2005)1; 
(Duerr et al., 2007a, An der Heiden et al., 2009)2; 
(Roberts et al., 2007)3; 
(Larson, 2007, Wein and Atkinson, 2009)4; 
(Nigmatulina and Larson, 2009)5; 
(Medlock and Meyers, 2009, Tuite et al., 2009, Tuite et al., 2010a)6 
3. Deterministic heterogeneous mixing & spatially explicit 
compartmental model 
ASV (Lunelli et al., 2009) 












(Gardam et al., 2007, Brauer, 2008, Arinaminpathy and McLean, 
2009)1; 
(Chowell et al., 2006b)2; 
(Eichner et al., 2007)3; 
(Nuño et al., 2007a, Gumel et al., 2008)4; 
(Flahault et al., 2006)5; 
(Arino et al., 2008)6; 
(Sattenspiel and Herring, 2003, Nuño et al., 2008)7; 
(Hollingsworth et al., 2006)8; 
(Vardavas et al., 2007)9 










(Wu et al., 2006)1; 
(Sypsa and Hatzakis, 2009)2; 
(Ferguson et al., 2006)3; 
(Germann et al., 2006, Das et al., 2008, Yasuda and Suzuki, 2009, 
Tsai et al., 2010)4; 
(Ciofi degli Atti et al., 2008)5; 
(Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2007)6; 
(Lee et al., 2010)7; 
(van den Dool et al., 2008, Basta et al., 2009, Milne et al., 2009, 
Sypsa et al., 2009, Yang et al., 2009)8 
6. Stochastic agent-based/individual-based network model A1; 
ADSV2 
(Duerr et al., 2007c)1; 




Table S2: (continued) 
Species and spread type Model type Interventions Articles 
A. Human-human 7. Stochastic agent-based/individual-based spatially 
explicit model 
ADS (Ferguson et al., 2005, Halloran et al., 2008) 







(Glass and Barnes, 2007)1; 
(Rizzo et al., 2008)2; 
(Gojovic et al., 2009)3; 
(Longini et al., 2004)4; 
(Haber et al., 2007)5; 
(Shaban et al., 2009)6; 
(Halloran et al., 2002, Weycker et al., 2005)7; 
9. Stochastic homogeneous mixing compartmental model A1; 
T2; 
TV3 
(Xu et al., 2007)1; 
(Epstein et al., 2007)2; 
(Wood et al., 2007)3 
10. Stochastic metapopulation model AT1; 
T2; 
V3 
(Colizza et al., 2007)1; 
(Cooper et al., 2006)2; 
(Flahault et al., 2009)3 
11. Stochastic network model D (Glass et al., 2006, Hsu and Shih, 2010) 
12. Stochastic spatially explicit network model ADV (Longini et al., 2005) 





(Iwami et al., 2009)2 
2. Stochastic agent-based/individual-based model V (Savill et al., 2006) 
3. Stochastic spatially explicit agent-based/individual-
based model 
M (Le Menach et al., 2006) 
4. Stochastic spatially explicit network model M (Sharkey et al., 2008) 
C. Bird-bird, bird-human 
and human-human 




1. Deterministic multi-host compartmental model V (Saenz et al., 2006) 
 
Key: A= antivirals for either or both prophylactic and treatment; D= include workplace closure, contact tracing, quarantine, isolation, cancellation of community and mass 
gathering, use of personal hygiene and protective equipment; M= movement control and depopulation in animals (including birds); S= school and daycare closure only; T=air travel 
restriction; V= vaccination before or during the outbreaks. Combination of letters indicates combination of these measures. Where there are more than one set of combination of 




Table S3: Summary of natural history parameters of influenza infection in humans either estimated from experimental and observational studies, 
referenced or assumed for modeling along with list of articles and references. 
 
Disease states Agent 








Median of max. 
values (Range)  Article Reference sources  
A. Incubation period (day) 
a) Estimated 
values 
1(a). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009  
2.0 - - - (Witkop et al., 2010)1 - 
 1(b). Pandemic influenza A/ 
H1N1 2009  
4.3  
(95%CI 2.6-6.0) 
4.0 - - (Tuite et al., 2010b)1,2 - 
 2. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 2.0 - 1.0 3.0 (Canadian Food 




1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918 
1.0 - - - (Carpenter and 
Sattenspiel, 2009)1 
(Longini et al., 2004, 
Dubé et al., 2008)1 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009 
2.0 (1.5 ± 3.0) - 1.0 5.0 (Kitching et al., 2006, 
Boni et al., 2009, 
Pourbohloul et al., 2009)1; 
(Pourbohloul et al., 
2009)3,4  
(Longini et al., 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Longini and Halloran, 
2005, Ferguson et al., 
2006, Germann et al., 
2006, Halloran et al., 
2008, Lessler et al., 
2009, WHO, 2009)1; 
 (WHO, 2009)3, 4 
3. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 
1957 and H1N1 2009 
2.0 - 1.0 3.0  (Chao et al., 2010)1,3, 4 (Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency, 
Halloran et al., 2007)1, 3, 
4 
 
Note: (a) Estimated values are those estimated from empirical data of experimental or observational studies; (b) Referenced values refer to those values taken from other articles or 
sources; (c) Assumed values are values assumed based on expert opinion or unpublished data sources. Summary estimates are medians and ranges of means, medians, minimum 
and maximum values of two or more articles. Single value represented value from either one article or same value from two or more articles. Superscript numbers on articles and 
reference sources correspond to columns of mean =1; median =2; minimum =3; and maximum = 4.   
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Table S3: (continued) 
 
Disease states Agent 








Median of max. 
values (Range)  Article Reference sources  
b) Referenced 
values 
4. Mutant influenza A/H5N1 1.7 (1.48 ± 1.9) 2.0 1.0 3.0 (Ohkusa and Sugawara, 
2007)2,3,4 
(Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Ohkusa and Sugawara, 
2007)1 
(Moser et al., 1979, 
Longini and Halloran, 
2005)1; (Longini et al., 
2005)2,3,4 
 
5. Pandemic influenza viruses 1.6 (1.0 ± 1.9)  2.0 1.0 3.0 (Germann et al., 2006, 
Colizza et al., 2007, 
Gardam et al., 2007, 
Rizzo et al., 2008)1 
(Germann et al., 2006)2 
(Germann et al., 2006, 
Basta et al., 2009)3, 4  
(Flahault et al., 1988, 
Ferguson et al., 2003b, 
Longini et al., 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Gani et al., 2005, 
Longini and Halloran, 
2005)1;  
(Longini et al., 2005)2 
(Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency, 
Longini and Halloran, 
2005, Halloran et al., 
2007)3, 4 
6. Novel influenza virus 1.9 - - 3.0 (Longini et al., 2005)1 
(Grais et al., 2003, 
Flahault et al., 2006)4 
(Dubé et al., 2008, 
Jones et al., 2008)1; 
(OIE, 2007)4 
7. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1 - - 1.0 4.0 (Chen and Liao, 2010) 3, 4 
 
(Anderson and May, 
1991, Thomas and DJ, 
2001, Mills et al., 
2004)3, 4 
8. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 - - 1.0 3.5 (3.0 ± 4.0)  
(Cauchemez et al., 2004, 
Chen and Liao, 2010) 3, 4 
 
(Anderson and May, 
1991, Nicholson, 1998, 
Hayden and Aoki, 
1999a, Thomas and DJ, 





Table S3: (continued) 
 
Disease states Agent 








Median of max. 
values (Range)  Article Reference sources  
b) Referenced 
values 
9. Influenza viruses 2.4 (1.9 ± 2.9) 2.0 1.0 3.0  (Flahault et al., 1994, Tsai 
et al., 2010)1  
(Chen and Liao, 2010, 
Tsai et al., 2010)2,3 
(Grais et al., 2004, Chen 
and Liao, 2010, Tsai et 
al., 2010)4 
(Flahault et al., 1988)1 
(Anderson and May, 
1991, Thomas and DJ, 
2001, Mills et al., 2004, 
Longini et al., 2005)2, 3 
(Anderson and May, 
1991, Thomas and DJ, 
2001, Mills et al., 2004, 
Longini et al., 2005, 
Office International des 
Epizooties (OIE), 
2007)4 
c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/ 
H1N1 2009  
- - 1.0 3.0 (Yang et al., 2009)3, 4  
2. Novel influenza virus  2.0 - - - (Arino et al., 2007)1  
B. Latent period (day) 
a) Estimated 
values 
1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009  
2.6 (2.3 ± 3.1) - - - (Tuite et al., 2010b)1  





1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918 
1.9 (1.0 ± 3.5) - 1.15 (0.8 - 1.5) 1.7 (1.5 - 1.9) (Mills et al., 2004, 
Chowell et al., 2006a, 
Chowell et al., 2006b, 
Chowell et al., 2007a, 
Chowell et al., 2007b, 
Massad et al., 2007, 
Carpenter and 
Sattenspiel, 2009, Rios-
Doria and Chowell, 
2009)1 
(Sertsou et al., 2006, 
Chowell et al., 2008a)3,4 
(Longini Jr et al., 1978, 
Longini et al., 2004, 
Mills et al., 2004, Dubé 
et al., 2008)1 
(Longini et al., 2004, 
Mills et al., 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Wallinga and Lipsitch, 
2007) & least-square 
fitted value to data by 





Table S3: (continued) 
 
Disease states Agent 








Median of max. 
values (Range)  Article Reference sources  
b) Referenced 
values 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 
1957 
1.9 - - - (Longini et al., 2004)1 (Halloran et al., 2002, 
Dubé et al., 2008, Jones 
et al., 2008)1 
3. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009 
1.5 (1.0 - 3.5) - 0.9 (0.7 - 1.0) 4.0 (2.9 ± 5.0) (Colizza et al., 2009a, 
Gojovic et al., 2009, 
Medlock and Meyers, 
2009, Pourbohloul et 
al., 2009, Sypsa and 
Hatzakis, 2009, Sypsa 
et al., 2009, Tuite et 
al., 2009, Perlroth et 
al., 2010, Tuite et al., 
2010a)1 
(Flahault et al., 2009, 




Longini et al., 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Chowell et al., 2008b, 
Balcan et al., 2009, 
Boëlle et al., 2009, 
Flahault et al., 2009, 
Fraser et al., 2009, 
Novel Swine-Origin 
Influenza et al., 2009, 
Shinde et al., 2009, 
World Health 
Organization (WHO), 
2009, Tuite et al., 
2010b)1; (Boëlle et al., 
2009, Fraser et al., 
2009, World Health 
Organization (WHO), 
2009)3,4  
4. Mutant influenza A/H5N1 1.1 (1.0 ± 1.2) 1.0 1.0 2.0 (Ohkusa and 
Sugawara, 2007, Milne 
et al., 2009)1, 
(Ohkusa and 
Sugawara, 2007)2,3, 4 
(Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency, 
Longini et al., 2005)1 





Table S3: (continued) 
 
Disease states Agent 











(Range)  Article Reference sources  
b) Referenced 
values 
5. Pandemic influenza viruses 1.5 (0.5 - 1.9) 1.0 1.0 (1.0 -
1.2) 
2.0 (Gumel and Moghadas, 
2003, Carrat et al., 2006a, 
Germann et al., 2006, Wu 
et al., 2006, Colizza et al., 
2007, Duerr et al., 2007a, 
Nuño et al., 2007a, Roberts 
et al., 2007, Wood et al., 
2007, Ajelli and Merler, 
2008, Ciofi degli Atti et al., 
2008, Tennenbaum, 2008, 
Balcan et al., 2009, Lunelli 
et al., 2009, Wein and 
Atkinson, 2009)1; 
(Germann et al., 2006)2 
(Germann et al., 2006, 
Roberts et al., 2007, Ajelli 
and Merler, 2008)3,4 
(Cauchemez et al., 2004, 
Longini et al., 2004, Mills et 
al., 2004, Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Gani et al., 2005, Longini and 
Halloran, 2005, Longini et al., 
2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Germann et al., 2006, Colizza 
et al., 2007, Roberts et al., 
2007)1 
(Longini et al., 2005)2 
(Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini 
and Halloran, 2005, Ferguson 
et al., 2006, Germann et al., 
2006, Roberts et al., 2007)3,4  
6. Novel influenza virus 1.6 (1.0 ± 1.2) - 1.0 2.0 (Gani et al., 2005, Longini 
et al., 2005, Hollingsworth 
et al., 2006, Duerr et al., 
2007a, Epstein et al., 2007, 
Nuño et al., 2008)1 
(Arino et al., 2008)3,4 
 
(Longini et al., 2004, Mills et 
al., 2004, Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Longini et al., 2005, Ferguson 
et al., 2006, Germann et al., 
2006, Dubé et al., 2008, Jones 
et al., 2008)1; 
(Longini et al., 2004)3,4 
7. Seasonal influenza 
A/pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918 
1.3 - - - (Davey et al., 2008)1 
 
(Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006)1 
8. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1  1.9 - 1.0 3.0 (Lessler et al., 2007, Chen 
and Liao, 2010)1 
(Chen and Liao, 2010)3,4 
(Anderson and May, 1991, 
Thomas and DJ, 2001, Longini 
et al., 2004, Mills et al., 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 2005)1,3; 
(Anderson and May, 1991, 





Table S3: (continued) 
 
Disease states Agent 











(Range)  Article Reference sources  
b) Referenced 
values 
9. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2  1.9 - 1.0 3.0 (Chen and Liao, 2010)1,3,4 (Anderson and May, 1991, 
Thomas and DJ, 2001, Mills et 
al., 2004)1,3,4 
10. Influenza viruses 1.9 (0.8 ± 1.9) 1.0 1.0 3.0 (2.0 ± 3.0) (Halloran et al., 2002, 
Weycker et al., 2005, Glass 
et al., 2006, Duerr et al., 
2007a, Eichner et al., 2007, 
Arino et al., 2008, Brauer, 
2008, van den Dool et al., 
2008, Chen and Liao, 
2010, Tsai et al., 2010)1 
(Tsai et al., 2010)2 
(Halloran et al., 2002, 
Weycker et al., 2005, Chen 
and Liao, 2010, Tsai et al., 
2010)3,4 
(Anderson and May, 1991, 
Thomas and DJ, 2001, Welliver 
et al., 2001, Hirotsu et al., 
2004, Longini et al., 2004, 
Mills et al., 2004, Ferguson et 
al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, Wallinga 
and Lipsitch, 2007, Dubé et al., 
2008)1; (Longini et al., 2005)2 
(Anderson and May, 1991, 
Thomas and DJ, 2001, Mills et 
al., 2004, Longini et al., 2005, 
Dubé et al., 2008)3,4 
c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009  
2.0 - 1.0 3.0 (Yasuda and Suzuki, 
2009)1;(Yang et al., 2009)3 
(Yang et al., 2009)4 
- 
2. Mutant influenza A/H5N1 3.0 - - - (Ohkusa and Sugawara, 
2009)1  
- 
3. Novel influenza virus  1.5 - - - (Ferguson et al., 2006)1 - 
4. Influenza viruses 1.0 - - - (Hartvigsen et al., 2007)1 - 
C. Subclinical infectious period (day) 
a) Estimated 
values  
1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918 (1st wave) 
2.9 
(95%CI 2.8 -3.1) 
- - - (Chowell et al., 2006a)1  
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918 (2nd wave) 
2.2 
(95%CI 1.9-2.7) 




Table S3: (continued) 
 












(Range)  Article Reference sources  
b) Referenced 
values 
1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.0 (0.5±2.5)  - 0.0 2.0  (Gojovic et al., 
2009, Pourbohloul 
et al., 2009, Perlroth 
et al., 2010)1 
(Pourbohloul et al., 
2009)3, 4 
(Longini et al., 2004, Ferguson 
et al., 2005, Longini et al., 
2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Boëlle et al., 2009, Flahault et 
al., 2009, Fraser et al., 2009)1 
(Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini 
et al., 2005)3, 4 
2. Mutant influenza A/H5N1 1.0 - - - (Milne et al., 2009) 1 (Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency) 
3. Pandemic influenza viruses 1.0 (0.25 ± 4.1) - - - (Duerr et al., 2007a, 
Gardam et al., 2007, 
Tennenbaum, 2008)1 
(Ferguson et al., 2003b, 
Longini et al., 2004, Ferguson 
et al., 2005, Gani et al., 2005, 
Longini et al., 2005, Germann 
et al., 2006)1 
4. Seasonal influenza A/pandemic 
influenza A/H1N1 1918 
- - 0.5 0.7 (Davey et al., 
2008)3,4  
(Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini 
et al., 2005, Ferguson et al., 
2006, Germann et al., 2006)3,4 
5. Influenza viruses 3.0 (0.5 - 4.1) - - - (Glass et al., 2006, 
Eichner et al., 2007, 
Brauer, 2008)1 
(Welliver et al., 2001, Longini 
et al., 2004)1 
b) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza viruses 0.5 - - - (Wu et al., 2006) 1 - 




1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 
(1st wave) 
1.2 ( 1.1-1.3) - - - (Chowell et al., 
2006a)1  
 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 
(2nd wave) 
2.6 ( 2.4±2.8) - - - (Chowell et al., 
2006a) 1 
 
3. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009  3.4 (2.1 ± 4.7) - - - (Tuite et al., 2010b)1  
4. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1 4.5 ( 3.7-5.3) - - - (Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency)1 
 
5. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 5.1 ( 4.5-5.8) - - - (Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency)1 
 





Table S3: (continued) 
 















1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 1.8  
(1.7 ± 3.0) 
- 1.7  
(1.6 ± 1.7) 
1.9  
(1.8 ± 1.9) 
(Chowell et al., 2007a, 
Rios-Doria and 
Chowell, 2009)1 
(Chowell et al., 
2006a)3; 
(Chowell et al., 2007a)4 
 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 1957 4.1 - - - (Longini et al., 2004)1  
 3. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009  5.6 - 1.0 10.0  
(8.0 ± 12.0) 
(Witkop et al., 2010)1, 3 
(De Serres et al., 2010, 










1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 4.6 (4.1 ± 5.0) - 2.6 
 (1.5 ± 3.3) 
4.2 
 (2.9 ± 7.0) 
(Sattenspiel and 
Herring, 2003, Mills et 
al., 2004, Chowell et 
al., 2007b, Massad et 
al., 2007)1 
(Chowell et al., 2006b, 
Sertsou et al., 2006, 
Chowell et al., 2008a, 
Carpenter and 
Sattenspiel, 2009)3, 4 
(Longini Jr et al., 1978, 
Chin, 2000, Longini et al., 
2004, Mills et al., 
2004)1;(Heymann, 2004, 
Longini et al., 2004, Mills 
et al., 2004, Ferguson et 
al., 2005, Ferguson et al., 
2006, Wallinga and 




Table S3: (continued) 
 
Disease states Agent 








Median of max. 




2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009 
3.8 (2.5 ± 7.0) - 3.8 (1.9 ± 4.0) 5.5 (2.9 ± 10.0) (Kitching et al., 
2006, Colizza et al., 
2009a, Gojovic et 
al., 2009, Medlock 
and Meyers, 2009, 
Pourbohloul et al., 
2009, Sypsa and 
Hatzakis, 2009, 
Sypsa et al., 2009, 
Tuite et al., 2009, 
Perlroth et al., 2010, 
Tuite et al., 2010a)1 
(Boni et al., 2009, 
Flahault et al., 2009, 




Longini et al., 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Longini et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Germann et al., 2006, 
Chowell et al., 2008b, 
Halloran et al., 2008, 
Balcan et al., 2009, 
Boëlle et al., 2009, 
Flahault et al., 2009, 
Fraser et al., 2009, 
Novel Swine-Origin 
Influenza et al., 2009, 
World Health 
Organization (WHO), 
2009, Tuite et al., 
2010b)1; (Cauchemez et 
al., 2004, Boëlle et al., 
2009, Fraser et al., 
2009, World Health 
Organization (WHO), 
2009)3, 4 
3. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 
1957/ and H1N1 2009 
6.0 - - - (Chao et al., 2010)1 (Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency, 
Halloran et al., 2007)1 
4. Mutant influenza A/H5N1 4.1 (4.0 ± 4.1) - 3.0 6.0 (Ohkusa and 
Sugawara, 2007, 





Longini et al., 2005)1 




Table S3: (continued) 
 
Disease states Agent 








Median of max. 




5. Pandemic influenza viruses 4.0 (1.8 ± 7.0) - 3.0 (2.5 ± 3.0) 8.0 (5.0 ± 10.0) (Gumel and Moghadas, 
2003, Carrat et al., 2006a, 
Germann et al., 2006, Wu 
et al., 2006, Colizza et al., 
2007, Duerr et al., 2007a, 
Gardam et al., 2007, 
Nuño et al., 2007a, 
Roberts et al., 2007, 
Wood et al., 2007, Ajelli 
and Merler, 2008, Rizzo 
et al., 2008, Balcan et al., 
2009, Basta et al., 2009, 
Lunelli et al., 2009, Wein 
and Atkinson, 2009)1 
(Carrat et al., 2006a, 
Germann et al., 2006, 
Tennenbaum, 2008)3; 
(Carrat et al., 2006a, 
Germann et al., 2006, 





Flahault et al., 1988, 
Hayden et al., 1998, 
Ferguson et al., 2003a, 
Stiver, 2003, 
Cauchemez et al., 2004, 
Longini et al., 2004, 
Mills et al., 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Gani et al., 2005, 
Longini et al., 2005, 
Bell, 2006, Ferguson et 
al., 2006, Germann et 
al., 2006, Colizza et al., 
2007, Halloran et al., 
2007)1 
(Longini et al., 2004, 
Mills et al., 2004, 
Chowell et al., 2006b)3; 
(Cauchemez et al., 
2004, Ferguson et al., 
2005, Longini et al., 
2005, Ferguson et al., 
2006) 4 
6. Seasonal influenza 
A/pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918 
- - 3.5 4.1 (Davey et al., 2008)3, 4 (Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Longini et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, 




Table S3: (continued) 
 
Disease states Agent 








Median of max. 




7. Novel influenza virus 4.0 (1.0 ± 7.0) - 5.0 10 (7.0 ± 12.0) (Grais et al., 2003, Gani 
et al., 2005, Longini et 
al., 2005, Flahault et al., 
2006, Hollingsworth et 
al., 2006, Saenz et al., 
2006, Duerr et al., 2007b, 
Nuño et al., 2007b, Nuño 
et al., 2008)1 
(Grais et al., 2003, 
Epstein et al., 2007, Nuño 
et al., 2007b)4 
(Couch and Kasel, 1983, 
Rvachev L and IM., 1985, 
Stiver, 2003, Longini et 
al., 2004, Stöhr, 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Longini et al., 2005, 
Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention 
(CDC), 2006, Dubé et al., 
2008, Jones et al., 2008)1; 
(Couch et al., 1986, 
Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention 
(CDC), 2006)3; (Couch 
and Kasel, 1983, Rvachev 
L and IM., 1985, Longini 
et al., 2004, Ferguson et 
al., 2005, Centers for 
Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), 2006, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Germann et al., 2006)4 
8. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1 4.1 - 2.0 8.0 (Lessler et al., 2007, 
Chen and Liao, 2010)1, 
(Chen and Liao, 2010)3,4 
(Anderson and May, 1991, 
Thomas and DJ, 2001, 
Longini et al., 2004, Mills 
et al., 2004, Ferguson et 
al., 2005)1; (Anderson and 
May, 1991, Thomas and 





Table S3: (continued) 
 
Disease states Agent 








Median of max. 




9. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 4.1 (3.8 ± 4.1) - 2.0 8.0 (Addy et al., 1991, 
Cauchemez et al., 2008, 
Chen and Liao, 2010)1; 
(Chen and Liao, 2010)3,4 
(Anderson and May, 1991, 
Thomas and DJ, 2001, 
Cauchemez et al., 2004, 
Mills et al., 2004, Dubé et 
al., 2008)1; 
(Anderson and May, 1991, 
Thomas and DJ, 2001, 
Mills et al., 2004)3,4 
10. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2/ 
influenza B 
3.8 - - - (Cauchemez et al., 2008)1 (Cauchemez et al., 2004)1 
11. Influenza viruses 4.1 (1.4 ± 7.0) - 3.0 (2.0 ± 3.0) 6.0 (6.0 ± 10.0) (Flahault et al., 1994, 
Halloran et al., 2002, 
Grais et al., 2004, Lavenu 
et al., 2004, Weycker et 
al., 2005, Glass et al., 
2006, Eichner et al., 
2007, Arino et al., 2008, 
Brauer, 2008, Chowell et 
al., 2008b, van den Dool 
et al., 2008, Shaban et al., 
2009, Tuite et al., 2009, 
Chen and Liao, 2010, 
Tsai et al., 2010)1 
(Halloran et al., 2002, 
Weycker et al., 2005, 
Chen and Liao, 2010, 
Tsai et al., 2010)3,4 
(Rvachev L and IM., 1985, 
Flahault et al., 1988, 
Anderson and May, 1991, 
Thomas and DJ, 2001, 
Welliver et al., 2001, 
Hirotsu et al., 2004, 
Longini et al., 2004, Mills 
et al., 2004, Ferguson et 
al., 2005, Longini et al., 
2005, Ferguson et al., 
2006, Fraser, 2007, 
Wallinga and Lipsitch, 
2007, Chowell et al., 
2008b, Chowell and 
Nishiura, 2008, Dubé et 
al., 2008, Tuite et al., 
2010b)1; (Rvachev L and 
IM., 1985, Anderson and 
May, 1991, Thomas and 
DJ, 2001, Mills et al., 
2004, Longini et al., 2005, 




Table S3: (continued) 
 












(Range)  Article Reference sources  
c) Assumed values 
 
 
1. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 1957  - - 3.8 5.3 (Arinaminpathy and 
McLean, 2009) 3,4 
 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H3N2 1968 3.0 - - - (Cooper et al., 2006)1  
3. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009  4.0  
(3.0 ± 5.0) 
- 3.0 7.0 (Yang et al., 2009, 
Yasuda and Suzuki, 
2009)1;(Yang et al., 
2009)3,4 
 
4. Pandemic influenza viruses  - - 2.0 3.0 (Nigmatulina and 
Larson, 2009) 3,4 
 
5. Novel influenza virus 4.0 - - - (Arino et al., 2007)1  
6. Influenza viruses 3.0 - - - (Hartvigsen et al., 2007, 
Vardavas et al., 2007)1 
 
E. Immune period (day) All modeling articles assumed immunity last till the duration of simulation after vaccination or recovery 
F. Percentage of pre-existing immunity (%)       
a) Estimated 
values 
1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009  - - 4.0 34.0 (Hancock et al., 2009)3, 4  
b) Referenced 
values 
1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 - 50.0 - - (Rios-Doria and 
Chowell, 2009)2 
(Barry et al., 2008)2;  
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009  - 34.0 
 (5.0 ± 50.0) 
 30.0 50.0  
(15.0 ± 70.0) 
(Kitching et al., 2006, 
Gojovic et al., 2009, 
Tuite et al., 2010a)2 
(Tuite et al., 2010a)3 
(Gojovic et al., 2009, 
Tuite et al., 2009, Tuite 
et al., 2010a)4 
(Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 
Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), 2009, Coburn 
et al., 2009, Fisman et al., 2009, 
Flahault et al., 2009, Fraser et al., 
2009)2; (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), 
2009, Fisman et al., 2009)3; 
(Hirotsu et al., 2004, Wallinga 
and Lipsitch, 2007, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), 2009, Coburn et al., 2009, 
Fisman et al., 2009, Flahault et 




Table S3: (continued) 
 











(Range)  Article Reference sources  
b) Referenced 
values 
3. Mutant influenza A/H5N1 - - - 27.0  (Ferguson et al., 2005)4 (Fox et al., 1982) 4 
4. Novel influenza virus - 30.0 - 100.0 (Nuño et al., 2007b)2,4 (Castillo-Chavez et al., 
1989)2,4 
 
5. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 - - - 27.0 (Cauchemez et al., 
2008) 3 
(Longini et al., 1988) 4 
6. Influenza viruses - - - 30.0 (van den Dool et al., 
2008) 3,4 
(Hirotsu et al., 2004, Wallinga 
and Lipsitch, 2007)3, 4 
c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 - - 10.0 20.0 (Sertsou et al., 2006)3,4 - 
 2. Novel influenza virus - 25.0 - - (Flahault et al., 2006)2 - 
 3. Influenza viruses - - - 62.5  
(50.0 ± 75.0) 
(Flahault et al., 1994, 




Table S4: Summary of natural history parameters of influenza infection in animals either estimated from experimental and observational studies, or 
referenced or assumed for modeling along with list of articles and references. 
Disease states  Agent Median of 
means 
(Range) 
Median of min. 
values (Range) 
Median of max. 
values (Range) 
Articles Reference sources 
A. Incubation period (day) Swine species      
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009  
- 1.0 (1.0±2.0) 2.5 (1.0 ± 3.0) (Howden et al., 2009, Lange 
et al., 2009, Brookes et al., 
2010)2,3 
- 
B. Latent period (day) 
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
- 1.0 2.0 (2.0 ± 5.0) (Lange et al., 2009, Brookes 
et al., 2010, Vincent et al., 
2010)2,3 
- 
2.  Swine influenza A/ 
H1N1  
- 1.0 2.0 (Vincent et al., 2009)2,3  
C. Clinical infectious period (day) 




- 7.0 (3.0 ± 7.0) 8.0 (5.0 ± 15.0) (Lange et al., 2009, Brookes 
et al., 2010, Vincent et al., 
2010)2,3 
 
 2. Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 (herd-
level) 
- 10.0 31 (20.0 ± 42.0) (Pasma and Joseph, 2010)2 
(Howden et al., 2009, Pasma 
and Joseph, 2010)3 
 
 3. Swine influenza 
A/H1N1 
- 3.0  5.0 (Vincent et al., 2009)2,3  
b) Referenced values 1. Novel influenza virus 7.0 - - (Saenz et al., 2006)1 (Hinshaw et al., 1981, Brown, 
2000, Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006)1 
D. Immune period (day) 
a) Estimated values 1. Swine influenza 
viruses 
- 365.0 692.5 (545.0 ± 840.0) (Blaskovic et al., 1970)2 
(Blaskovic et al., 1970, 
Desrosiers et al., 2004)3 
 
Note: (a) Estimated values are those estimated from empirical data of experimental or observational studies; (b) Referenced values refer to those values taken from other articles or 
sources; (c) Assumed values are values assumed based on expert opinion or unpublished data sources. Summary estimates are medians and ranges of means, medians, minimum 
and maximum values of two or more articles. Single value represented value from either one article or same value from two or more articles. Superscript numbers on articles and 




Table S5: Summary of natural history parameters of avian influenza infection in birds used for modeling. 








List of articles  Reference sources  
A. Incubation period (day)  
b) Referenced values 1. Avian influenza 
A/H5N1(individual level) 
5.0 - - (Elbakidze, 2008)1 (Mannelli et al., 2007)1 
c) Assumed values 1. Avian influenza 
A/H7N1(individual level) 
- 2.0 6.0 (Ward et al., 2009)2,3 - 
2. Avian influenza 
A/H7N7(individual level) 
- 1.0 3.0 (Stegeman et al., 2004)2,3 - 
B. Latent period 
(day) 
      
b) Referenced values 1. Avian influenza A/ H5N1 
(individual level)  
1.8 (1.5 ± 2.0) 1.0 2.0 (Savill et al., 2006, Sharkey 
et al., 2008)1; 
(Tiensin et al., 2007, Sharkey 
et al., 2008)2,3 
(van der Goot et al., 2003, Swayne and Beck, 
2005, Tian et al., 2005, Gao et al., 2006)1;(van der 
Goot et al., 2003, Lee et al., 2005, Swayne and 
Beck, 2005, Tian et al., 2005, Gao et al., 2006, 
Swayne et al., 2006, Webster et al., 2006)2,3 
 2. Avian influenza 
A/H7N7(individual level) 
2.0 - - (Le Menach et al., 2006, Bos 
et al., 2007, Bavinck et al., 
2009)1 
(European, 2003, Savill et al., 2006, van der Goot 
et al., 2007)1 
c) Assumed value 1. Avian influenza 
A/H7N7(individual level) 
2.0 - - (van der Goot et al., 2005) 1 - 
C. Subclinical infectious period (day) 
b) Referenced values 1. Avian influenza 
A/H5N1(individual level) 
1.0 - - (Savill et al., 2006)1 (Dube et al., 2011)1 
2.  Avian influenza 
A/H7N7(individual level) 
4.0  - 6.0 (Le Menach et al., 2006)1, 3 (European, 2003, Stegeman et al., 2004)1, 3 
D. Clinical infectious period (day) 
a.1) Estimated values 
(with 95%CI) 
1. Highly pathogenic avian 
influenza A/H5N2 
6.8 (4.91 ± 8.7) - - (van der Goot et al., 2003)1  
2. Low pathogenic avian 
influenza A/H5N2  
4.3 (2.6 ± 5.9) - - (van der Goot et al., 2003)1  
3. Avian influenza A/H7N7  6.3 (3.9 ± 8.7)   (van der Goot et al., 2005)1  
b) Referenced values 
 
1. Avian influenza A/ H5N1  2.8 (1.5 ± 4.0) 1.0 3.5 (3.0 ± 4.0) (Savill et al., 2006, Sharkey 
et al., 2008)1; (Tiensin et al., 
2007, Sharkey et al., 2008) 2,3 
(Anonymous, 2007, Dube et al., 2011)1; (Lee et 
al., 2005, Tian et al., 2005, Swayne et al., 2006, 
Webster et al., 2006, Anonymous, 2007)2,3 
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Table S5: (continued) 








List of articles  Reference sources  
b) Referenced values 
 
2. Avian influenza A/ H5N1 
(Flock level) 
10.0  - - (Elbakidze, 2008)1 (Office International des Epizooties (OIE), 2007)1 
3. Avian influenza A/H7N7  13.8  1.0 6.0 (Bos et al., 2007)1  
 
(Le Menach et al., 2006) 2,3 
(van der Goot et al., 2005)1; 
(European, 2003, Sanco, 2003, van der Goot et 
al., 2003, Stegeman et al., 2004) 2,3 
4. Avian influenza A/H7N7 
(Flock level) 
6.3  4.0 12.0 (Iwami et al., 2009)1; 
(Bavinck et al., 2009) 2,3 
(Capua and Alexander, 2004, Stegeman et al., 
2004)1; 
(Stegeman et al., 2004) 2,3 
5. Low pathogenic avian 
influenza 
9.2 (4.3 -14.0) - - (Guberti et al., 2007)1 (Grenfell and Anderson, 1985, Aznar et al., 
2011)1 
c) Assumed values 1. Avian influenza A/ H5N1 
(Village level)  
7.0   (Ward et al., 2009)1  
 
Note: (a) Estimated values are those estimated from empirical data of experimental or observational studies; (b) Referenced values refer to those values taken from other articles or 
sources; (c) Assumed values are values assumed based on expert opinion or unpublished data sources. Summary estimates are medians and ranges of means, medians, minimum 
and maximum values of two or more articles. Single value represented value from either one article or same value from two or more articles. Superscript numbers on articles and 




Table S6: Distributions of natural history of influenza infection in human and bird populations either estimated from experimental and 
observational studies, referenced or assumed for modeling along with list of articles and references. 
Disease states Agent Distributions used Article 
Human 
1. Incubation period  
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 Log-normal with a mean duration of 4.3 (95%CI 2.6±
6.6)  
(Tuite et al., 2010b) 
b) Referenced/assumed values 
  
1. Pandemic H2N2 1957/H1N1 2009 Mean of 1.9 days with empirical distribution of 1 day 
(30%); 2 days (50%); 3 days (20%)  
(Chao et al., 2010) 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 (Exponential with a mean of 1.4 day)1; (Uniform with a 
range of 1±3 days)2 
(Boni et al., 2009)1; (Yang et al., 2009)2 
   
3. Mutant avian influenza A/H5N1  Mean of 1.9 days with empirical distribution of 1 day 
(30%); 2 days (50%); 3 days (20%)  
(Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2007) 
4. Pandemic influenza virus  Mean of 1.9 days and empirical distribution of 1 day 
(30%); 2 days (50%); 3 days (20%)  
(Longini et al., 2004, Longini et al., 2005, 
Germann et al., 2006, Colizza et al., 2007) 
5. Novel influenza virus Gamma with a mean of 1.9 days and coefficient of 
variation of 37.8% 
(Duerr et al., 2007a) 
6. Influenza viruses (Right-shifted Weibull with a fixed offset of 0.5 days, 
shape parameter of 2.21 (95% CI 1.36±3.37) and scale 
parameter of 1.10 (95% CI 0.83±1.42) giving a mean 
incubation period of 1.48 days and standard deviation 
of 0.47 days)1; (Mean of 1.9 days with empirical 
distribution of 1 day (30%); 2 days (50%); 3 days 
(20%)) 2  
(Ferguson et al., 2005)1; (Tsai et al., 2010)2  
2. Latent period 
a) Estimated values 1. Mutant influenza A/H5N1 Right-shifted Weibull with a fixed offset of 0.5 days 
(lower bound cut-off value), shape parameter of 2.24 
and scale parameter of 1.11  
(Ferguson et al., 2005) 
b) Referenced/assumed values 
  
1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 Exponential with a mean of 1.25 days with an offset of 
0.75 day (lower bound cut-off value) 
(Perlroth et al., 2010)  
2. Mutant influenza A/H5N1  Mean of 1.9 days and empirical distribution of 1 day 
(30%), 2 days (50%) and 3 days (20%) 
(Longini et al., 2004, Longini et al., 2005, Ohkusa 
and Sugawara, 2007) 
 




Table S6: (continued) 
Disease states Agent Distributions used Article 
b) Referenced/assumed values 3. Pandemic influenza virus (Exponential with a mean of 1.2 days with an offset of 
0.75 day)1; (Exponential with a mean of 1.4 days)2; (Right-
shifted Weibull with a fixed offset of 0.5 day (lower bound 
cut-off value), shape parameter of 2.24 and scale parameter 
of 1.11)3; (Weibull with a fixed offset of 0.5 day (lower 
bound cut-off value), shape parameter of 2.21 and variable 
scale parameter values selected based on the serial 
intervals (which in turn were randomly selected from a 
range between latent and infectious periods; 1.6±10 days)4; 
(Mean of 1.9 days with empirical distribution of 1 day 
(30%), 2 days (50%), 3 days(20%))5 
(Colizza et al., 2007)1; (van den Dool et 
al., 2008)2; (Wu et al., 2006)3; (Lessler et 
al., 2007)4; (Germann et al., 2006)5 
4. Seasonal influenza virus A & H1N1 
2009 
Exponential with a mean of 1.25 days with an offset of 
0.75 day (lower bound cut-off value) 
(Davey et al., 2008) 
3. Clinical infectious period 
  
b) Referenced/assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/ H1N1 1918 Exponential with a mean of 3 days (Davey and Glass, 2008) 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 (Exponential with mean of 3 days)1; (Gamma with mean 
varied from 3.8±5.5 days)2; (Log-normal with a mean of 
9.3 days and 95%CI 2.6±24.2)3; (Uniform with a range 3±7 
days)4. 
(Perlroth et al., 2010)1; (Boni et al., 
2009)2; (Tuite et al., 2010b)3; (Yang et 
al., 2009)4  
3. Mutant avian influenza A/H5N1 Mean of 4.1 days and empirical distribution of 3 days 
(30%), 4 days (40%), 5 days (20%), and 6 days (10%). 
(Halloran et al., 2002, Longini et al., 2004, 
Longini et al., 2005, Weycker et al., 
2005, Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2007) 
4. Pandemic influenza virus (Exponential with a mean of 3 days)1; (Log-normal with 
mean of log(-0.72 days and 95%CI -1.64± -0.09 days) and 
standard deviation of log(1.8 days with 95%CI 1.3±2.5 
days))2; (Mean of 4.1 days and empirical distribution of 3 
days (30%), 4 days (40%), 5 days (20%), 6 days (10%))3.  
(Colizza et al., 2007)1; (Ferguson et al., 
2005, Ciofi degli Atti et al., 2008)2; 
(Germann et al., 2006)3  
5. Novel influenza viruses  Gamma with a mean of 5 days and coefficient of variation 
of 33.3%. 
(Duerr et al., 2007a) 
6. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1 Log-normal with variable median values selected based on 
serial intervals (which in turn were randomly selected from 
a range between latent and infectious periods; 1.6±10 days) 
and a variance of 0.23. 
(Lessler et al., 2007) 
7. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 (Gama with a mean of 3.8 days and standard deviation of 2 
days, and infectious period truncated at 10 days)1; (Gamma 
with scale parameter of 2 and shape parameter of 2.05)2 




Table S6: (continued) 
Disease states Agent Distributions used Article 
b) Referenced/assumed values 8. Influenza viruses (Exponential with mean of 3 days)1; (Exponential with a 
mean of 1.4 days)2; (Mean of 4.1 days and empirical 
distribution of 3 days (30%), 4 days (40%), 5 days (20%), 
6 days (10%))3 
(Glass et al., 2006)1; (van den Dool et al., 
2008)2; (Halloran et al., 2002, Weycker 
et al., 2005, Tsai et al., 2010)3;  
B. Bird 
1. Latent period 
b) Referenced/assumed values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 (Latent period of 48 hours + Binomial(48, 0.25) where p = 
probability of remaining in the latent period)1; (Normal 
with a mean of 1.5 days and standard deviation of 1 day)2 
(Savill et al., 2006)1; (Sharkey et al., 
2008)2;  
2. Avian influenza A/H7N7  Gama with a mean of 0.5 per day and shape parameter of 
20  
(Bos et al., 2007) 
2. Subclinical infectious period 
b) Referenced/assumed values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 Subclinical infectious period of 24 hours + Binomial(24, 
0.25) where p = probability of remaining in this state. 
(Savill et al., 2006) 
3. Clinical infectious period 
b) Referenced/assumed values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 Binomial(96, 0.05) where p = probability of remaining in 
this state. 
(Savill et al., 2006) 
2. Avian influenza A/H7N7 (Gamma with a mean of 0.159 per day with a shape 
parameter of 20)1; (Exponential around a mean of 6.3 days 
with 95% CI 3.9±8.7 days)2 





Table S7: Summary of daily contact frequencies in human and animal populations either estimated from experimental and observational studies, or 
referenced or assumed for modeling along with list of articles and references. 
Species Contacts category Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range) 
Median of max. 
values (Range) 
Articles Reference sources 
1. Humans-humans A. Age  (Hens et al., 2009)1  
a) Estimated values  
  
1. <5 10.21 (7.65) - -   
2. 5-9 14.81 (10.09) - -   
3. 10±14 18.69 (13.4) - -   
4. 15±19 19.93 (21.14) - -   
5. 20±29 17.18 (25.72) - -   
6. 30±39 17.83 (21.68) - -   
7. 40±49 17.51 (23.29) - -   
8. 50±59 15.96 (20.84) - -   
9. 60±69 10.51 (14.47) - -   
10. 70+ 7.71 (10.97) - -   
B. Household (Hens et al., 2009) 1  
1. Household size 1 11.23 (18.26) - -   
2. Household size 2 13.32 (17.89) - -   
3. Household size 3 14.67 (16.44) - -   
4. Household size 4 17.71 (17.67) - -   
5. Household size 5 19.49 (29.12) - -   
6. Household size 6+ 19.3 (13.14) - -   
C. Students (Mikolajczyk et al., 2008) 1  
1. Students -classmates 38.4 - -   
2. Students ±non-classmates 14.8 - -   
b) Referenced values  A. Activity based (Nigmatulina and Larson, 
2009) 1 
(Fu, 2005, Wallinga 
et al., 2006, Fu, 
2007) 1 
1. Low activity 2.0 - -   
2. Medium activity 10.0 - -   
3. High activity  50.0 - -   
Age group (Davey and Glass, 2008) 1 (Glass and Glass, 
2008) 1 
1. Children (0±11 years) 14.0 (3.0±24.0) - -   
2. Teen (12±18 years) 4.0 (3.0±4.0) - -   
3. Adult (19±64 years) 6.0 (3.0 ± 13.0) - -   




Table S7: (continued) 
Species Contacts category Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range) 
Median of max. 
values (Range) 
Articles Reference sources 
b) Referenced values Community structure 
1. Community in general  16.0 (1.0±32.0) 5.0 (5.0 ± 14.0) 27.0 (24.0±50.0) (Duerr et al., 2007a, 
Eichner et al., 2007, 
Larson, 2007, Gojovic et 
al., 2009)1,2,3 
(Wallinga et al., 
2006) and calibrated 
1,2,3
 
2. Health care worker with 
coworkers  
2.0 (2.0±8.0) - - (Kitching et al., 2006, Lee 
et al., 2009b) 1 
Pilot studies done by 
MIDA1 
3. Health care worker with patients 30.0 - - (Kitching et al., 2006, Lee 
et al., 2009b) 1 
Pilot studies done by 
MIDA1 
 4. Student with classmates 14.0 (14.0±15.0) - - (Kitching et al., 2006, Lee 
et al., 2009b) 1 
Pilot studies done by 
MIDA1 
 5. Student with non-classmates 15.0 - - (Kitching et al., 2006, Lee 
et al., 2009b) 1 
Pilot studies done by 
MIDA1 
c) Assumed values A. Age group  
 1. Children (0-11 years) 6.0 - - (Glass et al., 2006) 1  
 B. Community structure 
 1. Community in general 1.0 (1.0±2.0) - 1.0 (Flahault et al., 1994, 
Glass et al., 2006) 1 
 
2. Bird - bird       
a) Estimated values 1. Maximum farms visited by feed 
lorry/trip 
- - 6.0 (Sharkey et al., 2008) 1  
b) Referenced values 1. Flock to flock contact rate/day  - 0.2 0.3 (Elbakidze, 2008) 1 (Office International 
des Epizooties 
(OIE), 2007) 1 
c) Assumed values  1. Inter-company contact /day 3.0 - - (Sharkey et al., 2008) 1  
 2. Maximum farms visited by 
slaughter lorry/day  
- - 4.0 (Sharkey et al., 2008) 1  
 
Note: (a) Estimated values are those estimated from empirical data of experimental or observational studies; (b) Referenced values refer to those values taken from other articles or 
sources; (c) Assumed values are values assumed based on expert opinion or unpublished data sources. Summary estimates are medians and ranges of means, medians, minimum 
and maximum values of two or more articles. Single value represented value from either one article or same value from two or more articles. Superscript numbers on articles and 




Table S86XPPDU\RIWUDQVPLVVLRQSUREDELOLW\SHUFRQWDFWRILQIOXHQ]DYLUXVHV¶LQIHFWLRQLQKXPDQDQGELUGSRSXODWLRQVHVWLPDWHGUHferenced or 
assumed for modeling. 
Transmission parameter Spread in species and agent Median of means 
(Range)  






Articles Reference sources 
A. Human-human (all contact types combined)    
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918 
0.51 - - (Duerr et al., 2007a, 
Massad et al., 2007, Nuño 
et al., 2007b)1 
 
2. Novel influenza viruses  0.24 (0.1±0.024) - - (Longini and Halloran, 
2005, Germann et al., 
2006, Ohkusa and 
Sugawara, 2007) 1 
 
3. Influenza viruses 0.24  0.39 0.78 (Tsai et al., 2010)1; 
(van den Dool et al., 
2008)2,3 
 
b) Referenced values  1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009 
0.0435 (0.00255±0.6) - - (Kitching et al., 2006, Lee 
et al., 2009b) 1 
(Longini et al., 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Longini et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Germann et al., 2006, 
Halloran et al., 2008) 1 
2. Novel influenza viruses - 0.55 (0.5±0.6) 0.7 (Duerr et al., 2007a, Nuño 
et al., 2007b)2,3 
 
3. Influenza viruses - 0.2503 (0.0006-0.5) 0.0012 (Eichner et al., 2007, Xu et 
al., 2007) 1 
(Stilianakis et al., 1998) 1 
B. Bird-bird       
c) Assumed values  
  
1. Avian influenza A/H5N1(within 
flock/day) 
0.5 - - (Sharkey et al., 2008) 1  
2. Avian influenza A/H5N1(per 
dangerous slaughterhouse 
contact) 
0.25 - - (Sharkey et al., 2008) 1  
 
Note: (a) Estimated values are those estimated from empirical data of experimental or observational studies; (b) Referenced values refer to those values taken from other articles or 
sources; (c) Assumed values are values assumed based on expert opinion or unpublished data sources. Summary estimates are medians and ranges of means, medians, minimum 
and maximum values of two or more articles. Single value represented value from either one article or same value from two or more articles. Superscript numbers on articles and 
reference sources correspond to columns of mean =1; minimum =2; and maximum = 3. 
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Table S9: Summary of transmission coefficients/rates of influenza viruses infection in human and animal populations either estimated from 
experimental and observational studies, referenced or assumed for modeling along with list of articles and references 
Transmission parameter Spread in species and agent Median of means 
(Range) 
Median of min. 
values (Range) 
Median of max. 
values (Range) 
Articles Reference sources 
I. Transmission coefficient/rate - per day   
A. Human-human (all contact types combined)    




0.00001 0.6 (Sypsa and Hatzakis, 2009, 
Sypsa et al., 2009)1,2,3 
 
2. Novel influenza viruses  0.00058 0.00029  0.00102  (Haber et al., 2007)1,2,3  
3. Influenza viruses - 0.000005 0.08 (Halloran et al., 2002)1,2,3  
b) Referenced values  1. Pandemic influenza A/ 
H2N2 1957  
0.0125 (0.00001±0.08) - - (Longini et al., 2004) 1 (Longini, 1988, 
Addy et al., 1991) 1 
c) Assumed values  1. Novel influenza viruses - 0.58 0.64 (Carrat et al., 2006a)2,3  
B. Bird - Bird 
a) Estimated values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 
(bird level) 
2.66 2.01 2.55  (Tiensin et al., 2007)1,2,3  
2. Avian influenza A/H5N1 
(flock level) 
0.66 0.5 0.87  (Tiensin et al., 2007)1,2,3  
3. Avian influenza A/H5N2 
(bird level) 
0.24 0.12 0.45  (van der Goot et al., 
2003#1502)1,2,3 
 
4. Avian influenza A/H7N7 
(bird level) 
33  -  (van der Goot et al., 2005) 1  
5. Avian influenza viruses 0.22 - 0.42 (van der Goot et al., 2003)1,3  
C. Zoonotic spread 
c) Assumed values 1. Novel influenza virus      
a) Bird ± human  0.012 - - (Arino et al., 2007) 1  
b) Human - human 0.03 - - (Arino et al., 2007) 1  
 
Note: (a) Estimated values are those estimated from empirical data of experimental or observational studies; (b) Referenced values refer to those values taken from other articles or 
sources; (c) Assumed values are values assumed based on expert opinion or unpublished data sources. Summary estimates are medians and ranges of means, medians, minimum 
and maximum values of two or more articles. Single value represented value from either one article or same value from two or more articles. Superscript numbers on articles and 





Table S9: (continued) 
Transmission parameter Spread in species and agent Median of means 
(Range) 
Median of min. 
values (Range) 
Median of max. 
values (Range) 
Articles Reference sources 
II. Transmission coefficient/rate - continuous time 
A. Human-human (all contact types combined) 
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009 
- 0.00001 0.0125 (Yasuda and Suzuki, 2009)2,3  
2. Influenza viruses 0.581 0.199 0.425 (Arino et al., 2008)1; 
(Shaban et al., 2009)2,3 
 
b) Referenced values 1. Novel influenza virus 0.00017   (Hsu and Shih, 2010) 1 (Ferguson et al., 
2005) 1 
C. Zoonotic spread 
1. Between bird-human 
c) Assumed values 1. Novel influenza virus      
a) Bird±bird 0.15 (0.1±0.2) - - (Iwami et al., 2007, Kim et 
al., 2010) 1 
 
b) Human ± human  0.0006 0.0015 0.0025 (0.002±
0.003)  
(Kim et al., 2010)1; (Iwami 
et al., 2007)2; (Iwami et al., 
2007, Kim et al., 2010)3 
 
2. Between animal -human 
c) Assumed values 1. Novel influenza virus    (Saenz et al., 2006) 1  
a) Swine-swine  0.2857 - -   
b) Swine-human 0.00123     
c) Human-human 0.3 - -   





Table S10: Summary of R0 and generation intervals of influenza viruses infection in human and animal populations estimated from experimental 




Spread type and agent Subject of 
interest 
Median of 

















A. Humans - humans        
a.1) Estimated 
values (with 95%CI) 
1(a). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918  
(using first 10 days outbreak data 
of spring wave of Geneva, 
Switzerland) 
Individual 1.6  
(1.5 ± 1.7) 
- - - (Chowell et al., 2007a)1  
1(b). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918 
 (using first 10 days outbreak data 
of autumn wave of Geneva, 
Switzerland) 
Individual 3.1  
(2.8 ± 1.7)  
- - - (Chowell et al., 2007a) 1  
1(c). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918  
 (using non-hospitalized and 
asymptomatic cases outbreak 
data of 1st phase/spring wave in 
Geneva, Switzerland) 
Individual 1.49  
(1.45 ± 1.53) 
- - - (Chowell et al., 2006a) 1  
1(d). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918 
 (using non-hospitalized and 
asymptomatic cases data of 2nd 
phase/autumn wave of Geneva, 
Switzerland) 
Individual 3.8  
(3.6 ± 3.9) 








Spread type and agent Subject of 
interest 
Median of 














 1(e). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918 
 (using early exponential growth 
phase of autumn wave daily 
case notification data of San 
Francisco, California) 
Individual 3.0  
(2.7 ± 3.3) 
- - - (Chowell et al., 2007b) 1  
1(f). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918 
 (using deterministic SIR 
compartmental model of daily 
case notification data of 
autumn wave of San Francisco, 
California) 
Individual 2.4  
(2.2 ± 2.6) 
- - - (Chowell et al., 2007b) 1  
a.1) Estimated 
values (with 95%CI) 
1(g). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918 
 (using complex SEIR model of 
daily case notification data of 
autumn wave of San Francisco, 
California) 
Individual 2.2  
(1.6 ± 2.1) 
- - - (Chowell et al., 2007b) 1  
1(h). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 1918 
 (using SIR Bayesian approach 
method of daily case 
notification data of autumn 
wave San Francisco, 
California) 
Individual 2.1  
(1.1 ± 3.0) 
- - - (Chowell et al., 2007b) 1  
1(i). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918 
 
Individual - 2.0  
(1.7 ± 2.3) 
- - (Mills et al., 2004) 1  
2(a). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
Individual 1.3  
(1.3 ± 1.4) 
- - - (Tuite et al., 2010b) 1  
2(b). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
Individual 1.4  
(1.4 ± 1.5) 










Spread type and agent Subject of 
interest 
Median of 















values (with 95%CI) 
 
2(c). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
 (using intrinsic growth rate and 
generation interval obtained 
from household studies) 
Individual 2.2  
(2.1 ± 2.4) 
- - - (Boëlle et al., 2009) 1  
2(d). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
 (using intrinsic growth rate and 
generation interval obtained 
from viral excretion of 
experimental influenza 
infection study) 
Individual 2.6  
(2.4 ± 2.8) 
- - - (Boëlle et al., 2009) 1  
2(e). Pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009 
 (using intrinsic growth rate and 
generation interval obtained 
from hypothetical distribution 
from Elveback et al., (2008)) 
Individual 3.1  
(2.9 ± 3.5) 
- - - (Boëlle et al., 2009) 1  
2(f). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009 
 (using real time estimation of 
averaging the number of 
secondary cases across all 
possible chains of 
transmissions of epidemic 
curve) 
Individual - 3.2  
(2.1 ± 4.0) 
- - (Boëlle et al., 2009) 1  
3. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1 Individual - 1.19  
(0.76 ± 1.86) 
- - (Chen and Liao, 2010)2   
4. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 Individual - 1.41  
(0.92 ± 2.19) 
- - (Chen and Liao, 2010)2  
5. Seasonal influenza viruses  Individual 1.3  
(1.2 ± 1.4) 








Spread type and agent Subject of 
interest 
Median of 















values (without 95% 
CI) 




- 1.32  
(1.2 ± 2.8) 
2.2  
(1.2 - 3.1) 
(Massad et al., 2007, 
Caley et al., 2008)1; 
(Sertsou et al., 2006, 
Andreasen et al., 2008, 
Caley et al., 2008, 
Chowell et al., 2008a, 
Rios-Doria and 
Chowell, 2009) 3,4 
 
2. Pandemic influenza A/ H3N2 
1968 
Individual   1.2 3.0 (Cooper et al., 2006) 3,4  
3. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009 
Individual 1.5 1.3  
(1.2 - 1.4) 
1.34  
(1.1 - 2.3) 
1.9  
(1.3 - 2.9) 
(Fraser et al., 2009) 1, 2 
(Fraser et al., 2009, 
White et al., 2009, Yang 
et al., 2009)3,4 
 




5. Pandemic influenza viruses Individual 2.1 - - - (Carrat et al., 2006a)1  
6. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1 Individual 1.1 1.2 - 1.4 (Lessler et al., 2007) 1,2,4  
7. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2  Individual 1.6  
(1.4 - 1.7) 
- 1.4  
(1.3 - 1.5) 
1.7  
(1.6 - 1.8) 
(Cauchemez et al., 
2008) 1, 3,4 
 
8. Influenza viruses  Individual  
(within-
household) 
2.3 - - - (Fraser, 2007)1  
9. Influenza viruses Household 
level 
2.0  
(1.2 - 5.9)  
- - - (Fraser, 2007, Shaban et 
al., 2009)1 
 
b) Referenced values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 
1957 
- 1.7  
(1.7 - 1.7) 
- - - (Longini et al., 2004, 
Arinaminpathy and 
McLean, 2009)1 
(Gani et al., 
2005) and 
Longini et al., 
2004 based on 
empirical data 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 
1957/ and A/H3N2 1968  






al., 2006) 1,2, 3,4 
 315 
 




Spread type and agent Subject of 
interest 
Median of 














b) Referenced values 3. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009  
Individual 1.5  
(1.3 - 1.8) 
- 1.3  
(1.2 - 1.6) 
2.0  
(1.3 - 2.2) 
(An der Heiden et al., 
2009, Gojovic et al., 
2009, Medlock and 
Meyers, 2009, Sypsa 
and Hatzakis, 2009, 
Sypsa et al., 2009, Tuite 
et al., 2009, Yang et al., 
2009, Tuite et al., 
2010a)1; 
 
(Kitching et al., 2006, 
An der Heiden et al., 
2009, Boni et al., 2009, 
Flahault et al., 2009, 
Medlock and Meyers, 
2009, Yang et al., 2009, 
Perlroth et al., 2010, 
Tuite et al., 2010a) 3,4 
(Fraser et al., 
2009, Yang et 
al., 2009) and 
calibrated1;  
(Mills et al., 
2004, Glass et 
al., 2006, 
Boëlle et al., 
2009, Fraser et 
al., 2009, 
Nishiura et al., 
2009, Yang et 
al., 2009) and 
calibrated for 
Tuite et al 
2010a)3,4 
4. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 
1957/ and pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 2009  
Individual - 1.6 1.2 2.0 (Chao et al., 2010)2,3,4 Calibrated 
from 
secondary 
attack rate and 
illness attack 












Spread type and agent Subject of 
interest 
Median of 











Article Source Reference 
sources 
b) Referenced values 5. Mutant influenza A/H5N1 Individual 1.5  
(1.1 ± 2.0) 
- 1.6  
(1.5 ± 1.6) 
2.4  
(2.4 ± 2.5) 
 
(Iwami et al., 2007, 
Milne et al., 2009)1; 
 
(Milne et al., 2009, 
Ohkusa and Sugawara, 
2009) 3,4 
((Ferguson et al., 
2005, Caley et 
al., 2008) and 




(Longini et al., 
1988, Ferguson 
et al., 2005, 
Longini and 
Halloran, 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 
2006, Germann 
et al., 2006, 
Glass et al., 
2006, Caley et 
al., 2008, Davey 
et al., 2008, Dubé 








Spread type and agent Subject of 
interest 
Median of 











Article Source Reference 
sources 
b) Referenced values 6. Pandemic influenza viruses  - 1.9  
(1.5 ± 2.5) 
2.1  
(1.9 - 2.1) 
1.4 
(1.0 - 1.6) 
2.4  
(1.4 ± 3.0) 
(Germann et al., 2006, 
Wu et al., 2006, Colizza 
et al., 2007, Duerr et al., 
2007a, Nuño et al., 
2007a, Roberts et al., 
2007, Rizzo et al., 2008, 
Lunelli et al., 2009)1 
(Germann et al., 2006, 
Colizza et al., 2007, 
Nuño et al., 2007a)2 
(Germann et al., 2006, 
Wu et al., 2006, Colizza 
et al., 2007, Nuño et al., 
2007a, Roberts et al., 
2007, Ciofi degli Atti et 
al., 2008, Gumel et al., 
2008, Rizzo et al., 2008, 
Basta et al., 2009, 
Lunelli et al., 2009, 
Wein and Atkinson, 
2009) 3,4 
(Glezen, 1996, 
Longini et al., 
2004, Mills et al., 
2004, Ferguson et 
al., 2005, Gani et 
al., 2005, Chowell 
et al., 2006b, 
Ferguson et al., 
2006, Chowell et 
al., 2007a, 
Chowell et al., 
2007b, Chowell et 
al., 2008a)1; 
(Glezen, 1996, 
Longini et al., 
2004, Mills et al., 
2004, Ferguson et 
al., 2005, Gani et 
al., 2005, Chowell 
et al., 2006b, 
Ferguson et al., 
2006, Chowell et 
al., 2007a, 
Chowell et al., 
2007b, Chowell et 








Spread type and agent Subject of 
interest 
Median of 














b) Referenced values 7. Novel influenza  - 1.8  
(1.2 ± 3.8) 
- 1.4  
(0.3 ± 1.4) 
2.0  
(2.0 ± 3.3) 
(Grais et al., 2003, Gani 
et al., 2005, Flahault et 
al., 2006, Hollingsworth 
et al., 2006, Saenz et al., 
2006, Epstein et al., 
2007, Hsu and Shih, 
2010)1; 
 
(Gani et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Flahault et al., 2006, 
Epstein et al., 2007, 
Nuño et al., 2008)3,4 
(Burnett and 
White, 1974, 




Antia et al., 
2003, Mills et 
al., 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 
2005, Longini et 
al., 2005)1; 
(Rvachev L and 
IM., 1985, 
Longini et al., 
2004, Mills et 
al., 2004, 
Chowell et al., 
2007b)3,4 
8. Seasonal influenza/pandemic 
influenza A/H1N1 1918 
- 2.0 - - - (Davey et al., 2008)1 (Mills et al., 
2004, Glass et 
al., 2006) 1 
9. Seasonal influenza/pandemic 
influenza A/H2N2 1957  









Spread type and agent Subject of 
interest 
Median of 











Article Source Reference 
sources 
b) Referenced values 10. Influenza viruses  Individual 1.9  
(1.2 - 2.5) 
2.27  
(2.1 ± 2.4) 
1.37  
(1.3 ± 1.6) 
2.4  
(1.4 -2.73) 
(Grais et al., 2004, 
Eichner et al., 2007, 
Vardavas et al., 
2007, Brauer, 2008, 
Tsai et al., 2010)1; 
(Brauer, 2008, Tsai 
et al., 2010)2 
(Brauer, 2008, Tuite 
et al., 2009, Tsai et 
al., 2010) 3,4 
(Longini et al., 
1988, Flahault et 
al., 1994, Longini 
et al., 2004, Mills 
et al., 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 
2005, Ferguson et 
al., 2006, Chowell 
et al., 2007b, 





c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H3N2 
1968  
Individual - 2.5 1.5 3.5 (Glass and Barnes, 
2007) 2, 3,4 
 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009  




3. Pandemic influenza viruses Individual 1.9 1.4  1.4  
(1.1 - 1.5) 
2.0  
(1.7 - 3.5) 
(Balcan et al., 
2009)1; (Ajelli and 
Merler, 2008)2; 
(Gardam et al., 
2007, Wood et al., 
2007, Ajelli and 
Merler, 2008, 




4. Novel influenza virus Individual - - 1.1 2.4 (Longini et al., 
2005) 3,4 
 
5. Seasonal influenza/ and 
pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918 




6. Influenza viruses  Individual  2.0  1.5 3.0 (Hartvigsen et al., 









Spread type and agent Subject of 
interest 












Article Source Reference 
sources 
a.1) Estimated 
values (without 95% 
CI) 
B. Bird - bird 




(2.0 ± 2.6) 
- - - (Tiensin et al., 
2007)1 
 




(2.0 ± 3.5) 









(0.0 ± 2.4) 
- - - (van der Goot et al., 
2003) 1 
 





(0.0 ± 2.3) 




values (without 95% 
CI) 
1(a). Avian influenza A/H5N1 Between village 
level 
2.5  
(2.2 ± 2.7) 
 2.0 2.1 (Ward et al., 2009)3 (Two R0means 
were estimated by 













1(b). Avian influenza A/H5N1 Individual 
(within cage) 
 - 25.0 66.0 (Savill et al., 
2006)3,4 
Lower and upper 
ranged are for 
caged and floor 
reared birds 


























Article Source Reference 
sources 
a.2) Estimated 
values (without 95% 
CI) 
3(a). Avian influenza A/H7N7 Individual level   1.3 - (van der Goot et al., 2005) 3  
3(b). Avian influenza A/H7N7 Between farm 3.3  
(1.3 - 5.2) 
 3.6  
(3.1 ± 4.0) 
6.7 
(6.5 ± 6.9) 
(Le Menach et al., 2006, 
Bavinck et al., 2009)1; 
(Stegeman et al., 2004, Le 
Menach et al., 2006)3,4 
 
b) Referenced values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 Individual - - 25.0 66.0 (Sharkey et al., 2008) 3,4 (Savill et al., 2006) 3,4 
2. Avian influenza A/H7N7 Individual - 5.0  0.8 6.5 (Iwami et al., 2009)2, 3,4 (Stegeman et al., 
2004) 2, 3,4 
c) Assumed values  Zoonotic spread 
a. Human - human 
1. Mutant influenza A/H5N1 Individual - - 2.0  
(0.6 ± 3.5) 
4.1  
(1.1 ± 7.1) 
(Iwami et al., 2007, Kim et 
al., 2010) 3,4 
 
b. Swine - swine 
1. Novel influenza virus Individual 2.0 - - - (Saenz et al., 2006)1  
c. Bird-bird 
1. Mutant influenza A/H5N1 Individual 1.1 - 0.4  
(0.1 ± 0.8) 
1.8  
(1.1 - 2.5) 
(Iwami et al., 2007, Kim et 
al., 2010) 1, 3,4 
Derived from 
transmission rates 1, 3,4 
2. Generation 
intervals (day) 
A. Human- human   -     
a) Estimated values 
 
1. Pandemic influenza A/ H1N1 1918 Individual 2.6 -   (Caley et al., 2008)1  
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 Individual 3.5 - 2.6  
(2.2 ± 4.0) 
2.9  
(2.3 ± 5.0) 
(Yang et al., 2009)1; 
(White et al., 2009, Yang et 
al., 2009, Tuite et al., 
2010b)3,4 
 
3. Pandemic influenza viruses Individual 2.4 - 1.0 3.9 (Carrat et al., 2006a)1,3,4  
4. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1 Individual 2.1  
(1.9 ± 2.3) 
- 1.6  
(1.5 ± 1.6) 
3.3  
(2.7 ± 3.8) 
(Canadian Food Inspection 

























Article Source Reference 
sources 
a) Estimated values 
 
5. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 Individual 3.1 - 2.2 4.0 (Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency)1,2, 3 
 
6. Influenza viruses Individual 3.5  
(3.4 ± 3.6) 
- 2.9 4.3 (Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency, 
Cowling et al., 2009)1; 
(Cowling et al., 2009)3,4 
 
b) Referenced values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 Individual - - 2.6 4.0 (Andreasen et al., 
2008)2,3 
(Mills et al., 2004, 
Longini et al., 2005, 
Feighner et al., 
2009)2,3  
2. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 1957/ and 
pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 
Individual 3.4 - - - (Chao et al., 2010)1 (Cowling et al., 2009, 
Yang et al., 2009)1; 
3. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 Individual 3.1  
(1.9 ± 4.6) 
- 1.6  
(1.0 ± 6.6) 
5.0  
(2.7 ± 3.8) 
(Boëlle et al., 2009, 
Flahault et al., 2009, 
Fraser et al., 2009)1,2,3 
(Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency, 
Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Dubé et al., 2008, 
Ansart et al., 2009, 
Boëlle et al., 2009, 
Fraser et al., 2009)1,2,3 
4. Mutant H5N1 Individual 2.7  
(2.6 ± 2.9) 
- 2.5  
(2.1 ± 3.0) 
2.9  
(2.7 ± 3.0) 
(Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Milne et al., 2009)1,2,3 
((Fox et al., 1982) and 
adjusted from Ro by 
Milne et al., 2009)1,2,3 
5. Pandemic influenza virus Individual 2.9  
(2.6 ± 3.2) 
- 2.6 3.8 (Wu et al., 2006, Ciofi 
degli Atti et al., 2008)1; 
(Wu et al., 2006)3,4 
(Ferguson et al., 
2006)1,3,4 
6. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 Individual 2.4 - - - (Cauchemez et al., 
2008)1; 









Spread type and agent Subject of 
interest 
Median of 














b) Referenced values 7. Influenza viruses Individual 2.8 -   (Fraser, 2007, van den 
Dool et al., 2008)1 





c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918 
 6.0 - 3 6.0 (Chowell et al., 2007b)1;  







2. Pandemic influenza A/H3N2 
1968 
Individual 3.9  
(3.5 ± 4.2) 
-   (Cooper et al., 2006, 




3. Pandemic influenza viruses Individual  - 2.8  4.0 (Wood et al., 2007) 3,4  
4. Novel influenza virus Individual 2.6 -   (Ferguson et al., 2006, 




Note: (a) Estimated values are those estimated from empirical data of experimental or observational studies; (b) Referenced values refer to those values taken from other articles or 
sources; (c) Assumed values are values assumed based on expert opinion or unpublished data sources. Summary estimates are medians and ranges of means, medians, minimum 
and maximum values of two or more articles. Single value represented value from either one article or same value from two or more articles. Superscript numbers on articles and 





Table S11: Summary of intervention parameters either estimated from experimental and observational studies, referenced or assumed for modeling 
influenza infection in human and bird populations along with list of articles and references. 
Intervention type  Parameter  Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range)  
Median of max. 
values (Range)  
Articles References 
I. Human    
A. Antiviral treatment AV 
a) Estimated values 1. AV efficacy (%) - 70.0 75.5 (61.0±90.0) (Lipsitch et al., 2003)2;  
(Hayden and Aoki, 1999b, Lipsitch et al., 
2003)3 
 
b) Referenced values 1. AV efficacy (%) - 30.0 (28.0±30.0) 70.0 (30.0±100) (Longini et al., 2004, Carrat et al., 2006a, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, Nuño et al., 2007a, Ciofi 
degli Atti et al., 2008, Davey and Glass, 2008, 
Gumel et al., 2008, Rizzo et al., 2008, Sypsa et 
al., 2009, Perlroth et al., 2010)2; 
 
(Longini et al., 2004, Gani et al., 2005, Carrat 
et al., 2006a, Ferguson et al., 2006, Flahault et 
al., 2006, Germann et al., 2006, Gardam et al., 
2007, Nuño et al., 2007a, Roberts et al., 2007, 
Ciofi degli Atti et al., 2008, Davey and Glass, 
2008, Gumel et al., 2008, Rizzo et al., 2008, 
Sypsa et al., 2009, Chao et al., 2010, Perlroth 
et al., 2010, Tsai et al., 2010)3 
 
(Meat and Livestock 
Australia, Galbraith et al., 
1969, Hayden et al., 2000, 
Welliver et al., 2001, 
Halloran et al., 2002, 
Lipsitch et al., 2003, Hayden 
et al., 2004, Longini et al., 
2004, Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Longini et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006)2; 
(Meat and Livestock 
Australia, Hayden and Aoki, 
1999b, Hayden et al., 2000, 
Welliver et al., 2001, 
Lipsitch et al., 2003, Stiver, 
2003, Hayden et al., 2004, 
Trapman et al., 2004, 
Ferguson et al., 2005, Gani 
et al., 2005, Longini and 
Halloran, 2005, Ferguson et 
al., 2006, Jefferson et al., 
2006, Yang et al., 2007, 




Table S11: (continued) 
Intervention type  Parameter  Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range)  
Median of max. 
values (Range)  
Articles References 
b) Referenced values 2. Reduction in 
infectiousness (%) 
- 30.0 62.0 (28.0±80.0) (Nuño et al., 2007a, Gumel et al., 
2008)2; 
(Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 
2005, Carrat et al., 2006a, Ferguson et 
al., 2006, Flahault et al., 2006, 
Germann et al., 2006, Colizza et al., 
2007, Duerr et al., 2007b, Gardam et 
al., 2007, Nuño et al., 2007a, Roberts 
et al., 2007, Ciofi degli Atti et al., 
2008, Davey and Glass, 2008, Gumel 
et al., 2008, Sypsa et al., 2009, Chao et 
al., 2010, Perlroth et al., 2010, Tsai et 
al., 2010)3 
 
(Harper et al., 2004, Longini et 
al., 2004)2;(Meat and Livestock 
Australia, Hayden and Aoki, 
1999b, Hayden et al., 2000, 
Welliver et al., 2001, Halloran et 
al., 2002, Harper et al., 2004, 
Longini et al., 2004, Ferguson et 
al., 2005, Gani et al., 2005, 
Longini et al., 2005, Ferguson et 
al., 2006, Jefferson et al., 2006, 
Yang Y et al., 2006, Yang et al., 
2007)2,3 
3. Reduction in 
susceptibility (%) 
- 30.0 (25.0±30.0) 35.0 (30.0±90.0) (Doyle et al., 2006, Flahault et al., 
2006, Germann et al., 2006, Gardam et 
al., 2007, Nuño et al., 2007a, Xu et al., 
2007, Gumel et al., 2008, Rizzo et al., 
2008, Tsai et al., 2010)2; 
(Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 
2005, Carrat et al., 2006a, Doyle et al., 
2006, Flahault et al., 2006, Gardam et 
al., 2007, Nuño et al., 2007a, Xu et al., 
2007, Ciofi degli Atti et al., 2008, 
Davey and Glass, 2008, Gumel et al., 
2008, Rizzo et al., 2008, Sypsa et al., 
2009, Chao et al., 2010, Perlroth et al., 
2010)3 
 
(Meat and Livestock Australia, 
Gross et al., 1995, Stilianakis et 
al., 1998, Hayden and Aoki, 
1999b, Hayden et al., 2000, 
Welliver et al., 2001, Fock et al., 
2002, Kawai et al., 2003, Lipsitch 
et al., 2003, Hayden et al., 2004, 
Longini et al., 2004, Gani et al., 
2005, Longini et al., 2005, 
Jefferson et al., 2006, Yang et al., 
2007)2; (Meat and Livestock 
Australia, Gross et al., 1995, 
Stilianakis et al., 1998, Hayden 
and Aoki, 1999b, Hayden et al., 
2000, Fock et al., 2002, Kawai et 
al., 2003, Lipsitch et al., 2003, 
Hayden et al., 2004, Longini et 
al., 2004, Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Gani et al., 2005, Longini et al., 
2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, 





Table S11: (continued) 
Intervention type  Parameter  Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range)  
Median of max. 
values (Range)  
Articles References 
b) Referenced values 4. AV coverage (%) - 50.0 (0.0±60.0) 90.0 (50.0 ± 
100) 
(Nuño et al., 2007a, Davey and Glass, 
2008, Gumel et al., 2008, An der 
Heiden et al., 2009, Perlroth et al., 
2010)2; 
(Ferguson et al., 2005, Wu et al., 2006, 
Nuño et al., 2007a, Xu et al., 2007, 
Davey and Glass, 2008, Gumel et al., 
2008, An der Heiden et al., 2009, 
Gojovic et al., 2009, Perlroth et al., 
2010)3 
 
(Stilianakis et al., 1998, Meltzer 
et al., 1999, Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Gani et al., 2005, Ferguson et al., 
2006)2, 3 
 
5. AV treatment 
duration (day) 
- 10.0 (5.0±10.0) 10.0 (5.0±10.0) (Carrat et al., 2006a, Germann et al., 
2006, Ciofi degli Atti et al., 2008, 
Davey and Glass, 2008, Halloran et al., 
2008, Sypsa et al., 2009, Perlroth et al., 
2010, Tsai et al., 2010)2,3 
(Meat and Livestock Australia, 
Hayden and Aoki, 1999b, Hayden 
et al., 2000, Welliver et al., 2001, 
Halloran et al., 2002, Longini et 
al., 2004, Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, Germann et 
al., 2006, Yang et al., 2007)2,3 
6. AV use compliance 
(%) 
- 48.0 (5.0 ± 90) 90.0 (Sypsa et al., 2009, Chao et al., 2010)2; 
(Sypsa et al., 2009)3 
(Longini et al., 2004, Germann et 
al., 2006, Halloran et al., 2008)2; 
(Germann et al., 2006, Halloran 
et al., 2008)3 
c) Assumed values 1. AV efficacy (%) - 50.0 30 (30.0±100) (Gojovic et al., 2009)2; 
(Doyle et al., 2006, Wu et al., 2006, 
Duerr et al., 2007b, Das et al., 2008, 
Arinaminpathy and McLean, 2009, 




2. Reduction in 
infectiousness (%) 
- - 62.0 (30.0±
100.0)  
(Gani et al., 2005, Wu et al., 2006, 
Duerr et al., 2007b, Das et al., 2008, 
Yasuda and Suzuki, 2009)3 
 
3. Reduction in 
susceptibility (%) 
- - 30 (30.0±100) (Ferguson et al., 2006, Wu et al., 2006, 
Duerr et al., 2007b, Das et al., 2008, 





Table S11: (continued) 
Intervention type  Parameter  Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range)  
Median of max. 
values (Range)  
Articles References 
c) Assumed values 4. AV coverage (%) - 50.0 (2.0±80.0) 100.0 (6.0±100) (Gani et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, Carrat 
et al., 2006a, Ferguson et al., 2006, Germann 
et al., 2006, Colizza et al., 2007, Duerr et al., 
2007a, Gardam et al., 2007, Ciofi degli Atti et 
al., 2008, Rizzo et al., 2008, Arinaminpathy 
and McLean, 2009, Yasuda and Suzuki, 2009, 
Tsai et al., 2010)2; 
 
(Gani et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2005, Carrat 
et al., 2006a, Doyle et al., 2006, Ferguson et 
al., 2006, Germann et al., 2006, Colizza et al., 
2007, Duerr et al., 2007a, Eichner et al., 2007, 
Gardam et al., 2007, Roberts et al., 2007, 
Arinaminpathy and McLean, 2008b, Ciofi 
degli Atti et al., 2008, Halloran et al., 2008, 
Rizzo et al., 2008, Sypsa et al., 2009, Yasuda 
and Suzuki, 2009, Chao et al., 2010, Tsai et al., 
2010)3 
 
Coverage of 2% (lowest 
minimum value) and 6% 
(lowest max. value) are 
global coverage % (Colizza 
et al., 2007)2,3 
5. AV treatment 
duration (day) 
- 7.5 (5 - 10) 5.0 (Longini et al., 2004, Ferguson et al., 2005, 
Gani et al., 2005, Doyle et al., 2006, Ferguson 
et al., 2006, Wu et al., 2006, Duerr et al., 
2007b, Gojovic et al., 2009, Chao et al., 
2010)2,3 
 
6. AV use compliance 
(%) 
- 5.0 100 (80.0±100) (Longini et al., 2004, Doyle et al., 2006, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, Wu et al., 2006, Duerr et 
al., 2007b, Davey and Glass, 2008, Halloran et 






Table S11: (continued) 
Intervention type  Parameter  Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range)  
Median of max. 
values (Range)  
Articles References 
B. Vaccination 1.       
a) Estimated values 2. Vaccine efficacy 
(%) 
- 38.75 (19.0±58.5) 57.5 (47.0±68.0) (Vu et al., 2002, Hayden et al., 2004)2,3  
b) Referenced values 1. Vaccine efficacy 
(%) 
- 40.0 (20.0±70.0) 73.0 (30.0±100) (Longini et al., 2004, Bansal et al., 2006, 
Doyle et al., 2006, Nuño et al., 2007a, Ciofi 
degli Atti et al., 2008, Gumel et al., 2008, van 
den Dool et al., 2008, Gojovic et al., 2009, 
Milne et al., 2009, Sypsa and Hatzakis, 2009, 
Tuite et al., 2009, Yang et al., 2009, Tuite et 
al., 2010a)2; 
 
(Longini et al., 2004, Longini et al., 2005, 
Bansal et al., 2006, Doyle et al., 2006, 
Kitching et al., 2006, Nuño et al., 2007a, Ciofi 
degli Atti et al., 2008, Gumel et al., 2008, van 
den Dool et al., 2008, Gojovic et al., 2009, 
Milne et al., 2009, Sypsa et al., 2009, Tuite et 
al., 2009, Yang et al., 2009, Chao et al., 2010, 
Tuite et al., 2010a)3 
 
(Gross et al., 1995, Belshe et 
al., 1998, Halloran et al., 
1999, Hayden and Aoki, 
1999b, Belshe et al., 2000, 
Longini et al., 2000, 
Welliver et al., 2001, Fock et 
al., 2002, Halloran et al., 
2002, Vu et al., 2002, Kawai 
et al., 2003, Lipsitch et al., 
2003, Demicheli et al., 
2004, Harper et al., 2004 
{Fiore, 2008 #1582 , 
Hayden et al., 2004, Longini 
et al., 2004, Zangwill and 
Belshe, 2004, Jefferson et 
al., 2005, Bansal et al., 
2006, Goodwin et al., 2006, 
Rivetti et al., 2006, Smith, 
2006, Yang et al., 2007, 
Basta et al., 2008, Fiore et 




Table S11: (continued) 
Intervention type  Parameter  Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range)  
Median of max. 
values (Range)  
Articles References 
b) Referenced values 2. Reduction in 
infectiousness (%) 
- 30.0 (20.0±50.0) 70.0 (40.0±90.0) (Bansal et al., 2006, Nuño et al., 2007a, Gumel 
et al., 2008, Basta et al., 2009, Gojovic et al., 
2009, Sypsa and Hatzakis, 2009, Tuite et al., 
2010a)2; 
 
(Longini et al., 2005, Bansal et al., 2006, Nuño 
et al., 2007a, Gumel et al., 2008, Basta et al., 
2009, Gojovic et al., 2009, Sypsa et al., 2009, 
Chao et al., 2010, Tuite et al., 2010a)3 
(Halloran et al., 1999, Vu et 
al., 2002, Harper et al., 
2004, Longini et al., 2004, 
Jefferson et al., 2005, Bansal 
et al., 2006, Goodwin et al., 
2006, Basta et al., 2008, 
Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), 
2009)2; 
(Halloran et al., 1999, 
Hayden and Aoki, 1999b, 
Hayden et al., 2000, 
Welliver et al., 2001, Vu et 
al., 2002, Harper et al., 
2004, Longini et al., 2004, 
Jefferson et al., 2005, Bansal 
et al., 2006, Goodwin et al., 
2006, Yang et al., 2007, 
Basta et al., 2008, Centers 
for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), 2009)3 
3. Vaccine immune 
delay (days) 
- 7.0 42.0 (Milne et al., 2009)2,3 (Bresson et al., 2006, 
Leroux-Roels et al., 2007) 2,3 
4. Vaccination 
coverage (%) 
60.0 (50.0±60.0) 25.5 (18.0±26.0) 87.5 (69.0±
100.0) 
(Vardavas et al., 2007, Ciofi degli Atti et al., 
2008, Rizzo et al., 2008, van den Dool et al., 
2008)1; 
(van den Dool et al., 2008, Tuite et al., 2009, 
Tuite et al., 2010a)2;  
(Germann et al., 2006, van den Dool et al., 
2008, Tuite et al., 2009, Tsai et al., 2010, Tuite 
et al., 2010a)3 
(Hayward et al., 2006) and 
the govt. report1; 
(Hayward et al., 2006, 
Kwong et al., 2008, Moran 
et al., 2009)2; 
(Kwong et al., 2008, Moran 





Table S11: (continued) 
Intervention type  Parameter  Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range)  
Median of max. 
values (Range)  
Articles References 
c) Assumed values 1. Vaccine efficacy 
(%) 
- 30.0 (5.0±50.0) 70.0 (30.0±100) (Weycker et al., 2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Germann et al., 2006, Rizzo et al., 2008, Basta 
et al., 2009, Lunelli et al., 2009, Medlock and 
Meyers, 2009, Yasuda and Suzuki, 2009, Tsai 
et al., 2010)2; 
(Halloran et al., 2002, Weycker et al., 2005, 
Carrat et al., 2006a, Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Flahault et al., 2006, Germann et al., 2006, 
Glass and Barnes, 2007, Hartvigsen et al., 
2007, Vardavas et al., 2007, Das et al., 2008, 
Davey and Glass, 2008, Rizzo et al., 2008, 
Basta et al., 2009, Lunelli et al., 2009, 
Medlock and Meyers, 2009, Shaban et al., 
2009, Yasuda and Suzuki, 2009, Perlroth et al., 
2010, Tsai et al., 2010)3 
 
2. Reduction in 
infectiousness (%) 
- 50.0 (30.0±50.0) 80.0 (40.0±100) (Halloran et al., 2002, Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Germann et al., 2006, Glass and Barnes, 2007, 
Hartvigsen et al., 2007, Vardavas et al., 2007, 
Das et al., 2008, Shaban et al., 2009, Tsai et 
al., 2010)2,3; 
 
3. Vaccine immune 
delay (days) 
 15.0 (0.0±15.0) 14.0 (0.0±14.0) (Carrat et al., 2006a, Nuño et al., 2007a, Ciofi 
degli Atti et al., 2008, Rizzo et al., 2008)2; 
(Ferguson et al., 2006, Kitching et al., 2006, 
Vardavas et al., 2007, van den Dool et al., 





Table S11: (continued) 
Intervention type  Parameter  Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range)  
Median of max. 
values (Range)  
Articles References 
c) Assumed values 4. Vaccination 
coverage (%) 
50.0 (30.0±50.0) 20.0 (0.0±50.0) 75.0 (7.0±100) (Longini et al., 2004, Flahault et al., 2006, 
Kitching et al., 2006, Basta et al., 2009, 
Flahault et al., 2009, Gojovic et al., 2009, Yang 
et al., 2009)1; 
(Halloran et al., 2002, Longini et al., 2004, 
Longini et al., 2005, Weycker et al., 2005, 
Bansal et al., 2006, Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Kitching et al., 2006, Epstein et al., 2007, 
Hartvigsen et al., 2007, Basta et al., 2009, 
Flahault et al., 2009, Gojovic et al., 2009, 
Milne et al., 2009, Yang et al., 2009)2; 
(Halloran et al., 2002, Longini et al., 2004, 
Longini et al., 2005, Weycker et al., 2005, 
Bansal et al., 2006, Carrat et al., 2006a, Doyle 
et al., 2006, Ferguson et al., 2006, Kitching et 
al., 2006, Epstein et al., 2007, Glass and 
Barnes, 2007, Hartvigsen et al., 2007, Davey 
and Glass, 2008, Basta et al., 2009, Flahault et 
al., 2009, Gojovic et al., 2009, Milne et al., 
2009, Shaban et al., 2009, Sypsa and Hatzakis, 
2009, Yang et al., 2009, Yasuda and Suzuki, 






Table S11: (continued) 
Intervention type  Parameter  Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range)  
Median of max. 
values (Range)  
Articles References 
C. School closure 
c) Assumed values 1. School closure 
contact reduction 
(%) 
75.0 (50.0 ± 80.0) 31.5 (30.0 ± 33.0) 100 (70.0±100) (Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2007, Rizzo et al., 
2008, Lunelli et al., 2009)1; 
(Lunelli et al., 2009, Yasuda and Suzuki, 
2009)2; 
(Haber et al., 2007, Ciofi degli Atti et al., 
2008, Davey and Glass, 2008, Lunelli et al., 
2009, Sypsa and Hatzakis, 2009, Yasuda and 
Suzuki, 2009, Perlroth et al., 2010)3 
 
c) Assumed values 2. School closure 
duration (days) 
14.0 (7.0 ± 28.0) 7.0 (7.0±60.0) 25.0 (7.0±300.0) (Haber et al., 2007, Gojovic et al., 2009, 
Lunelli et al., 2009)1; 
(Haber et al., 2007, Gojovic et al., 2009, Lee et 
al., 2009b, Lunelli et al., 2009, Chao et al., 
2010)2; 
(Haber et al., 2007, Roberts et al., 2007, Rizzo 
et al., 2008, Gojovic et al., 2009, Lee et al., 
2009b, Lunelli et al., 2009, Yasuda and Suzuki, 
2009)3 
 
3. School closure 
delay (days) 
- 0.0±14.0  7.0 (0.0± 56.0) (Germann et al., 2006, Ohkusa and Sugawara, 
2007, Cauchemez et al., 2008, Rizzo et al., 
2008, Gojovic et al., 2009, Yasuda and Suzuki, 
2009, Tsai et al., 2010)2; 
(Ferguson et al., 2006, Haber et al., 2007, 
Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2007, Ciofi degli Atti 
et al., 2008, Rizzo et al., 2008, Lee et al., 





Table S11: (continued) 
Intervention type  Parameter  Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. 
values (Range)  
Median of max. 
values (Range)  
Articles References 
C. Quarantine 
c) Assumed values 1. Quarantine contact 
reduction (%) 
50.0 55.0 (40.0±60.0) 85.0 (30.0±100) (Nuño et al., 2007a)1; (Ohkusa and Sugawara, 
2007, Davey and Glass, 2008, An der Heiden 
et al., 2009, Perlroth et al., 2010)2; 
(Sattenspiel and Herring, 2003, Longini et al., 
2005, Wu et al., 2006, Duerr et al., 2007b, 
Ohkusa and Sugawara, 2007, Roberts et al., 
2007, Davey and Glass, 2008, An der Heiden 





10.0 (2.0±10.0) 1.0  7.0 (3.0±21.0) (Haber et al., 2007, Davey and Glass, 2008, 
Perlroth et al., 2010)1; 
(Haber et al., 2007)2; 
(Ferguson et al., 2005, Carrat et al., 2006a, 
Ferguson et al., 2006, Wu et al., 2006, Haber et 
al., 2007, Roberts et al., 2007, Das et al., 2008, 
Halloran et al., 2008, Chao et al., 2010)3 
 
II. Birds 
C. Quarantine       
c) Assumed values 1. Quarantine period 
(days) 
21.0±31.0 - - (Sharkey et al., 2008)1  
 
Note: (a) Estimated values are those estimated from empirical data of experimental or observational studies; (b) Referenced values refer to those values taken from other articles or 
sources; (c) Assumed values are values assumed based on expert opinion or unpublished data sources. Summary estimates are medians and ranges of means, medians, minimum 
and maximum values of two or more articles. Single value represented value from either one article or same value from two or more articles. Superscript numbers on articles and 
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